[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-13202 APRIL 1, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-00448-JOF-ECS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JESUS VARGAS-CALDERON,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(April 1, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jesus Vargas-Calderon appeals his 70-month sentence imposed after he
pleaded guilty to being a previously deported alien who unlawfully re-entered the
United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2). On appeal, Vargas-
Calderon argues his sentence is excessive and unreasonable in light of both the
record and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. He asserts his sentence fails to
account for the mitigating aspects of his history and personal characteristics.
Specifically, Vargas-Calderon contends his sentence is unreasonable because six
of his twelve criminal history points were attributable to crimes he committed
when he was seventeen, thus his sentence was unduly influenced by his youthful
indiscretions.
We review sentences for reasonableness, using an abuse-of-discretion
standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).
When evaluating the “substantive reasonableness” of a sentence, we consider the
totality of the circumstances. Id. On appeal, the party challenging the sentence
bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable. United States v.
Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). We determine whether
the sentence is substantively reasonable based on the factors in section 3553(a),
and we ordinarily expect a within-guidelines sentence to be reasonable. Id. We
will only vacate a sentence if we determine that “after giving a full measure of
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deference to the sentencing judge, that the sentence imposed truly is
unreasonable.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1191 (11th Cir. 2010) (en
banc), petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3361 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2010) (No. 10-
727).
The parties dispute the applicable guidelines range—the government argues
the 70 month sentence is a below-guidelines variance, and Vargas-Calderon
argues it is at the low-end of the applicable guidelines range. Either way, Vargas-
Calderon’s sentence is substantively reasonable. First, Vargas-Calderon’s
sentence was well below the statutory maximum of 20 years. See, e.g., United
States v. Valnor, 451 F.3d 744, 751–52 (11th Cir. 2006) (upholding a sentence as
reasonable in part because it was “appreciably below” the statutory maximum).
Second, the sentence correctly reflects Vargas-Calderon’s multiple illegal re-
entries into the United States and his multiple convictions for driving under the
influence. The district court considered Vargas-Calderon’s arguments regarding
his age and work history in fashioning the sentence. Vargas-Calderon has not met
his burden to show that the district court abused its discretion, so we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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