United States v. Maurer

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______

No. 10-3049
______

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DERL H. MAURER,
Appellant
______

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Criminal No. 10-cr-00060)
District Judge: Hon. Susan D. Wigenton
______

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 22, 2011

Before: SMITH, ALDISERT, and VAN ANTWERPEN,
Circuit Judges.

(Filed: April 22, 2011)
Kevin F. Carlucci, Esq.
Office of Federal Public Defender
972 Broad Street, 4th Floor
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Appellant

Aaron Mendelsohn, Esq.
Office of United States Attorney
970 Broad Street, Room 700
Newark, NJ 07102

Counsel for Appellee
______

OPINION OF THE COURT
______

VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Derl H. Maurer (“Maurer”) pleaded guilty to
a single count information charging him with possession of
child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2252A(a)(5)(B). The District Court imposed a sentence of
sixty months of imprisonment and a five-year term of
supervised release, which included special conditions
restricting internet access and association with minors. On
appeal, Maurer challenges the procedural reasonableness of
his sentence as well as the special conditions of his
supervised release. For the reasons that follow, we will
affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

2
 Maurer came to the attention of authorities on July 7,
2009, after sending an email via an online social networking
website to a fictitious eighteen-year-old teenager, (“Nate”),
whose internet profile was created by undercover law
enforcement officers to investigate crimes involving sexual
exploitation of children. In the email, Maurer solicited the
exchange of nude images and asked “Nate” how old he was.
The following day, Maurer sent another email again inquiring
about nude pictures and reiterating his interest in “young guys
too your age and under,” and stating “hope your into older
men.” (Presentence Report (“PSR”) ¶ 10.) Three images,
which depicted a nude older man exposing himself, were
attached to this email. Thereafter, Maurer sent another email
directing “Nate” to a website featuring pictures and videos of
Maurer performing sexual acts.

In response to a request transmitted by authorities
through “Nate,” on or about July 13, 2009, Maurer mailed
two compact disks (“CDs”) to a provided address. The
package containing the CDs included a handwritten note from
Maurer describing the contents of the CDs, soliciting the
trade of additional images, and expressing the desire to “meet
and have some good fun together.” (Id. ¶ 16.) Upon
inspection, law enforcement officers confirmed that the CDs
contained numerous images and videos of child pornography.
Based upon this information, the investigating officers
obtained a search warrant to search and seize computers and
videos from Maurer‟s residence.

On July 23, 2009, law enforcement officers executed a
search of Maurer‟s residence pursuant to the warrant. Maurer
admitted to authorities that he had sent the CDs to “Nate,”

3
that he had been viewing and collecting child pornography for
six months, and that there was additional child pornography
on his computer as well as a library of CDs in his bedroom
closet. He denied having any sexual contact with minors. In
total, law enforcement officers seized from Maurer‟s
residence forty image files and nineteen video files containing
child pornography. An examination of these files revealed
that several depicted adult males penetrating and otherwise
sexually abusing prepubescent children, some of whom were
bound with rope and tape. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 20, 23.)

On February 2, 2010, Maurer pleaded guilty, pursuant
to a written plea agreement, to a one-count information
alleging that he possessed child pornography in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). At his plea hearing, Maurer
admitted that he “knowingly possess[ed] . . . . more than 600
images of child pornography,”1 some of which depicted
“individuals who were clearly minors that had not attained the
age of 12 . . . engaging in sexually explicit conduct with other
minors and adults.” (Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 36-37.)
Maurer additionally admitted that “possession of these images
involve[d] the use of a computer.” (Id. at 36.) These
admissions were mirrored in the plea agreement, which also
contained a waiver of Maurer‟s right to appeal the District
Court‟s acceptance of the stipulations contained therein and
an acknowledgment that the District Court was not bound by
them. (Id. at 22, 26.)

1
For purposes of determining the number of images,
each video or similar visual depiction is equivalent to 75
images of child pornography. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 cmt. n.
4(B)(ii). Maurer admitted to possessing more than 600
images based on the application of this conversion formula.

