In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-2576
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
G ARJON C OLLINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:09-cr-00186—Joseph S. Van Bokkelen, Judge.
A RGUED JANUARY 12, 2011—D ECIDED A PRIL 22, 2011
Before K ANNE and T INDER, Circuit Judges, and H ERNDON,
District Judge.
H ERNDON, District Judge. The defendant, Garjon Collins,
seeks review by this Court of his sentence, asserting
that the district judge’s sentence of 108 months of incar-
ceration was unreasonable. The defendant seeks a reduc-
tion in sentence of 24 months. We affirm.
The Honorable David R. Herndon, Chief Judge, United States
District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, sitting by
designation.
2 No. 10-2576
I. B ACKGROUND
The defendant was indicted on 11 counts of misusing
a Social Security number under 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B)
and 11 counts of aggravated identity theft in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The defendant entered a plea of
guilty to all 22 counts and, after a lengthy sentencing
hearing which included additional testimony and evi-
dence from the government, the district judge sentenced
the defendant to 108 months, composed of 60 months
on each of Counts 1-11 to run concurrently with each
other; 24 months on Count 12 to run consecutively to
Counts 1-11; 24 months on Count 13, to run consecu-
tively to Count 12; and 24 months on each of Counts 14-22,
to run concurrently with each other and with Count 13.
The defendant has exhibited a lengthy, well-seasoned
history of identity theft. His first sentence for this offense
occurred in 2003 in Cook County, Illinois, where he
received a state sentence of 18 months probation for
possession or display of altered identification documents.
He used those documents, in 2003, to purchase five fire-
arms in Indiana. For that offense he was charged and
convicted in federal court with being a felon in posses-
sion of a firearm, and was sentenced to 37 months impris-
onment. Soon after his release from federal prison in
2007, the defendant went on an identity theft spree,
obtaining the names, addresses, social security numbers
and birth dates from Illinois residents, mostly from the
North Shore area of Chicago. These individuals had, in
general, salaries in excess of $250,000. He used these
identities to create false birth certificates, pay records, and
No. 10-2576 3
other documents which he then took to the Bureau of
Motor Vehicles offices in northern Indiana to obtain
multiple Indiana state identification cards, none of which
were in his real name. With these Indiana identities,
the defendant, or one of his co-conspirators, would pur-
chase large-ticket items, and take those items back
into Illinois for resale.1
The evidence presented at the sentencing hearing
was that between 2002-2004 the defendant stole at least
seven additional identities. Two victims of those offenses
testified at his sentencing hearing. These victims (identified
as “D.D.” and “D.C.”) testified as to the impact of the
identity theft on their lives, which was significant. D.C.
testified that he has spent countless hours over the
past five years dealing with the aftermath of the defen-
dant’s use of his identity (including having had a war-
rant issued for his arrest in Indiana for writing bad checks).
D.D., an established businessman, testified that he
worked in the financial industry for twenty years, and
had a limited liability company which designed medical
1
At the time of the execution of the search warrant on the
defendant’s mother’s home, items seized from his bedroom
included: 8 Indiana State ID cards with the defendant’s photo-
graph (or that of his co-conspirators) bearing names of identity
theft victims; 2 Michigan operator’s licenses with his photo-
graph and false names and addresses; credit cards in the names
of other persons; checks in the names of others; a “Profile”
ledger with names, addresses, birth dates, Social Security
numbers, mortgage and vehicle information for individuals
other than the victims in this case; original birth certificates, and
many more items associated with identity theft. (Govt. Ex. 11).
4 No. 10-2576
field software. After his identity was stolen by the defen-
dant, and over $12,000 was charged to accounts in his
name, D.D.’s credit rating dropped, he was denied credit,
his company failed and he lost his investment.
Three victims from the instant case (identified as
“D.W.C.,” “P.R.” and “J.M.”) testified at the sentencing
hearing as well. D.W.C. testified that his stolen identity
resulted in harassing calls from a collection agency, and
approximately $4,500.00 in unauthorized charges against
his account. He testified to the mental anguish and hours
he spent trying to resolve the issues resulting from the
theft of his identity. P.R. testified that her credit score
had been adversely affected as a result of the theft of her
identity by the defendant, that she lost her sense of pri-
vacy, the ability to secure a home equity loan for a
period of time, the loss of her good name and morale. J.M.
testified that the identity theft he experienced as a result
of the defendant’s actions caused him to lose time at
work, and his feeling of violation.
