UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4257
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DAVID OTERO-CAMPOS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:08-cr-00027-RLV-DCK-3)
Submitted: March 30, 2011 Decided: April 19, 2011
Before AGEE, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Claire J. Rauscher, Executive Director, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF
WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Ross H. Richardson, Assistant
Federal Defender, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant
United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
David Otero-Campos appeals his conviction and
151-month sentence after pleading guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess
with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846 (2006), and one count of possession with
intent to distribute cocaine and aiding and abetting, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006), 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(A) (2006). Otero-Campos’s sole assertion on appeal is
that the district court violated his due process rights when it
enhanced his sentence based on evidence he asserts lacked
sufficient indicia of reliability. Finding no error, we affirm.
This court reviews the district court’s factual
findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
United States v. Chacon, 533 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2008). The
deferential “clear error” standard of review requires reversal
only if this court is “left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 542 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)).
“District courts traditionally have been given wide
latitude as to the information they may consider in passing
sentence after a conviction.” United States v. Nichols,
438 F.3d 437, 439 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
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omitted). “That is because it is highly relevant — if not
essential — to the selection of an appropriate sentence for the
sentencing court to possess the fullest information possible
concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics.” Id. at
440 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Thus, a sentencing court may consider any relevant
information “without regard to its admissibility under the rules
of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information
has sufficient indicia of reliability . . . ” U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 6A1.3(a) (2008). See United
States v. Wilkinson, 590 F.3d 259, 269 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]
sentencing court may give weight to any relevant information
before it, including uncorroborated hearsay. . . .”); see also
United States v. Paulino, 996 F.2d 1541, 1547 (3d Cir. 1993)
(“[A] sentencing judge may consider information, largely
unlimited as to kind or source, that would be inadmissible at
trial.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
There are constitutional limitations on the
information a district court may consider, however. For
instance, this court has “construed various Supreme Court
decisions as recognizing a due process right to be sentenced
only on information which is accurate.” Nichols, 438 F.3d at
440 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Thus, the
Guidelines explicitly suggest that information relied upon at
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sentencing should have “sufficient indicia of reliability to
support its probable accuracy.” USSG § 6A1.3(a). We have
reviewed the district court record and conclude that the
information relied upon by the district court possessed
sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable
accuracy. We thus conclude that the district court did not err
when it calculated Otero-Campos’s Guidelines range.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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