4
 The District Court held a sentencing hearing on June
28, 2010. According to the PSR prepared by the United
States Probation Office, Maurer‟s total offense level under the
Sentencing Guidelines was 28, and his criminal history
category was I, yielding an advisory Guidelines range of 78 to
97 months of imprisonment. Notably, the Probation Office
found that Maurer‟s offense involved material that portrayed
“sadistic or other violent conduct,” and therefore
recommended application of a four level enhancement set
forth in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4). (PSR ¶ 23.) The Probation
Office relied on dictionary definitions of these terms to
determine the applicability of this four level enhancement.
(Id. ¶ 23 n.2.) Although Maurer stipulated to conduct
providing the basis for sentencing enhancements relating to
his use of a computer and possession of images depicting
prepubescent minors, he did not stipulate to possession of
images depicting sadistic or violent conduct. Prior to
sentencing, Maurer objected to the application of §
2G2.2(b)(4) recommended in the PSR, contending that “the
material described in paragraph 23 is [in]sufficient for the
enhancement to apply nor does it seem to meet the definitions
provided in footnote 2 of the report.” (Id. Addendum.)

During his sentencing hearing, Maurer presented
arguments against the application of § 2G2.2(b)(4) and
requested a downward variance based on the factors set forth
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The District Court denied Maurer‟s
objection to the four level enhancement authorized by §
2G2.2(b)(4), stating that “[w]ithout question I think that‟s an
enhancement that is applicable and has been appropriately
applied.” (J.A. at 67.) The District Court further explained,
“I do think that [the enhancement] is appropriately applied . .

5
. because to indicate that children being essentially molested,
raped and tortured is not sadistic or somehow masochistic, I
think it strains credibility to make that argument. . . . [a]nd
this case is certainly no different, given the videos that were
involved, the photos that were involved.” (Id.) The District
Court then proceeded to calculate Maurer‟s total offense level
as 28 and his criminal history category as I, yielding a
Guidelines sentence range of 78 to 97 months, consistent with
the PSR. Upon considering Maurer‟s arguments pertaining to
the sentencing objectives set forth in § 3553(a), the District
Court granted a downward variance and sentenced Maurer to
sixty months of imprisonment, followed by a five-year term
of supervised release.

The District Court included several special conditions
as part of Maurer‟s five-year term of supervised release.
Only two are relevant to this appeal: (1) a prohibition on
“possess[ing], procur[ing], purchas[ing], or otherwise
obtain[ing] access to any form of computer network, bulletin
board, Internet, or exchange format involving computers
unless specifically approved by the U.S. Probation Office,”
with disputes regarding applicability “to be decided by the
court”; and (2) a prohibition on “having any contact with
children of either sex, under the age of 18, without the
expressed approval of the U.S. Probation Office . . . [and
from] obtain[ing] employment or perform[ing] volunteer
work which includes, as part of its job/work description,
contact with minor children without the expressed approval of
the U.S. Probation Office.” (J.A. at 5, 72.) The District
Court did not explain the factual basis for imposing these
conditions. (Id. at 72.) Maurer did not object to the length of
his supervised release term or any of the accompanying
special conditions specified by the District Court.

6
 A timely appeal followed.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review sentences for both procedural and
substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion
standard. United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir.
2010). To this end, “[w]e must first ensure that the district
court committed no significant procedural error in arriving at
its decision,” and if it has not, “we then review the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” United States v.
Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2008). Alternatively,
where the alleged error pertains to the district court‟s
interpretation of the Guidelines, our review is de novo. See
id. at 217. Our review of the District Court‟s findings of fact
is for clear error. Id.

We also review a district court‟s decision to impose a
special condition of supervised release under the abuse of
discretion standard. United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386,
390 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d
122, 127 (3d Cir. 1999)). Where, however, a defendant fails
to object to the conditions imposed at sentencing, the district
court‟s decision is reviewed for plain error. United States v.
Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 404 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United
States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 248 (3d Cir. 1998)).

III. DISCUSSION

7
 A. Application of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4)2

Maurer contends that the District Court abused its
discretion by applying U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) because: (1)
the enhancement itself is vague and overly broad, evinced by
the fact that the Probation Office had to reference a dictionary
to determine whether the enhancement applied; (2) the
photographs at issue are not “sadistic” or “violent” according
to the ordinary meaning of those terms; and (3) the
Government and Probation Office never established that he
intended to receive the images or that he derived pleasure
from viewing them. Maurer also challenges application of
the enhancement by arguing that the District Court failed to
give due regard to the written plea agreement. None of these
arguments are persuasive.

