UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5218
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KALI ELOI ROBINSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
District Judge. (5:09-cr-00035-D-1)
Submitted: December 1, 2010 Decided: April 11, 2011
Before KING, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Mitchell G. Styers, BANZETT, THOMPSON & STYERS, PLLC, Warrenton,
North Carolina, for Appellant. George Edward Bell Holding,
United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United
States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kali Eloi Robinson pleaded guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to two counts of armed bank robbery and
aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d)
(2006) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); and one count of brandishing a
firearm during a crime of violence and aiding and abetting, in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2010) and 18
U.S.C. § 2. The district court sentenced Robinson to a total of
162 months of imprisonment, and Robinson now appeals.
Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether the
sentence is procedurally unreasonable because Robinson was
assigned to criminal history category III. Counsel concedes,
however, that this issue appears to be precluded by Robinson’s
plea waiver and states that he is “unable to identify any
meritorious issues for review not covered by [the] appeal waiver
contained in [Robinson’s] plea memorandum.” Despite being
informed of his right to do so, Robinson has not filed a pro se
supplemental brief.
The Government has filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal of Robinson’s sentence based on the appellate waiver in
the plea agreement, which Robinson, through counsel, opposes as
premature. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal
of Robinson’s sentence and affirm his conviction.
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Pursuant to a plea agreement, a defendant may waive
his appellate rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). United
States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990). This court
reviews the validity of an appellate waiver de novo, and will
enforce the waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed is
within the scope of the waiver. United States v. Blick, 408
F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005).
An appeal waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly
and intelligently agreed to the waiver. Id. at 169. To
determine whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, this
court examines “the totality of the circumstances, including the
experience and conduct of the accused, as well as the accused’s
educational background and familiarity with the terms of the
plea agreement.” United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400
(4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Generally, if the district court fully questions a defendant
regarding the waiver of his right to appeal during the Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 colloquy, the waiver is both valid and enforceable.
United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that
Robinson knowingly and intelligently entered into the plea
agreement and waived his right to appeal his sentence.
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Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion to
dismiss the appeal of Robinson’s sentence. Although Robinson’s
plea waiver does not preclude a direct appeal of his conviction,
we have examined the entire record in accordance with the
requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Robinson’s conviction.
This court requires that counsel inform Robinson, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Robinson requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Robinson. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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