Both the government and the defendant objected to
the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) and submit-
ted sentencing memoranda to the district court. The
defendant asserted that there were only eleven victims,
not thirty, and that his criminal history had been incor-
rectly determined. The government asserted that the
amount of loss was in excess of $200,000, not $46,203.92, as
determined by the PSR. The district judge heard oral
argument on the objections, took the matter under ad-
visement, and ruled at a later sentencing hearing. Neither
party objected to the factual description of the offense.
No. 10-2576 5
The district court determined that the total number of
victims was twenty-three (23)2 , and also determined
that the defendant’s final criminal history calculation
would not include an offense which took place in 1989,
because that offense occurred more than fifteen years
before the date of the offenses to which the defendant
had plead guilty.
The district court further determined that the defen-
dant’s total criminal history category was a IV, after
subtracting three points. Finally, the district court deter-
mined that the amount of loss was $171,049.00, declining
to adopt the government’s argument that the crimes
committed between 2002-2004 were to be included in
the loss calculation. The district judge determined that
the total offense level was a twenty-two (22), finding
that the offenses had a base offense level of six (6) which
was increased ten (10) levels pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(F) because the loss involved more than
$120,000.00. The district court added two (2) levels to
the sentence based on U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i) because
the defendant’s offense involved more than ten (10)
victims. Two (2) levels were added because the de-
fendant’s offense included stolen property and because
the defendant was involved in receiving and selling
stolen property. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(4). Finally, the
2
The victim number calculation was based on the eleven
victims from the indictment plus twelve additional victims
who came from the defendant’s accomplices’ actions which
were related to the charges in the indictment to which the
defendant pleaded guilty.
6 No. 10-2576
district court added four (4) levels pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1(a) upon the district court’s finding that the de-
fendant was an organizer or leader of five (5) or more
individuals in the commission of the offenses. The ad-
justed offense level was a twenty-four (24), however
the defendant received a reduction of two (2) levels for
his acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a final
offense level of twenty-two (22).
The district judge then recited the factors of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) acknowledging his obligation under the law as
he began his analysis. To frame just how scheming
the defendant had been in his criminal activity and
how serious the crimes were that he committed, the
district judge began by reading a letter the defendant
had written to the judge in the days leading up to the
hearing. In the letter, the defendant sounded a sincere
note as he spoke of his remorse at having adversely
affected so many people—victims and family alike. He
wanted to apologize to all and assure the district court
he was and would be a changed man. The defendant
requested of the district judge, “that you consider
leniency in sentencing me.” The defendant failed to
consider that a sentencing judge is not likely to leave
relevant matters of the past in the past. From defendant’s
last federal sentencing, Judge Van Bokkelen retrieved a
letter which the defendant had written to Judge Lozano
before being sentenced. The 2005 letter was nearly
identical in tone and word regarding the defendant’s
attestations of remorse, promises of change, and his
plans for rehabilitation. Not restricting himself to the
defendant’s prior written word, Judge Van Bokkelen
No. 10-2576 7
read the defendant’s words from the prior sentencing
transcript: “I’m not going to do any more crimes, period.
I am not going to do any more criminal activity, pe-
riod. That is out of my life permanently.”
The district judge analyzed, in depth for purposes of
sentencing, a significant portion of the evidence which
supported the government’s prosecution of the case. It
was clear from the evidence seized from the defendant’s
house that a great deal of criminal activity having to
do with identity theft was ongoing. Obviously, the defen-
dant’s criminal enterprise would have continued for
the foreseeable future but for his arrest. The district
court noted that the defendant’s crime included his
involvement of others and opined that had the de-
fendant not been arrested, he would likely have con-
tinued to steal others’ identities. The district court con-
sidered the impact of the defendant’s actions on the
lives of others and the long-range impact of his crimes
on his victims. The district court determined that a total
of 108 months of imprisonment was necessary to
protect society from further crimes by the defendant,
reflected the seriousness of his offenses, and was a just
punishment for his crimes. The district court further
found that the defendant’s criminal history demon-
strated that a shorter period of imprisonment would
likely be insufficient to deter him from further crimes.3
3
The government had sought a term of imprisonment of at
least ten years, and the defendant sought a term of imprison-
ment of 65 months, in part due to the fact that the defendant
(continued...)
8 No. 10-2576
The district judge commented on the calculation and
planning that was involved in the commission of the
offenses and that the crimes were not the result of accident.
II. A NALYSIS
The parties are in agreement that when no procedural
errors are raised, as the case in this appeal, this court
applies an abuse of discretion standard of review. United
States v. Coopman, 602 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir.) cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 303 (2010).