In our view, § 2G2.2(b)(4) is not vague or overly
broad, and it clearly encompasses the images and videos
Maurer possessed. Under § 2G2.2(b)(4), “[i]f the offense
involved material that portrays sadistic or masochistic
conduct or other depictions of violence,” a defendant‟s
offense level is increased by four levels. U.S.S.G. §
2G2.2(b)(4). Although the Sentencing Guidelines do not
define “sadistic or masochistic conduct” or “depictions of

2
Section 2G2.2(b)(4) was previously identified within
the Guidelines as § 2G2.2(b)(3). The present designation
came into effect on November 1, 2004. U.S.S.G. Supp. App.
C, amend. 664 (2010). For consistency and clarity,
throughout this opinion we have replaced references to
subsection “(3)” within quoted excerpts of other opinions
with “([4]).”

8
violence,” we believe that the ordinary meaning of these
terms provides courts with sufficient guidance to ensure that
the enhancement is appropriately applied to specific and
identifiable conduct.3 See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S.
37, 42 (1979) (“A fundamental canon of statutory
construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be

3
To date, we have not spoken precedentially on the
meaning of “sadistic,” “masochistic,” and “violent” as used
within § 2G2.2(b)(4), or otherwise precisely determined what
type of depictions warrant application of the four-level
enhancement provided for in this Guidelines provision. In
United States v. Parmelee, we suggested that images
depicting sexual abuse and bondage of children should have
compelled a district court to apply the four level
enhancement, yet we did not elaborate further on the actual
meaning of the terms within § 2G2.2(b)(4) or the general
circumstances under which the enhancement should apply.
See 319 F.3d 583, 585 n.3, 594 (3d Cir. 2003). In United
States v. Miller, we briefly commented on the meaning of
“sadomasochistic” when determining whether a district court
had correctly concluded that the appellant‟s testimony was
perjurious. See 527 F.3d 54, 59, 76-79 (3d Cir. 2008). Our
discussion of the term‟s meaning, however, was limited to
whether it was clear enough to conclude that the defendant
knowingly gave false testimony when he denied possessing
images fitting this description. See id. Finally, in United
States v. Grober, we generally discussed the enhancements
set forth in § 2G2.2(b), including subsection (b)(4), however
our ruling neither addressed nor resolved the issues before us
in the instant appeal. See 624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010). Our
remaining consideration of § 2G2.2(b)(4) and the terms
within is limited to non-precedential decisions.

9
interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning.”); United States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252, 268
(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d
450, 452 (3d Cir. 1992), for the proposition that “[w]e
construe terms of the Guidelines according to their plain
meaning” and relying on a dictionary for this purpose).
Moreover, other circuits have construed this Guidelines
provision according to the ordinary meaning of its terms, and
we too are comfortable following this approach. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 614-15 (9th Cir.
2003); United States v. Lyckman, 235 F.3d 234, 238 (5th Cir.
2000); United States v. Delmarle, 99 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir.
1996).

Webster‟s Dictionary defines “sadism” as “the
infliction of pain . . . as a means of obtaining sexual release,”
“delight in physical or mental cruelty,” and “excessive
cruelty.” WEBSTER‟S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (unabridged) 1997-98 (1993). “Masochism,” on
the other hand, is defined as obtaining “sexual gratification
through the acceptance of physical abuse or humiliation.” Id.
at 1388. “Violence” is defined primarily as the “exertion of
any physical force so as to injure or abuse.” Id. at 2554.
Although violence, in isolation, can be interpreted broadly, its
use here immediately follows the more narrow and specific
terms “sadistic or masochistic conduct,” and thus we are
compelled to construe its meaning narrowly. See CSX
Transp., Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101,
1113 (2011) (“We typically use ejusdem generis to ensure
that a general word will not render specific words
meaningless.”); see also Lyckman, 235 F.3d at 238 (“[T]he
general term „other depictions of violence‟ casts its net no
wider than necessary to capture images akin to those included

10
by § 2G2.2(b)([4])‟s more specific terms.”). Thus, we are
content that an expansive application of the enhancement is
not tenable, and we reject Maurer‟s contention that §
2G2.2(b)(4) is vague and overly broad.4

