UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4893
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PHILIP MURPH, a/k/a Phil, a/k/a Phillip Murph, a/k/a Philip
Murphy,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (7:94-cr-00036-BR-2)
Submitted: March 31, 2011 Decided: April 5, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Philip Murph was placed on supervised release
following his release from imprisonment for federal drug
distribution crimes. Murph’s supervised release was revoked
after he was again convicted for federal drug distribution
violations; he was sentenced to thirty months of imprisonment
for violating his supervised release. On appeal, Murph argues
that his sentence is unreasonable because the court failed to
explain why it denied his request to have the sentence imposed
run concurrently with the federal sentence he was then serving.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a
sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first consider whether the
sentence imposed is unreasonable. Id. at 438. In making this
determination, we follow “the procedural and substantive
considerations that we employ in our review of original
sentences.” Id. at 438. In this inquiry, we take a more
deferential posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise
of discretion than reasonableness review of Guidelines
sentences. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th
Cir. 2007). Only if we find the sentence procedurally or
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substantively unreasonable, must we decide whether it is
“plainly” so. Id. at 657.
While a district court must consider Chapter Seven’s
policy statements and the statutory provisions applicable to
revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (West
2000 & Supp. 2010), the district court need not robotically tick
through every subsection, and it has broad discretion to revoke
the previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to
the statutory maximum provided by § 3583(e)(3). Moulden, 478
F.3d at 656-57 (4th Cir. 2007); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
Moreover, while a district court must provide a statement of the
reasons for the sentence imposed, the court “need not be as
detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it
must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence.” United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010); see
United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 938 (4th Cir. 2010) (a
properly preserved objection to an inadequate explanation is
reviewed for harmless error).
Here, prior to imposing sentence, the district court
listened to arguments from both parties, heard from Murph
himself, and stated that it had considered the relevant Chapter
Seven policy statements in the Sentencing Guidelines, and the
§ 3553(a) factors applicable to revocation sentences. Moreover,
although Murph sought a concurrent sentence, the Government
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informed the court that any term of imprisonment for a violation
of supervised release must be imposed to run consecutively to
any term of imprisonment then being served by a defendant under
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.3(f), p.s. (2009). See
id. (stating “[a]ny term of imprisonment imposed upon the
revocation of supervised release shall be ordered to be served
consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that the defendant
is serving”). Under these circumstances, we do not find that
the district court’s failure to grant Murph’s request for a
concurrent sentence was plainly unreasonable. Moulden, 478 F.3d
at 656; Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439-40.
Accordingly, we affirm Murph’s thirty-month sentence.
We dispense with oral argument as the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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