UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4538
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
GERALD GARDNER,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:09-cr-00619-JFM-1)
Submitted: March 21, 2011 Decided: April 7, 2011
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Melissa M. Phinn, LAW OFFICE OF MELISSA PHINN, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Thiruvendran Vignarajah, Assistant United States
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gerald Gardner pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to one count of possession with the intent to
distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)
(West 2006 & Supp. 2010), and was sentenced to 180 months’
imprisonment. In the plea agreement, Gardner reserved the right
to challenge the district court’s denial of the motion to
suppress evidence seized from his vehicle. Gardner contends on
appeal that the district court erred in denying the motion to
suppress. We affirm.
In reviewing the district court’s denial of Gardner’s
suppression motion, we review the court’s factual findings for
clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v.
Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1104 (2010). Because the district court denied
Gardner’s motion, we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government. United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d
210, 217 (4th Cir. 2008). We also defer to the district court’s
credibility determinations. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d
210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008).
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the
people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This guarantee requires that
“searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an
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independent judicial officer.” California v. Carney, 471 U.S.
386, 390 (1985). There are, however, “a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions” to this general
rule. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
With these standards in mind, and having reviewed the
transcript of the suppression hearing and the parties’ briefs,
we conclude that the district court did not err in denying
Gardner’s motion to suppress. The record amply supports the
district court’s finding that a law enforcement officer asked
Gardner for consent to search his vehicle and that Gardner
voluntarily consented to the search. See Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 227 (1973) (recognizing that
consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that
voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the
circumstances); United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650
(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (listing factors appropriate for
consideration in reviewing whether consent was voluntarily
given). *
*
Because we conclude that the evidence permitted the
district court to conclude that Gardner voluntarily consented to
the search of his vehicle, we need not evaluate whether the
officers involved also possessed probable cause to conduct the
search.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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