4
Maurer couches his argument that § 2G2.2(b)(4) is
vague and overbroad in general terms, contending simply that
these defects render a sentencing court‟s application of this
provision an abuse of discretion. Nowhere in his appellate
brief does he claim that these alleged defects render §
2G2.2(b)(4) unconstitutionally vague. To the extent that
Maurer‟s argument can be construed as a claim of
unconstitutional vagueness, we similarly reject this claim.
Given the clarity of the enhancement when interpreted
according to the ordinary meaning of its terms, we are
confident that the provision does not fail to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice of the conduct to which it
applies. See United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 319-20 (3d
Cir. 1992) (considering a claim of constitutional vagueness
with respect to a specific Guidelines provision and holding
that the provision was not unconstitutionally vague in part
because it gave fair notice), superseded by statute on other
grounds, as stated in United States v. Roberson, 194 F.3d
408, 417 (3d Cir. 1999). Similarly, we are confident that the
enhancement, as written, does not authorize or encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See United States
v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 249 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that
a statute may also be unconstitutionally vague if it “authorizes
or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.” (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732
(2000))).
Additionally, Maurer cannot show vagueness in light
of the facts of his specific case. See United States v. Mazurie,

11
 After considering the ordinary meaning of these terms,
we join other circuits in holding that the application of §
2G2.2(b)(4) is appropriate where an image depicts sexual
activity involving a prepubescent minor that would have
caused pain to the minor.5 We believe that this approach is

419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975) (“It is well established that
vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First
Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts
of the case at hand.”); Jones, 979 F.2d at 319-20 (requiring an
appellant to show vagueness in light of the facts of his
specific case when alleging that a Guidelines provision was
unconstitutionally vague). The images at issue here, which,
as noted, depicted prepubescent children being bound and
sexually penetrated by adults, should have put Maurer on
notice that their possession could trigger the four level
enhancement in § 2G2.2(b)(4). See United States v. Rearden,
349 F.3d 608, 615 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that “[a] person of
reasonable intelligence would figure that a picture of [a male
sexually penetrating a child] portrays an adult male‟s pleasure
at the expense of the child‟s pain.”).
5
See United States v. Rodgers, 610 F.3d 975, 978-79
(7th Cir. 2010) (“We have found that § 2G2.2(b)(4) applies to
acts likely to cause physical pain.”) (internal citation
omitted); United States v. Freeman, 578 F.3d 142, 146 (2d
Cir. 2009) (“[I]f a sentencing court finds that (1) an image
depicts sexual activity involving a minor and (2) the depicted
activity would have caused pain to the minor, that court need
not make any additional findings in order to impose a four-
level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4).”); United
States v. Belflower, 390 F.3d 560, 562 (8th Cir. 2004)
(“[I]mages involving the sexual penetration of a minor girl by

12
consistent with the meaning of § 2G2.2(b)(4) and that it
provides a sufficiently narrow basis on which sentencing
courts may determine whether the enhancement applies.
Moreover, in light of our interpretation of § 2G2.2(b)(4), we
hold that in order to apply this enhancement, a sentencing
court need only find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
an image depicts sexual activity involving a prepubescent
minor and that the depicted activity would have caused pain
to the minor. See United States v. Freeman, 578 F.3d 142,
147-48 (2d Cir. 2009). We agree with other circuits that it is
well within the sentencing court‟s discretion and capacity to
make this finding and that nothing more is required to sustain
application of the enhancement. See United States v. Caro,
309 F.3d 1348, 1352 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases

an adult male and images of an adult male performing anal
sex on a minor girl or boy are per se sadistic or violent within
the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)([4]).”); Rearden, 349
F.3d at 616 (“We join these circuits, and hold that the district
court did not improperly apply § 2G2.2(b)([4]) after finding
that the images depicted subjection of a child to a sexual act
that would have to be painful, and thus sadistic.”); United
States v. Bender, 290 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[A]
photograph is sadistic within the meaning of Section
2G2.2(b)([4]) when it depicts the subjection of a young child
to a sexual act that would have to be painful.”) (internal
quotations and citations omitted)); Lyckman, 235 F.3d at 239
(“[I]t was certainly reasonable for the district court to infer
that the conduct depicted by the photographs caused the
children pain, physical or emotional or both, and therefore
constitutes sadism or violence within the meaning of the
guideline.”).

13
holding that expert testimony is not required to determine
whether depicted conduct is “sadistic”); Lyckman, 235 F.3d at
239 (“[I]t was certainly reasonable for the district court to
infer that the conduct depicted . . . caused the children pain . .
. and therefore constitutes sadism or violence within the
meaning of the guideline.”); Delmarle, 99 F.3d at 83 (“[I]t
was within the [sentencing] court‟s discretion to conclude that
the subjection of a young child to a sexual act that would
have to be painful is excessively cruel and hence is sadistic
within the meaning of § 2G2.2(b)([4]).”).

