FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
April 12, 2011
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 10-6083
v. (D.C. No. 5:09-CR-00229-F-1)
(W.D. Oklahoma)
LEO MAX BURNS, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, HARTZ, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Leo Max Burns pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma to one count of being a felon in possession of a
firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court imposed a mandatory
minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment after determining that
Mr. Burns’s criminal history qualified him as an armed career criminal under the
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). On appeal he attacks
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences and of statutes allowing a
court to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum only if the government
so moves. He also appears to contend that the federal sentencing statutes permit a
court to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum even if the prosecutor
does not request such a reduction in sentence. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm because Mr. Burns’s contentions are contrary to this
court’s precedents.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 21, 2009, Mr. Burns was indicted on one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm. He pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. His
presentence investigation report stated that he was an armed career criminal
because of his two prior convictions of burglary and one prior conviction of
possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and therefore faced a
mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. 924(e).
He sought a lower sentence, however, by providing information to the
government. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) the district court may impose a sentence
below the mandatory minimum if the defendant provides “substantial assistance”
to the government and the government moves for a downward departure. But no
government agency could use Mr. Burns’s information and the government did
not request a sentence below the mandatory minimum.
II. DISCUSSION
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The government argues that we should review all of Mr. Burns’s arguments
under a plain-error standard because he failed to preserve them properly below.
Mr. Burns, at least in his reply brief, asserts that he preserved his arguments
below so that our review is de novo. We tend to agree with the government. But
we need not resolve the dispute on the standard of review, because there was no
error.
A. Statutory Argument
We first address Mr. Burns’s statutory claims. He contends that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(e) (which gives the district court authority, subject to a motion by the
government, to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum if the defendant
has provided “substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another
person”) conflicts with 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (which states that the sentencing
guidelines should reflect the appropriateness of imposing a below-minimum
sentence on a defendant who provides substantial assistance) and with 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a) (which directs courts to impose the minimum sentence that satisfies
the statutorily enumerated purposes of sentencing). What Mr. Burns would have
us infer from the alleged conflict, however, is far from clear; after asserting the
conflict, he switches abruptly to his constitutional contentions. Giving him the
benefit of the doubt, we will assume that he is contending that § 3553(e) is
overridden by the statutes it supposedly conflicts with. But we reject this
contention. Section 3553(e) is the most specific provision on the matter. As its
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title states, it addresses precisely the “[l]imited authority to impose a sentence
below a statutory minimum.” Because it is the more precise provision, it controls
over any contrary inferences that may be drawn from the language in § 3553(a) or
§ 994(n). See Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147, 1150 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009);
see also United States v. Huskey, 502 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007) (§ 3553(a)
does not apply to mandatory sentences). Hence, Mr. Burns is not entitled to relief
based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 994(n).
B. Eighth Amendment Argument
Mr. Burns argues that mandatory minimum sentences violate the Eighth
Amendment because they deprive a defendant of individualized sentencing.
Absent the mandatory minimum, he argues, the district court might well have
sentenced him to less than 180 months because he has “no record of violence
perpetrated physically against anyone.” Aplt. Br. at 21. Relying on decisions in
capital cases that require an individualized inquiry, he contends that the same
principle should be applied to felonies. But he ignores the Supreme Court’s
rejection of this very contention. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995–96
(1991), the Court held that the capital-case requirement of individualized
sentencing did not apply to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. Following Harmelin, we have rejected the claim that
mandatory minimum sentences for felonies violate an Eighth Amendment right to
individualized sentencing. See Huskey, 502 F.3d at 1197, 1200 (mandatory
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minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)); cf. United States v. Horn,
946 F.2d 738, 746 (10th Cir. 1991) (no due-process right to individualized
sentencing in noncapital case); United States v. Nolan, 342 F. App’x 368, 371–72
(10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (mandatory minimum sentence under ACCA; issue
addressed as matter of due process).
Mr. Burns’s reply brief on appeal seems to argue that the imposition of a
mandatory minimum also violates the Eighth Amendment because of a lack of
proportionality. But we decline to address the claim because he failed to argue it
in his opening brief. See United States v. Murray, 82 F.3d 361, 363 n.3 (10th Cir.
1996) (“We decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply
brief.”).
C. Separation of Powers Argument
Mr. Burns contends that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) violates the separation-of-
powers doctrine because it allows encroachment on judicial power by the
executive branch. He argues that sentencing is a power conferred upon the
judiciary and although Congress shares the power “on its peripheries to the extent
of determining sentencing limits generally, the encroachment occurs when it
separates a certain group of offenders and mandates that the executive branch
prosecution, not the judicial branch court, has the sole authority to permit a
sentence below the mandatory minimum.” Aplt. Br. at 11. Again, however, this
argument is foreclosed by our precedent. We have held that § 3553(e) does not
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violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. See United States v. Snell, 922 F.2d
588, 590–91(10th Cir. 1990).
D. Fifth Amendment Argument
Mr. Burns argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment because the decision to make a downward-departure
motion is “not governed by any standards or guidelines and thus result[s] in
random, arbitrary, and disproportionate decisions.” Aplt. Br. at 4. He asserts that
“[t]he risk of arbitrary decisions or widely disproportionate determinations of
what cooperation is deemed substantial is obvious and is analogous to the striking
down of the death penalty statute in the per curiam opinion in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1972).” Id. at 12.
Once more, however, our precedent is to the contrary. We have rejected
the contention that § 3553(e) violates procedural due process absent judicial
review of the prosecutor’s decision not to recommend a reduced sentence. See
United States v. Sorensen, 915 F.2d 599, 601, 603 (10th Cir. 1990), overruled on
other grounds by United States v. Duncan, 242 F.3d 940, 947 (10th Cir. 2001).
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. The appellate briefs in this
case will be unsealed 20 days from the date that this Order and Judgment is filed
unless one of the parties moves to seal or redact one or more briefs, stating
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specific reasons necessitating sealing or redaction. Such a motion may be
provisionally sealed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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