Coates v. Powell

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
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No. 10-1639
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Crystal Coates, *
*
Plaintiff-Appellant, *
*
v. * Appeal from the United States
* District Court for the
Derrick Powell, in his official and * Western District of Missouri.
individual capacity; Jeff Glandon, *
in his official and individual capacity; *
James Keathley, Superintendent of the *
Missouri State Highway Patrol, in his *
official capacity, *
*
Defendants-Appellees. *
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Submitted: September 20, 2010
Filed: April 8, 2011
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Before GRUENDER, BRIGHT, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
___________

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Crystal Coates brought suit against Missouri State Highway
Patrolman Derrick Powell, City of New Franklin Police Officer Jeff Glandon, and
others, alleging § 1983 constitutional claims and state tort claims for events that
occurred during the course of an investigation concerning alleged child neglect by
Crystal Coates. Coates settled her claims against Powell and several other defendants
and the district court1, in a separate order, denied her request for attorney’s fees under
42 U.S.C. § 1988.2 The district court also granted Glandon summary judgment on the
basis of qualified immunity. Coates v. Powell, 650 F.Supp.2d 932, 941 (W.D. Mo.
2009). Coates appeals these adverse determinations.

We affirm, concluding (1) the private settlement agreement between Ms. Coates
and Powell did not make Coates a prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees under
federal law, and (2) the district court properly determined that Glandon was entitled
to qualified immunity for his Fourth Amendment violation in remaining in Coates’s
home without consent for ten to fifteen minutes. The district court found that it was
not clearly established that he was required to immediately leave her home under the
circumstances in this case.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 5, 2006, the Missouri Department of Social Services received a call
that Coates’s children were playing outside the home unattended. This prompted an
investigation by Tiffany Clevenger, a Children’s Social Worker with the Children’s
Division of the Missouri Department of Social Services. On the next day, Clevenger
contacted local law enforcement offices and requested that Officer Glandon
accompany her to investigate the call, as provided for in Missouri statutes.3 Trooper

1
The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri.
2
Although the claim for fees was brought under section 1988, the discussion on
fees would encompass any claims under section 1983.
3
The district court quoted and cited the statutory provisions applicable which
we repeat in this footnote. Missouri Revised Statute Section 210.145.4 provides that
the Children’s Division of the Missouri Department of Social Services:

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Powell was present at the time and volunteered to assist Clevenger and Officer
Glandon in the investigation.

The three proceeded to Coates’s house, arriving at approximately 10:00 in the
morning. They possessed no warrant to enter Coates’s house and believed the
children were at school. Once there, Coates’s boyfriend consented to their entry into
the house. Coates awoke from her sleep and, after some heated discussion with the
officers, she told the officers to “get the ---- out of my house.” During this time,
Coates attempted to get up from a couch where she was seated, but Powell touched
her at least twice, forcing her back into the couch. However, at no time did Officer
Glandon touch Coates. The officers remained in the house for another ten to fifteen
minutes at which time Clevenger directed that they leave and all three left the house.

After the investigators left the house, Coates also left her home, got in her car,
and drove off to pick up her daughter from school. The officers stayed outside
Coates’s home until she returned, at which time Powell asked Coates for her driver’s
license, intending to cite her for improperly displaying a license plate and not wearing
a seatbelt. Coates refused to sign the citations and told Powell to “haul her in.”
Powell arrested her, and in handcuffing her, applied a “CLAMP” maneuver during
which he broke her arm. He then called for medical assistance. Coates did not believe

shall contact the appropriate law enforcement agency
immediately upon receipt of a report which [Children's
Division] personnel determine merits an investigation and
provide such agency with a detailed description of the
report received. In such cases the local division office shall
request the assistance of the local law enforcement agency
in all aspects of the investigation of the complaint.

Section 210.145.4 also states that “[t]he appropriate law enforcement agency shall .
. . assist the division in the investigation.” Id.

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Powell intended to break her arm. The application of the CLAMP maneuver took
only a couple of seconds.