Additionally, contrary to Maurer‟s claim, there is no
need for the sentencing court to determine whether a
defendant intended to possess the images or actually derived
pleasure from viewing them. Section 2G2.2(b)(4) is applied
on the basis of strict liability. See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4)
Application Note 2 (“Subsection (b)(4) applies if the offense
involved material that portrays sadistic or masochistic
conduct or other depictions of violence, regardless of whether
the defendant specifically intended to possess, access with
intent to view, receive, or distribute such materials.”)
(emphasis added); United States v. Richardson, 238 F.3d 837,
840 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[L]iability for receiving violent child
pornography is strict. Sentencing enhancements generally are
imposed on the basis of strict liability rather than of the
defendant‟s intentions or even his lack of care.”). Moreover,
we agree with the Second Circuit that this factual inquiry is
an objective one, and thus, “[a] sentencing court need not
determine whether the people depicted in the image are
deriving sexual pleasure from the infliction of pain; nor need
it gauge whether the viewer of the picture is likely to derive
pleasure from the fact that the image displays painful sexual
acts.” Freeman, 578 F.3d at 146. Thus, Maurer‟s contention

14
that the District Court needed to establish that he intended to
possess or actually derived pleasure from viewing the images
at issue here is unavailing.

We also note our belief that the application of §
2G2.2(b)(4) is not limited to circumstances where the pain
that would result from the depicted conduct is the result of
sexual penetration by an adult or bondage of a child.6 As the
Fifth Circuit observed in Lyckman, many of the cases
involving the application of this enhancement involve
“pornographic images depicting bondage or the insertion of
foreign objects into the body canals of a child,” but such
“images hardly exhaust the malevolent universe of sexual
violence against children.” See 235 F.3d at 238-39. Thus,
although we interpret § 2G2.2(b)(4) as applying to a restricted
universe of conduct limited by the ordinary meanings of its
terms, we do not interpret this provision so narrowly as to

6
This position is consistent with precedent in other
circuits. For example, the Seventh Circuit determined that §
2G2.2(b)(4) applies not only to “acts likely to cause physical
pain,” but also to “sexual gratification which is purposefully
degrading and humiliating, [and] conduct which causes
mental suffering or psychological or emotional injury in the
victim.” Rodgers, 610 F.3d at 978-79 (internal citations
omitted). Similarly, the Eighth Circuit noted that “the terms
„violence‟ and „sadism,‟ as ordinarily used, are not limited to
activity involving a rope, belt, whip, chains,” and held that §
2G2.2(b)(4) applies more broadly to acts that depicted sexual
gratification resulting from a child‟s pain, irrespective of
whether those acts specifically involved bondage or sexual
penetration. See United States v. Parker, 267 F.3d 839, 847
(2001) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4)).

15
restrict its application to a subset of sadistic and violent acts
of sexual abuse. Sentencing courts are free to apply the
enhancement whenever an image depicts sexual activity
involving a prepubescent minor that would have caused pain
to the minor, regardless of the means through which that pain
would result.

Turning now to the facts of Maurer‟s case, we observe
that the District Court applied § 2G2.2(b)(4) based upon a
correct interpretation of the enhancement provision and after
making the required findings articulated above. The District
Court explained, “I do think that [the enhancement] is
appropriately applied . . . because to indicate that children
being essentially molested, raped and tortured is not sadistic
or somehow masochistic, I think it strains credibility to make
that argument. . . . [a]nd this case is certainly no different,
given the videos that were involved, the photos that were
involved.” (J.A. at 67.) The images and videos the court
referred to included the following depictions: “a prepubescent
. . . male . . . anally penetrated by an older male”; “a
prepubescent . . . female with her wrist bound to her ankle
with duct tape”; and an image of “a prepubescent . . . female,
her legs bound above her head with white rope, with an object
inserted between her legs.” (PSR ¶¶ 17, 23.) Although the
District Court did not explicitly state that these sexual acts
would cause pain, it is clear from the District Court‟s
references to “rape,” “torture,” and “children,” and its
statement that “this case is certainly no different,” that it
believed the depicted acts would have caused the children
pain. Thus, the District Court‟s decision to apply the four
level enhancement under § 2G2.2(b)(4) was supported by the
required findings we articulated above—namely, that the
images Maurer possessed depicted sexual activity involving a

