UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4760
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TRAVIS MARCUS LOCK,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
District Judge. (3:02-cr-00009-FDW-1)
Submitted: March 31, 2011 Decided: April 5, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard M. Thompson, COULTER & THOMPSON, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United
States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Travis Marcus Lock appeals the sixty-month sentence of
imprisonment imposed by the district court upon revocation of
supervised release. Lock admitted the eight violations alleged
in the petition on supervised release. On appeal, Lock’s
counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), asserting, in his opinion, there are no
meritorious issues for appeal. Counsel questions whether the
district court abused its discretion in sentencing Lock to sixty
months in prison when his original term of supervised release
was thirty-six months, but concludes that because Lock was
convicted of a class A felony (possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking offense), 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3) (2006) authorized the maximum sixty-month term of
imprisonment. Lock was informed of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but has not done so. The Government
declined to file a brief.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range, and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). Here, the prescribed
statutory maximum term for Lock’s revocation sentence was five
years’ imprisonment because the offense that resulted in his
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supervised release term was a class A felony. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3).
We must next determine if the sixty-month sentence was
plainly unreasonable. To determine if a sentence is plainly
unreasonable, we must first consider whether the sentence
imposed is unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438. In making
this determination, we follow “the procedural and substantive
considerations that we employ in our review of original
sentences.” Id. In this inquiry, we take a more deferential
posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion
than reasonableness review of Guidelines sentences. United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if
we find the sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable,
must we decide whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657.
While a district court must consider Chapter Seven’s
policy statements and the statutory provisions applicable to
revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006),
the district court need not robotically tick through every
subsection, and it has broad discretion to revoke the previous
sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory
maximum provided by § 3583(e)(3). Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656-57;
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. Moreover, while a district court must
provide a statement of the reasons for the sentence imposed, the
court “need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
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revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-
conviction sentence.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544,
547 (4th Cir. 2010). After reviewing the record, we conclude
that the sixty-month sentence imposed by the district court was
within the prescribed statutory range and not unreasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Lock in writing of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Lock requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Lock. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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