Coates subsequently filed state law tort claims and claims for deprivation of her
civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the two officers, Clevenger, Powell’s
supervisor (James Keathley), and the City of New Franklin. In December 2009, after
Powell and several other defendants settled with Coates on the eve of trial, Coates
moved for attorney’s fees against these parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. On January
25, 2010, the district court determined from the record that the private settlement
agreement did not make Coates a “prevailing party” entitled to attorney’s fees. Coates
v. Powell, 2010 WL 376995 (W.D. Mo. 2010).

As for Glandon, in July 2009, the district court granted him qualified immunity
against Coates’s § 1983 claims. Coates, 650 F.Supp.2d at 941. The court determined
that Glandon violated the Fourth Amendment when he refused to leave Coates’s
home. Nevertheless, the court granted Glandon qualified immunity, finding that the
law did not clearly establish “at the time of this incident that an officer was required
to leave a private home in the middle of a child neglect investigation.” Id. at 938-39.4
This timely appeal followed.

4
The court primarily relied on Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) and
Gates v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Reg. Servs., 537 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2008).
Although dicta in Georgia states that “[n]o question has been raised, or reasonably
could be, about the authority of the police to enter a dwelling to protect a resident
from domestic violence,” Georgia expressly disclaimed the effect of its holding on
domestic victims. 547 U.S. at 118. (“[T]his case has no bearing on the capacity of the
police to protect domestic victims.”). Id. The dicta in Georgia focused on the need
to protect a person present in the home who was in danger of abuse. As for Gates, we
believe it is not determinative because it considered the law before the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). Accordingly, these
cases are not determinative here.

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 II. DISCUSSION

A. Attorney’s fees

Coates challenges the district court’s determination that she was not a
prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. We review de
novo whether a litigant is a prevailing party. Advantage Media, LLC v. City of
Hopkins, 511 F.3d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 2008).

A “prevailing party” is one that obtains a judicially sanctioned, material
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc.
v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 601 (2001).
Examples include enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent
decrees. Id. at 604. We have stated that Buckhannon “implied [that] a party that
obtains a mere private settlement does not qualify [as a prevailing party], because
‘private settlements do not entail the judicial approval and oversight involved in
consent decrees.’” Bill M. v. Nebraska Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 570 F.3d
1001, 1003 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 n.7).

Shortly after Buckhannon, we examined whether a private settlement between
a class of prisoners and a training school rendered the class of prisoners a prevailing
party. Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990, 991-92 (8th Cir. 2003). Although
the district court in that case approved the settlement agreement as “fair, reasonable,
and adequate” under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this exercise
failed to impose the necessary imprimatur on the agreement. Id. Nor was the district
court’s retention of enforcement jurisdiction alone sufficient to establish judicial
imprimatur. Id. We held that the private settlement agreement did not serve as a
consent decree and therefore the inmate class was not a prevailing party. Id. at 993-
94.

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 Recently, in Bill M., we affirmed the denial of prevailing party status where the
parties reached an oral settlement agreement that the district court directed be reduced
to writing. Id. at 1001-02. In that case, the district court made no determination of
whether the agreement was “good or bad or fair or unfair,” nor did it incorporate the
terms of the agreement into its order of dismissal or otherwise retain jurisdiction to
enforce the settlement agreement. Id. at 1003-04. Consequently, we determined that
“the parties’ settlement does not entail the judicial approval and oversight required for
a judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.” Id. at 1004
(quotations and citations omitted). We held that the settlement lacked “the necessary
judicial imprimatur” to confer prevailing party status upon the plaintiffs. Id.