16
prepubescent minor that would have caused the child to
experience pain. Moreover, the District Court‟s conclusion
that these acts fit within the meaning of “sadistic” rested on a
sound interpretation of the enhancement. Without dwelling
further on the horrid acts depicted within the pictures and
videos Maurer possessed, we will simply express our belief
that it does indeed “strain[] credibility” to argue that these
actions are not “sadistic” within the ordinary meaning of that
term. Accordingly, the District Court did not misinterpret the
meaning of the enhancement, commit a procedural error, or
otherwise abuse its discretion in applying § 2G2.2(b)(4) based
on the facts of Maurer‟s offense. Therefore, we hold that the
District Court properly applied the four level enhancement.

We also find no merit in Maurer‟s contention that the
court abused its discretion by accepting the plea agreement
and then making additional factual findings beyond those
factual stipulations provided within it. The agreement itself
explicitly states that “[t]his agreement to stipulate . . . cannot
and does not bind the sentencing judge, who may make
independent factual findings and may reject any or all of the
stipulations entered into by the parties.” (J.A. at 22.)
Moreover, we have previously held that “[a] sentencing court
is not bound by factual stipulations in a plea agreement and
has discretion to make factual findings based on other
relevant information.” United States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d
789, 792 n.6 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Nothing in the
record indicates, nor does Maurer allege, that the agreement
was anything less than knowing and voluntary. Thus,

17
although the District Court accepted the plea agreement, it
was not thereafter limited by it.7 See id.

Finally, the record clearly demonstrates that the
District Court meaningfully considered Maurer‟s sentencing
arguments, weighed the sentencing factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), and sentenced Maurer to a term of
imprisonment that was reasonable in light of his offense.

B. Special Conditions of Supervised Release

Maurer also challenges two of the special conditions
imposed by the District Court as part of his five-year term of
supervised release. As previously explained, these special
conditions prohibited Maurer: (1) from “possess[ing],

7
We note that in the plea agreement, the Government
never agreed to recommend a specific Guidelines range, nor
did it provide any assurance that it would advocate for a
sentence within the range yielded by the factual stipulations
set forth in the agreement. Furthermore, the plea agreement
explicitly provided: “The sentencing judge may impose any
reasonable sentence up to and including the statutory
maximum term of imprisonment. . . . This Office cannot and
does not make any representation or promise as to what
guideline range may be found by the sentencing judge, or as
to what sentence Derl H. Maurer ultimately will receive.”
(J.A. at 20.) In light of this and other provisions, Maurer is
hard pressed to argue that the District Court‟s acceptance of
the agreement gave rise to an obligation that it sentence him
within a range limited by the factual stipulations set forth
therein.

18
procur[ing], purchas[ing], or otherwise obtain[ing] access to
any form of computer network, bulletin board, Internet, or
exchange format involving computers unless specifically
approved by the U.S. Probation Office,” with disputes
regarding applicability “to be decided by the court”8; and (2)
“from having any contact with children of either sex, under
the age of 18, without the expressed approval of the U.S.
Probation Office . . . [and from] obtain[ing] employment or
perform[ing] volunteer work which includes, as part of its
job/work description, contact with minor children without the
expressed approval of the U.S. Probation Office.” (J.A. at 5.)
Maurer contends that the limitation on internet use is unduly
restrictive given that he neither contacted a minor for sex nor
had a prior record of doing so. Maurer similarly argues that
the prohibition on contact with minors is unsupported by the
facts underlying his offense of conviction and that the
condition amounts to an excessive delegation of authority to
the Office of Probation. Because Maurer did not object to the
District Court‟s imposition of these special conditions at the
sentencing hearing, we review for plain error.9 Heckman, 592
F.3d at 404.

8
Hereinafter we will refer generally to this condition as
a restriction on “internet” use. Notably, the condition at issue
here is distinct from and more narrow than a restriction on
“computer” use, which would bar a defendant from accessing
both computers and the internet.
9
We use a four-prong analysis to determine whether the
district court committed plain error. An appellant must show:
(1) an error was committed; (2) the error was plain; (3) the
error affected the defendant‟s substantial rights; and (4) the
error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Olano,