The defendant characterizes the sentence imposed as
one which was above the advisory Guidelines range,
asserting that the district court imposed a twenty-five
percent increase in the highest suggested term under the
advisory Guidelines. In particular, the defendant asserts
that the district court improperly imposed consecutive
sentences on two of the aggravated identity theft con-
victions.
As stated above, the district court imposed a total
sentence of 108 months, as set forth in the Judgment
and Commitment Order. This sentence was comprised
of 60 months on each of Counts 1-11, such terms to be
served concurrently; 24 months on Count 12, to be served
consecutively to the sentences imposed on Counts 1-11;
3
(...continued)
had suffered a stroke, had a traumatic childhood, had cooper-
ated with the government after his arrest and had indicated
his remorse.
No. 10-2576 9
24 months on Count 13, to be served consecutively to
the sentence imposed on Count 12; and 24 months on
Counts 14-22 to be served concurrently with the sen-
tence imposed on Count 13.
The defendant’s assertion is that the 24-month con-
secutive sentences on each of Counts 12 and 13 for ag-
gravated identity theft were improper and that they
should have been concurrent sentences.4 The crime
of aggravated identity theft carries a two-year term of
imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1), and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(b)(2) mandates that the two-year sentence is to
run consecutively to the sentence for any other offenses.
See United States v. LaFaive, 618 F.3d 613, 619 (7th Cir.
2010) (statutory scheme provides for mandatory con-
secutive sentence for aggravated identity theft convic-
tions). Indeed, § 1028A(b)(2) provides that this two-
year term shall not “run concurrently with any other
term of imprisonment.” However, the sentencing court
has the discretion to impose terms of imprisonment
that run concurrently for multiple convictions for the
same offense of aggravated identity theft. The statute
specifically provides for such concurrent terms of im-
prisonment “only with another term of imprisonment
that is imposed by the court at the same time on
that person for an additional violation of this section. . . .”
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(b)(4) (emphasis added).
4
The court notes that the applicable advisory Guidelines
range on Counts 1-11 was 63-78 months; therefore, the defen-
dant’s sentence on those counts was actually below the
advisory Guidelines range.
10 No. 10-2576
Guideline § 2B1.6, Application Note 1(B) provides, “in
the case of multiple convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A,
the term of imprisonment imposed on such counts
may, in the discretion of the court, run concurrently, in
whole or in part with each other.” As further guidance,
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2, Application Note 2(B)(ii) provides that,
“[g]enerally, multiple counts of 18 U.S.C § 1028A should
run concurrently with one another in cases in which the
underlying offenses are groupable under § 3D1.2.” How-
ever, the sentencing court is also to consider the “nature
and seriousness of the underlying offenses” and whether
“the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2) are better achieved by imposing a concur-
rent or consecutive sentence for multiple counts of 18
U.S.C. § 1028A.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2, Application Notes 2B(i)
and 2B(iii).
At sentencing, the district court, in fact, grouped the
underlying counts under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. Although
the aggravated identity theft counts, under the ad-
visory Guidelines, are “generally” grouped as well under
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2, Application Note 2B(ii), district courts
still have the discretion to impose consecutive sentences
in light of the aggravating and mitigating factors even
when the counts are groupable. See, e.g., United States v.
Kreitinger, 576 F.3d 500, 504 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that
the consecutive sentence on an aggravated identity
theft conviction was reasonable in light of the serious-
ness of the defendant’s criminal history, ongoing nature
of the crimes and serious likelihood of recidivism).
A sentencing court has discretion to make a sentence
consecutive or concurrent. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a); United
No. 10-2576 11
States v. Campbell, 617 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2010). In
this case, the district court’s decision to impose consecu-
tive sentences for two of the eleven convictions for ag-
gravated identity theft was reasonable in light of the
facts of the case and was an appropriate exercise of dis-
cretion.
The district court noted at sentencing that at least one
of the aggravated identity theft counts was to be
imposed consecutively. Moreover, the district court was
faced with sentencing the defendant for eleven counts of
aggravated identity theft. Although the district court did
not specifically mention the provisions of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2,
Application Note 2B(ii) (“Generally multiple counts of
18 U.S.C. § 1028A should run concurrently with one
another in cases in which the underlying offenses are
groupable under § 3D1.2”), any oversight of not addressing
that specific provision was not reversible error.