We conclude this line of cases forecloses Coates from obtaining attorney’s fees
as a prevailing party. Shortly before trial, Powell (and others) offered to settle for
$45,000. The entirety of the offer states, “This letter is to formalize the settlement
offer on behalf of the State of Missouri. We are willing to pay your client $45,000.00
in settlement of all claims between Plaintiff and the Defendants.” Jt. App. at 750. On
the eve of trial, Coates responded to the offer via email: “We’ve reviewed the
$45,000 settlement offer you faxed on Friday and my client has accepted your terms.”
Jt. App. at 751. The parties did not otherwise execute a formal written settlement
contract. The district court did not incorporate the agreement into a settlement decree
or into the order for dismissal and expressly stated that it would not incorporate the
terms of the settlement into its judgment or retain jurisdiction over enforcement of the
contract.

Here, the district court took no action judicially sanctioning or materially
altering the legal relationship of the parties. The court did not approve a settlement,
nor enter a judgment on the merits or a consent decree. There is no judicial
imprimatur on the settlement which could give rise to prevailing party status.
Accordingly, we hold that Coates is not entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §
1988.

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 B. Qualified Immunity

Coates contends the district court erred in holding that Glandon did not violate
her clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by remaining in her home after she
revoked the consent given by her boyfriend.5 Coates argues that “black letter law”
establishes that intrusions into the home, absent a warrant, exigent circumstances, or
consent of an apparently authorized party are presumed unreasonable.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party presents no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Seymour v. City of Des
Moines, 519 F.3d 790, 796 (8th Cir. 2008). We review de novo summary judgment
where granted on the basis of qualified immunity. Omni Behavioral Health v. Miller,
285 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 2002).

“[Q]ualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v.
Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982)). We may first determine whether the officer’s conduct violated a
constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part by
Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 818 (holding Saucier’s two-step sequence is not mandatory).

5
Coates does not appear to challenge the district court’s rulings with respect to
her excessive force or state law tort claims against Glandon. We deem these issues
waived. See Milligan v. City of Red Oak, Iowa, 230 F.3d 355, 360 (8th Cir. 2000)
(holding appellant waived issues not supported with argument and legal authority);
Bechtold v. City of Rosemount, 104 F.3d 1062, 1068 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Generally, we
will consider an issue not raised or briefed in this court waived.”). Additionally, we
note that Coates frames her qualified immunity challenge as against Glandon and
Powell. But she settled “all claims” against Powell. Consequently, we need not
review the district court’s qualified immunity determination regarding Powell.

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If so, we next consider whether that right was clearly established at the time of the
misconduct. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02.

As to the first inquiry, the district court concluded that Glandon violated the
Fourth Amendment when he refused to leave Coates’s home, explaining:

The undisputed facts indicate that there [was no threat to the
Coates children] confronting Officer Glandon. While there is evidence
of a hotline call, the only descriptions of the hotline call indicate that it
was a report of children playing outside unattended. . . . [T]here was no
urgency in the conduct of that investigation . . . .The parties agree that,
at the time Coates revoked consent, the officers knew that the children
were not in the home. . . . The officers apparently did not believe Coates
herself to be a danger to the children . . . [And] do not argue that
Coates’s agitation alone created exigent circumstances independently
allowing the officers to remain in the house. . . . They could have
attempted to obtain a warrant. They did not. The officers raise no
argument that they left Coates’s house within a reasonable time of being
ordered to leave: there is evidence that they did not leave for more than
ten minutes after consent was revoked, and only upon Clevenger’s
request. They were in violation of the Fourth Amendment when they
remained in the house for an unreasonable time after consent was
revoked.

Coates, 650 F.Supp.2d at 939-40.

On appeal, neither Coates nor Glandon challenge the court’s determination that
Glandon’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we turn to the
second inquiry of qualified immunity analysis.

“In determining whether the legal right at issue is clearly established, this
circuit applies a flexible standard, requiring some, but not precise factual
correspondence with precedent, and demanding that officials apply general, well-
developed legal principles.” J.H.H. v. O’Hara, 878 F.2d 240, 243 (8th Cir. 1989)

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(quotation omitted). This is a “fact-intensive inquiry and must be undertaken in light
of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Samuelson v.
City of New Ulm, 455 F.3d 871, 875 (8th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). We assess
the “objective reasonableness of the action . . . in light of clearly established law and
the information the searching officers possessed.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 641 (1987) (stating an officer’s “subjective beliefs about the search are
irrelevant”). As we explained in Omni, “the contours of the right must be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.” 285 F.3d at 653. Accordingly, we frame the clearly established question as
whether a reasonable police officer would have known that he violated clearly
established Fourth Amendment law by remaining in Coates’s home for ten to fifteen
minutes when the officer was accompanying a social services worker investigating a
complaint of child neglect as authorized by state statute. We affirm the grant of
qualified immunity.