19
 Although sentencing judges have broad discretion in
fashioning special conditions of supervised release, this
discretion is not without limit. Id. at 405. Sentencing courts
must exercise this discretion within the parameters of 18
U.S.C. § 3583, which requires that any special conditions be
“reasonably related” to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a).10 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a)-(d). Moreover, any such
condition must impose “no greater deprivation of liberty than
is reasonably necessary” to deter future criminal conduct,
protect the public, and rehabilitate the defendant. 18 U.S.C. §
3583(d)(2); see United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 248-
49 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that the considerations included in §
3583 by the incorporation of § 3553(a) “are fairly broad, but

507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993). “A plainly erroneous condition
of supervised release will inevitably affect substantial rights,
as a defendant who fails to meet that condition will be subject
to further incarceration.” United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d
241, 251 (3d Cir. 2005). Moreover, imposing a sentence not
authorized by law “seriously affects the fairness, integrity,
and reputation of the proceedings.” Id. Thus, if we find that
the District Court plainly erred in imposing this supervised
release condition, we must vacate the condition.
10
Those factors include: “(1) the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; [and] (2) the need for the
sentence imposed . . . (B) to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant
with needed educational or vocational training, medical care,
or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

20
they do impose a real restriction on the district court‟s
freedom to impose conditions on supervised release.”).11

B.1. Special Condition Restricting Internet Access

We have previously identified several key
considerations when addressing challenges to special
conditions restricting internet and computer use. In United
States v. Heckman, we explained that “three factors [] have
guided our prior holdings in this area: (1) the length and (2)

11
We also observe that, “courts of appeals have
consistently required district courts to set forth factual
findings to justify special probation conditions,” United
States v. Warren, 186 F.3d 358, 366 (3d Cir. 1999); however,
“[w]here a sentencing court fails to adequately explain its
reasons for imposing a condition of supervised release or the
condition‟s relationship to the applicable sentencing factors,
we may nevertheless affirm the condition if we can „ascertain
any viable basis for the . . . restriction in the record before the
District Court . . . on our own.‟” United States v. Voelker,
489 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Warren, 186 F.3d
at 367). Although Maurer does not discuss this requirement
in his appellate brief, our independent review of the record
reveals that the District Court failed to explain the factual
underpinnings of the special conditions it imposed. We do
not believe that this defect requires that we vacate these
conditions, however, as we are able to identify a viable basis
for their imposition. See Voelker, 489 F.3d at 144. The
nature of Maurer‟s computer use, the character and size of his
child pornography collection, and his stated sexual interest in
minors provide ample grounds for imposition of these special
conditions.

21
coverage of the imposed ban; and, (3) the defendant‟s
underlying conduct.” 592 F.3d at 405. Consistent with this
approach, in United States v. Miller, we explained: “First, we
must examine the scope of the supervised release condition,
including both its duration and its substantive breadth—here,
the degree to which access to computers and the internet is
restricted. . . . Second, we must consider the severity of the
defendant‟s criminal conduct and the facts underlying the
conviction, with a particular focus on whether the defendant
used a computer or the internet to solicit or otherwise
personally endanger children.” 594 F.3d 172, 187 (3d Cir.
2010). Although these factors provide a helpful framework
for analyzing the challenge presented here, we remain
cognizant of the reality that “this is an area of law that
requires a fact-specific analysis.” See Heckman, 592 F.3d at
405.

Maurer argues that the circumstances of his offense,
when considered in light of the factors highlighted above and
compared to other cases in our circuit dealing with similar
challenges, require that we vacate the special condition
restricting his use of the internet. In support of this position,
Maurer places considerable emphasis on the fact that his use
of the internet did not involve sexual exploitation of an
individual who was actually a minor. Indeed, as noted above,
the presence or absence of such conduct has been an
important factor in previous decisions of this Court wherein
we considered the reasonableness of restrictions on internet
and computer use. See Miller, 594 F.3d at 187. For example,
in United States v. Crandon, we upheld a three-year ban on
internet use because the defendant “used the Internet as a
means to develop an illegal sexual relationship with a young
girl.” 173 F.3d 122, 125, 127 (3d Cir. 1999). Similarly, in

22
United States v. Thielemann, we upheld a computer
restriction where a defendant, in addition to possessing child
pornography, encouraged another person through an online
“chat” to have sexual contact with a young girl. 575 F.3d
265, 278-79 (3d Cir. 2009). In contrast, in United States v.
Voelker, we struck down a lifetime ban on computer use
given its “extraordinary breadth” and because the defendant
“did not use his computer equipment to seek out minors nor
did he attempt to set up any meetings with minors over the
internet.” 489 F.3d at 144, 146. Thus, Maurer is correct that
in addition to considering the length and breadth of such
restrictions, our analysis looks to whether or not the
defendant used the computer and internet to engage in
predatory behavior.