The only question, then, is whether the sentence was
reasonable in light of the sentencing factors of § 3553(a). It
is well settled that on appeal this court presumes that
a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range is rea-
sonable and will reverse only for an abuse of discretion.
See United States v. Portman, 599 F.3d 633, 636 (7th Cir.
2010). When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court
is to consider and apply the factors of § 3553(a) which
include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (3) the
need to deter future crime, protect the public, and
provide the defendant with necessary services such
12 No. 10-2576
as vocational training and medical care; (4) the Sen-
tencing Commission’s recommendations regarding
the sentencing range; (5) the Sentencing Commis-
sion’s policy statements; and (6) the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities.
United States v. Snyder, 2011 WL 923502,*2 (7th Cir. Mar. 18,
2011). Although the district judge is not required to
make factual findings as to each of the above factors, the
record on appeal should reveal that the district judge
considered the factors. United States v. Neal, 512 F.3d
427, 438 (7th Cir. 2008) (cited in Snyder, 2011 WL 923502, at
*2). In addition, the district court must “start by using
the Guidelines to provide a benchmark that curtails
unwarranted disparities.” United States v. Kirkpatrick,
589 F.3d 414, 416 (7th Cir. 2009).
The defendant asserts that the sentence of 108 months
was unreasonable because it was a higher sentence
than necessary to meet the standards of § 3553(a). In this
case, the district court throughly and meaningfully ana-
lyzed the factors of § 3553(a) and there is no evidence
that there was error in that analysis. The district court
discussed the nature and circumstances of the offenses,
including the planning involved, the number of victims,
the impact on the victims, the harm to society from
the actions of the defendant in this conspiracy, the need
to punish the defendant for his crimes, and the need for
a period of incarceration that would deter the defendant
and others from the commission of similar criminal
activity in the future. “[W]e regularly affirm sentences
where the district judge does not explicitly mention
each mitigation argument raised by the defendant.
No. 10-2576 13
Indeed, sentencing judges must only demonstrate mean-
ingful consideration of § 3553(a) factors.” United States
v. Paige, 611 F.3d 397, 398 (7th Cir. 2010). The district court
noted that the defendant targeted his victims, recruited
others to assist him in his crimes, and, in light of the
documents found at the time of the execution of the
arrest, would have been likely to continue his criminal
activities with the “filing cabinet full of documentation”
on future victims.
The defendant asserts that the district court failed to
consider his mitigating factors, including: his childhood
trauma, cooperation with the authorities, his stroke and
the resulting physical impairments, and his apologies
to the district court. The court notes, however, that the
district court, in sentencing, did take note of the defen-
dant’s physical impairments, recognizing that the
Bureau of Prisons has facilities which could accom-
modate his needs. Further, the district court clearly ad-
dressed and dismissed the defendant’s expressions of
remorse as not credible. The fact that the district court
did not mention the defendant’s childhood trauma or
cooperation specifically is not error. See United States v.
Vallar, 2011 WL 488877, *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 14, 2011) (where
the court noted: “The district court addressed the
majority and strongest of [defendant’s] arguments. That
the district court did not explicitly discuss each of [defen-
dant’s] weaker arguments does not constitute reversible
error . . . .”); Neal, 512 F.3d at 438. Although this court
has stated this principle before, it bears repetition here:
When a district judge makes an adequate, thoughtful
analysis of the sentencing factors vis-à-vis the facts of the
14 No. 10-2576
case, and the district judge makes it clear, on the record,
that in reaching the final sentence, he has considered the
applicable sentencing factors, and the arguments made
by the parties, the sentencing judge has, then, satisfied
the review standards which must be met. It is simply
not required that the sentencing judge tick off every
possible sentencing factor or detail and discuss, separately,
every nuance of every argument raised for this court
to find that the sentence was proper. See, e.g., Snyder,
2011 WL 923502; Vallar, 2011 WL 488877; Paige, 611 F.3d
397; Neal, 512 F.3d 427.
In light of the record as a whole, this court finds that
the district court properly calculated the defendant’s
guideline range at a level 22, criminal history category IV,
which resulted in a range of 63-78 months. With the
imposition of two mandatory 24-month concurrent sen-
tences, the imposition of a sentence of 108 months was
actually below the advisory Guidelines range of 111-126
months for these offenses, and therefore, was reasonable.
III. C ONCLUSION
The district judge properly considered the § 3553(a)
sentencing factors and imposed an appropriate, reasonable
sentence in this case. We therefore A FFIRM the sentence
the district court imposed upon defendant Collins.
4-22-11