NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-4038
___________
DARIN LEE HAUMAN,
Appellant
v.
*SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS; FREDERICK ROSEMEYER,
Superintendent; FRED A. BEERS, Fire and Safety
Manager of SCI-LH; GAIL BEERS, Mail Room
Supervisor of SCI-LH; DAN BUCK, Boiler Plant
Manager of SCI-LH; JOE HILLEGAS, Heating, Ventilation
and Air Conditioning Instructor of SCI-LH; MARDIANN
HUNSBERGER, Superintendent, SCI-LH; JAMES
KREUTZBERGER, Facility Maintenance Manager of SCI-LH;
JAMES PHILLIPPI, Education Department Head of SCI-LH
(*Pursuant to Rule 43©, Fed. R. App. P.)
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 05-cv-00439)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 25, 2011
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 4, 2011)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Darin Lee Hauman appeals from the final order of the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania concerning his civil rights complaint. The
proceedings in this matter have been lengthy. Because the parties are familiar with the
background, we will present only a summary. In 2005, Hauman commenced a pro se
civil rights action against several prison officials and employees at SCI-Laurel Highlands
(“the prison”) at Somerset, Pennsylvania, where Hauman is an inmate. He alleged that
the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by exposing him to various
environmental dangers, including toxic coal smoke emitted from the prison’s coal-fired
boiler plant that infiltrates the prison’s indoor air, environmental or second hand tobacco
smoke (“ETS”) from prisoners who smoke on prison grounds, and friable asbestos
stemming from exposure on a work assignment where asbestos was present and disturbed
in his presence.1 Hauman contended that on numerous dates, especially in 2005, he
suffered shortness of breath and dizziness, and that his health has been negatively
affected by the prison environment. Hauman sought compensatory and punitive
damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
Hauman filed a motion for appointment of counsel, which was denied without
discussion. The case proceeded to discovery. Hauman filed several unsuccessful
discovery-related motions, including a motion to compel. The Magistrate Judge denied
the motion without discussion. Hauman appealed the order to the District Court, and the
1
Hauman also listed other environmental dangers in his complaint. He also raised First
Amendment violations.
2
District Court reversed the ruling as it pertained to Hauman’s requested discovery of his
medical records. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and responses.
In February 2008, the Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation that
summary judgment be granted in the defendants’ favor on all claims except for the claim
for injunctive relief based on the allegations of deliberate indifference to exposure to
friable asbestos. Hauman filed objections. By order entered March 26, 2008, the District
Court adopted the report and recommendation and granted summary judgment to the
defendants except for the single claim for injunctive relief; that claim was set to proceed
to a non-jury trial.
Hauman then sought leave to file an amended complaint to commence a class
action and again sought the appointment of counsel. The Magistrate Judge denied these
motions. In April 2008, Hauman filed a motion to appoint an expert for his remaining
claim for injunctive relief on the friable asbestos claim, which the Magistrate Judge
denied. On appeal of that denial, the District Court remanded the issue for consideration
under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Magistrate Judge again denied the
motion, and the District Court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion by the Magistrate
Judge. In the interim, Hauman also filed objections to the denial of his counsel motion,
and the District Court ruled that the Magistrate Judge’s order was not clearly erroneous.
Hauman filed a third counsel motion, which again was denied without discussion but
with direction to the Clerk of the District Court to mark any subsequent counsel motions
as denied upon receipt.
The Magistrate Judge then conducted a site visit to the prison with the parties.
3
After that visit, on September 3, 2009, the Magistrate Judge issued a report and
recommendation that judgment be entered in Hauman’s favor on his remaining claim for
injunctive relief. The Magistrate Judge noted that the only remaining issue for trial
would be whether Hauman could prove exposure to asbestos and whether the defendants
were deliberately indifferent to any need for medical monitoring, and that the defendants
had advised during the site visit that they were willing to place Hauman in the same
medical monitoring program used for the individuals who were potentially affected by a
documented release of friable asbestos at the prison in April 2006. But the Magistrate
Judge reasoned that the proposed relief remedied any possible claim for injunctive relief.
Hauman filed objections. The District Court adopted the report and recommendation and
entered judgment in Hauman’s favor on the remaining claim for injunctive relief,
directing that Hauman be included in the same medical monitoring program used by the
Department of Corrections for monitoring individuals exposed to friable asbestos. In its
order, the District Court noted that its order of injunctive relief was enforceable against
the defendants. The District Court later denied Hauman’s motion to alter or amend the
order.
This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and exercise plenary review over the District Court=s decision to grant summary
judgment. McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005). Summary judgment
is appropriate when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (amended Dec. 1, 2010). A court reviewing a summary judgment
4
motion must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref.
Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1995). However, a party opposing summary judgment
“must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to
show the existence of a genuine issue.” Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594
(3d Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Hauman’s appeal focuses on his Eighth Amendment claims with respect to
exposure to coal smoke, ETS, and asbestos. At issue is whether the defendants knew of
and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to Hauman. See Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). We first turn to the District Court’s entry of judgment on
Hauman’s claims for damages. The record includes the documentation of Hauman’s
respiratory condition during the relevant period. Not noted in the Magistrate Judge’s
report, but conceded by the defendants in their motion for summary judgment, was that
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a notice of violation
based on particulate matter emissions from the prison’s coal-fired boiler plant, and that
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania paid a civil penalty in settlement of this violation of
the Clean Air Act. The defendants also acknowledged that asbestos or asbestos-
containing materials are present at the prison, and that there was an incident in April 2006
involving a release of friable asbestos, though Hauman does not allege that he was
directly exposed during that particular event.2 Hauman responded to the defendants’
motion for summary judgment with affidavits and additional supporting evidence of his
2
Hauman claims that he was potentially harmed when the inmates directly involved in
5
respiratory ailments and diagnoses.
The Magistrate Judge considered the evidence and stated that, accepting the
evidence in the light most favorable to Hauman, a reasonable fact finder would have
insufficient evidence to determine whether Hauman was or was not directly exposed to
friable asbestos during the May 2005 work assignment or by second-hand contact after
the April 2006 release of friable asbestos. However, the Magistrate Judge recommended
that summary judgment be granted in the defendants’ favor based on the lack of expert
evidence to show that Hauman’s respiratory conditions were caused by or were
aggravated by any of the environmental conditions of the prison, and that Hauman’s lack
of expert proof is fatal to his ability to prevail at trial. We are troubled by this result,
given that the Magistrate Judge had earlier denied Hauman’s motion for appointment of
counsel without comment and without acknowledging any need for expert evidence. See
Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 504-05 (3d Cir. 2002). As we stated in
Montgomery, although appointed counsel might still have difficulty in obtaining and
affording an expert, counsel would have much better opportunity to do so than would an
indigent prisoner. See id. at 505. The Magistrate Judge anticipated an objection
regarding the lack of expert evidence (and Hauman did indeed object on this basis), and
so the Magistrate Judge noted that the court had no authority to appoint an expert on
Hauman’s behalf. (Feb. 22, 2008 Report and Recommendation at 8 n.3, citing Boring v.
Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 474 (3d Cir. 1987).) In addition, the Magistrate Judge noted
that Federal Rule of Evidence 706 allows a court to appoint its own impartial expert, but
the April 2006 event returned to the housing unit, bringing the asbestos fibers with them.
6
not to appoint an expert on Hauman’s behalf. One could infer from the Magistrate
Judge’s report, and from his later orders in the case, that he would never entertain a
party’s motion for appointment of a court-appointed expert under Rule 706 because such
an appointment, in his view, always would be viewed as an abdication from his role as a
neutral tribunal. (See id., Sept. 16, 2008 order, Oct. 3, 2008 order.) However, the rule
itself contemplates that a court may appoint an expert on its own motion or on the motion
of any party. Viewing the Magistrate Judge’s analysis in the context of the proceedings
in this case, 3 it would seem that no indigent pro se prisoner with a similar claim could
ever defeat a summary judgment motion.
The Magistrate Judge also determined that the defendants were entitled to
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Specifically, the Magistrate
Judge concluded that Hauman failed to overcome a qualified immunity defense because
he produced no evidence that the defendants knowingly or recklessly exposed him to
dangerous levels of asbestos.4 As Hauman argues in his brief, it is the defendants’
burden to establish their entitlement to qualified immunity. See Oatess v. Sobolevitch,
914 F.2d 428, 431 n.8 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussing qualified immunity as an affirmative
defense that a defendant must plead and prove, not for a plaintiff to disprove, in the
3
As we noted earlier, the Magistrate Judge denied Hauman’s counsel motion at the
outset, without consideration of the factors under Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-58
(3d Cir. 1993). The record reflects that Hauman may have encountered difficulty in
obtaining the discovery necessary to his case. For example, he succeeded in obtaining
access to his own medical records only after intervention by the District Court. Even
after Hauman’s claim for injunctive relief survived summary judgment, the Magistrate
Judge entered an order preemptively denying any further counsel motions by Hauman.
4
The Magistrate Judge discussed qualified immunity concerning Hauman’s asbestos
claim, but also appears to have applied the same reasoning to the other environmental
7
context of a dismissal prior to service). The defendants here did not seek summary
judgment on that basis. To the extent that the Magistrate Judge placed the burden on
Hauman to disprove the availability of qualified immunity, the burden was unfairly
placed.
We add that Hauman raises several arguments that pertain to the District Court’s
order entering judgment in his favor on his claim for injunctive relief. We do not address
this order because Hauman received a favorable disposition and therefore is not
“aggrieved” in such a way that the order is appealable by him. See, e.g., Solar Turbines
Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, 1078 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989); Watson v. City of Newark, 746 F.2d
1008, 1010-11 (3d Cir. 1984).
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s March 26, 2008
order to the extent that it granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and will
remand the matter for further proceedings.
claims.
8