UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4333
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ISIAH MARQUALE HAYES, a/k/a Isaiah Marquale Hayes,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (1:09-cr-00137-JAB-1)
Submitted: March 30, 2011 Decided: April 8, 2011
Before KING, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas N. Cochran, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United
States Attorney, Michael F. Joseph, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Isiah Marquale Hayes pled guilty to possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2006), and the district court sentenced him to a
within-Guidelines sentence of 115 months. Counsel filed a brief
in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating there are no meritorious issues for appeal but
questioning whether Hayes’s sentence was unduly harsh. Hayes
was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief, but he
has not done so. After our initial review, we ordered the
parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the
district court adequately stated its reasons for imposing the
chosen sentence and, if not, whether its failure to do so
constitutes harmless error. Having fully considered the
arguments raised by Hayes and the Government, we affirm.
Because counsel preserved any procedural challenge to
the sentence by arguing for a below-Guidelines sentence, our
review is for an abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 578, 581, 583-84 (4th Cir. 2010). If the
district court procedurally erred and thus abused its
discretion, we must reverse unless the error is harmless. Id.
at 581, 585.
In determining the procedural reasonableness of a
sentence, this court considers whether the district court
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properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range,
considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, analyzed any
arguments presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained
the selected sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). “Regardless of whether the district court imposes an
above, below, or within-Guidelines sentence, it must place on
the record an individualized assessment based on the particular
facts of the case before it.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Where, as here, the district court imposed a within-Guidelines
sentence, the explanation may be “less extensive, while still
individualized.” United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 639
(4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2128 (2010). However,
that explanation must be sufficient to allow for “meaningful
appellate review” such that the appellate court need “not guess
at the district court’s rationale.” Carter, 564 F.3d at 329-30
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Although the district court properly calculated the
Guidelines range, allowed counsel to argue in mitigation, and
afforded Hayes an opportunity to allocute, we conclude that the
district court abused its discretion in failing to place on the
record an individualized assessment of the § 3553(a) factors
relating to Hayes. “Sentencing courts are statutorily required
to state their reasons for imposing a particular sentence.”
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United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 2010).
In this case, although the district court briefly stated that it
had considered the statutory sentencing factors, the court erred
by failing to indicate the basis for rejecting counsel’s
arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence. See Lynn, 592 F.3d
at 584 (“[T]he court must offer some ‘individualized assessment’
justifying the sentence imposed and rejection of arguments for a
higher or lower sentence based upon § 3553.”) (quoting Gall, 552
U.S. at 50); Carter, 564 F.3d at 328-30.
Having concluded that the district court procedurally
erred, we next consider whether the error is harmless. In this
context, “the [G]overnment may avoid reversal only if it
demonstrates that the error did not have a substantial and
injurious effect or influence on the result[,]” such that “we
can [] say with fair assurance[] that the district court’s
explicit consideration of [the defendant’s] arguments would not
have affected the sentence imposed.” Boulware, 604 F.3d at 838
(internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted). Relevant
factors in this analysis include whether the record leaves any
doubt that the district court considered the defendant’s
arguments in light of the relevant § 3553 factors and any other
information submitted, id. at 839, and the strength of the
defendant’s arguments for a different sentence. Id. at 839-40;
Lynn, 592 F.3d at 585.
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With these standards in mind, we conclude that the
Government met its burden. In this case, the district court
indicated that it had performed its duties to consider the
relevant § 3553 factors in light of the arguments and evidence
presented by Hayes’s counsel. Moreover, the arguments for
leniency Hayes advanced at sentencing were less than compelling,
and Hayes “produced no evidence that the effects on others from
[his] imprisonment would be unusually severe.” Boulware, 604
F.3d at 840. Thus, any procedural error is harmless and does
not require reversal. Finally, with regard to the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence, Hayes has failed to rebut our
presumption that his within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable.
See United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Hayes, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Hayes requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Hayes. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
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materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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