UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4434
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KRISTY RENEE RASNICK,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District
Judge. (1:08-cr-00027-jpj-pms-3)
Submitted: March 29, 2011 Decided: April 11, 2011
Before AGEE and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael A. Bragg, BRAGG LAW, PLC, Abingdon, Virginia, for
Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Jean B.
Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, J. Wells Harrell,
Third Year Law Student, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kristy Renee Rasnick appeals the twenty-four-month
sentence imposed after the district court revoked her supervised
release. On appeal, Rasnick asserts that her sentence was
procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to
state why a sentence above the three-to-nine-month Guidelines
range was appropriate and that her sentence was substantively
unreasonable. Finding no error, we affirm.
This court reviews a sentence imposed upon revocation
of a defendant’s supervised release to determine whether the
sentence is “plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a
revocation sentence is “plainly unreasonable,” we must first
determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively
unreasonable. Id. at 438. Although a sentencing court must
consider the Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors 1 in fashioning its sentence,
the sentencing court retains broad discretion to revoke a
defendant’s supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment
up to the statutory maximum. 461 F.3d at 439. Moreover, “a
court’s statement of its reasons for going beyond non-binding
1
Contrary to Rasnick’s argument on appeal, not every § 3553
factor applies to sentences imposed pursuant to a revocation of
supervised release. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2010); see also Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
2
policy statements in imposing a sentence after revoking a
defendant’s supervised release term need not be as specific as
has been required when courts departed from [pre-Booker 2
mandatory] guidelines” at sentencing for criminal offenses.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (“A court need not
be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence
as it must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence.”). Only
if the defendant demonstrates that the sentence is unreasonable
will we consider whether the sentence was “plainly
unreasonable.” Id.
With these standards in mind, we have reviewed the
record on appeal and conclude that the sentence is procedurally
and substantively reasonable and that the district court
adequately explained its reasons for sentencing Rasnick to the
statutory maximum sentence of twenty-four months’ imprisonment.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
2
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
3