We have stated that qualified immunity “protects public officials who act in
good faith while performing discretionary duties that they are obliged to undertake.”
Kloch v. Kohl, 545 F.3d 603, 609 (8th Cir. 2008). In that case, we held the Nebraska
Attorney General’s obligation to enforce the laws of his state entitled him to qualified
immunity, even though the law was of arguable constitutional validity. Id. Likewise,
the Ninth Circuit has held that an officer who acts in reliance on a duly-enacted statute
is ordinarily entitled to qualified immunity, unless the statute is “obviously”
unconstitutional. Humphries v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1202 (9th Cir.
2009), as amended by 547 F.3d 1117. And the Tenth Circuit has observed that
“reli[ance] on a state statute, regulation, or official policy that explicitly sanctioned
the conduct in question” is a relevant factor in considering the objective legal
reasonableness of a state official’s action. Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d
1230, 1251-52 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding reliance on a state statute did not authorize
removal of children absent pre-deprivation procedures).

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 Here, Glandon undertook an obligation under Missouri law to assist Clevenger
in the investigation relating to Coates’s children.6 Although Coates ordered the
officers out of the house, she did not address Clevenger in that request.7 Clevenger
remained inside the house, attempting to continue the investigation. We believe that
a reasonable police officer could act in good faith and remain in the house still
assisting Clevenger. Glandon did exactly that in this case. He (and Powell)
immediately left the house when Ms. Clevenger told them to leave.

For these reasons, we agree with the finding of the district court “that Glandon
is entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time of
this incident that an officer was required to leave a private home in the middle of a
child neglect investigation.” Coates, 650 F.Supp.2d at 938-39. That precisely was the
situation here.

For the above reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the § 1983 claim against
Officer Glandon on the basis of his receiving qualified immunity. Thus, we affirm on
the issues presented on this appeal.

6
We note that Missouri law describes the contours of the investigation as
follows: “The investigation shall include but not be limited to the nature, extent, and
cause of the abuse or neglect; the identity and age of the person responsible for the
abuse or neglect; . . . any indication of incidents of physical violence . . . and other
pertinent data.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 210.145.7.
7
Had Coates ordered Clevenger to leave, the qualified immunity analysis may
be different because in that instance, Glandon could not reasonably rely on his
statutory duty to assist Clevenger because Clevenger would have had no right to
remain in Coates’s home.

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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur with the majority’s conclusion that Coates was not a prevailing party
entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. I part ways with the majority,
however, over its decision to grant qualified immunity to Glandon.

I am deeply concerned about the Fourth Amendment violation at issue in this
case. Respect for the sanctity of the home “has been embedded in our traditions since
the origins of the Republic.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980). The
Supreme Court is crystal clear that without a warrant, an officer cannot enter a home
absent exigent circumstances. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-12
(1981). Because Glandon did not have a warrant and there were no exigent
circumstances, Glandon could only enter the home with Coates’s voluntary consent,
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006), and he remained in the home subject
to her approval, United States v. McMullin, 576 F.3d 810, 815 (8th Cir. 2009).
Although a report of child abuse is a serious allegation, by the time Glandon was
asked to leave the home, Glandon knew there was no immediate danger to the
children. Accordingly, Glandon violated Coates’s Fourth Amendment rights when he
did not leave her home at her request.

A finding of a Fourth Amendment violation does not end the analysis, and I
agree with the majority that the crux of the qualified immunity question is whether a
reasonable officer would have understood that remaining in Coates’s home without
her permission violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law. But I disagree
with the majority’s conclusion that despite the longstanding Fourth Amendment
prohibition, Glandon acted reasonably because of the obligations imposed on officers
under the Missouri statute at issue. Because I believe the Missouri statute did not
make Glandon’s actions objectively reasonable, I respectfully dissent.

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 The qualified immunity inquiry turns on the “objective legal reasonableness of
the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time
it was taken.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999) (internal quotations
omitted). “[T]he existence of a statute or ordinance authorizing particular conduct is
a factor which militates in favor of the conclusion that a reasonable official would find
that conduct constitutional.” Roska, 328 F.3d at 1252 (quoting Grossman v. City of
Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir. 1994)). Police officers are entitled to rely on
the assumption that the legislature considered the views of legal counsel and
concluded that the statute is constitutional. Id. at 1252 n.29 (quoting Grossman, 33
F.3d at 1209). The existence of an authorizing statute, however, does not make an
officer’s actions per se reasonable. Denton v. Rievley, 353 F. App’x 1, 6 (6th Cir.
2009); Roska, 328 F.3d at 1252; Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1209-10.

Whether a statute makes an officer’s actions reasonable depends in part on “the
degree of specificity with which the statute authorized the conduct in question.”
Roska, 328 F.3d at 1253. For example, in Denton, the Sixth Circuit found that a state
statute indicating a preference for arrest where there is probable cause of domestic
abuse was insufficiently specific to make the officer’s arrest of a person inside his
home without a warrant objectively reasonable. 353 F. App’x at 6-7. Because the
state statute did not require warrantless arrests and was silent as to whether the
preference for arrest applied to warrantless, in-home arrests, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the statute did not make the officer’s actions reasonable in light of
longstanding Supreme Court precedent holding that such actions violate the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 7. Accordingly, before concluding that the Missouri statute at
issue made Glandon’s actions reasonable, I think the majority should have considered
the statute’s specificity.

Because the Missouri statute imposes only a general obligation on officers,
Glandon’s compliance with the statute did not make his actions reasonable. The
relevant Missouri statute, section 2010.145.4 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, states

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that “[t]he appropriate law enforcement agency shall . . . assist the [Children’s]
division in the investigation.” The statute does not, however, define or specify the
form of assistance required. Thus, although the statute obligated Glandon to offer
some type of help, it did not specifically require him to accompany social services
workers in their investigations, let alone require him to accompany them into private
homes or remain with them in private homes even after homeowners withdraw their
consent. See Denton, 353 F. App’x at 7. Here, because remaining in Coates’s home
without her consent violated well-established Fourth Amendment law and nothing in
Missouri statute obligated Glandon to stay, Glandon’s actions were not objectively
reasonable.

The majority cites Kloch in support of its opposite conclusion. In Kloch, we
hinted at a per se rule of reasonableness when we broadly stated that officers’ actions
are objectively reasonable when they act “in good faith while performing discretionary
duties that they are obliged to undertake.” 545 F.3d at 609. However, because legal
reasonableness ultimately depends on the legal landscape taken as a whole, Wilson,
526 U.S. at 614, Kloch must stand for the limited proposition that when a state statute
specifically requires officers to take certain actions, the officer’s compliance with the
statute will generally resolve the question of reasonableness. Accordingly, Kloch is
not dispositive here because the Missouri statute did not specifically require Glandon
to remain with the social services worker.

The majority finds Kloch applicable because it treats the Missouri statute as
obligating Glandon to accompany social services workers into private homes. The
majority describes the clearly established question as whether the Fourth Amendment
was violated “when the officer was accompanying a social services worker
investigating a complaint of child neglect as required by state statute” (emphasis
added). If the Missouri statute had in fact required Glandon to “accompany” the
social services worker, I would most likely agree that it made Glandon’s actions
reasonable. Because the statute imposed only a general obligation to assist, however,

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I conclude that despite the Missouri statute, a reasonable officer would have known
that remaining in Coates’s home violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to grant qualified immunity
to Glandon.
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