Contrary to Maurer‟s position, however, our
consideration of this factor as well as its underlying concerns
actually militate in favor of upholding the restriction on his
use of the internet. Although Maurer did not in this particular
instance use the internet to exploit a person that was actually
a minor, his use of the internet nonetheless triggers concerns
of predation that we believe are sufficient to sustain the
restriction at issue here. While “Nate” was, insofar as Maurer
knew, eighteen years old and therefore not a minor, Maurer
explicitly stated via an internet message that he was interested
in “young guys too your age and under.” (PSR ¶ 10
(emphasis added).) Moreover, Maurer was clearly willing to
use the internet to facilitate a sexual encounter. He directed
“Nate” to a website featuring images of himself engaging in
sexual acts and later expressed a desire “to meet and have
some good fun together.” (Id. ¶ 16.) These facts, when
viewed together, demonstrate that Maurer‟s use of the internet
went beyond simply obtaining child pornography. Maurer‟s

23
expressed interest in minors, when coupled with his
demonstrated willingness to use the internet as a means for
arranging sexual encounters, presents a tangible risk to
children. This risk exists notwithstanding the fact that “Nate”
was eighteen years old insofar as Maurer knew at the time.
Thus, although Maurer did not actually use the internet to
seek out a minor in this particular instance, we believe that
the unique facts of his offense trigger the very concerns that
animated our consideration of the solicitation and predation
concerns highlighted in Miller. See 594 F.3d at 187.

We also believe that the duration and scope of the
restriction on internet use are reasonable. While there is no
precise formula for determining what constitutes a reasonable
length of time, five years falls comfortably within the range
of time periods we have previously upheld. See, e.g.,
Thielemann, 575 F.3d at 270, 278 (upholding a special
condition lasting for ten years); Crandon, 173 F.3d at 125,
127-28 (upholding a special condition lasting for three years).
Although Maurer is an older man, his age was not an obstacle
to committing the instant offense, and we do not believe his
age renders a five-year restriction excessive. The scope of the
restriction is also sufficiently narrow. Rather than restricting
all computer use, the District Court limited only Maurer‟s
access to the internet, with exceptions to be provided by the
Probation Office. Once released, Maurer may still use a
computer for daily tasks. Thus, this restriction does not
amount to “cybernetic banishment,” as did the condition in
Voelker, 489 F.3d at 148, and it is more akin to the
sufficiently narrow internet-only conditions we affirmed in

24
Crandon and Theilemann.12 See 575 F.3d 278-79; 173 F.3d
at 127-128. Furthermore, the District Court expressly stated
at sentencing that disputes regarding the applicability of the
restrictions would be “decided by the court.” (J.A. at 72.)

The restriction on internet use therefore shares a nexus
to the goals of deterrence and protection of the public and
does not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is
necessary in this case. Accordingly, the District Court did not
plainly err in imposing this condition.

B.2. Special Condition Restricting Association with
Minors

We also reject Maurer‟s contention that the restriction
on contact with minors is overly broad and amounts to an
excessive delegation of authority to the Office of Probation.
As discussed above, in the course of a conversation with
“Nate” wherein Maurer ultimately suggested meeting for a

12
Our explanation in Thielemann is equally applicable
here. Therein, we acknowledged that “[c]omputers and
Internet access have become virtually indispensable in the
modern world.” 575 F.3d at 278 (citation and quotation
marks omitted). Nonetheless, we found the restriction on
internet use appropriate given the fact that the defendant
could “own or use a personal computer as long as it is not
connected to the internet; thus he is allowed to use word
processing programs and other benign software. Further, he
may seek permission from the Probation Office to use the
internet during the term of his ten-year restriction, which is a
far cry from the unyielding lifetime restriction in Voelker.”
Id.

25
sexual encounter, Maurer stated that he had a sexual interest
in minors. Moreover, his substantial collection of child
pornography contained a number of images that depicted
sadistic and violent sexual abuse of prepubescent children.
These facts, taken together, suggest that Maurer is a risk to
children, and therefore the District Court did not plainly err in
restricting his contact with minors, regardless of the fact that
he was convicted only for possession of child pornography.
See United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 254, 268 (3d Cir.
2001) (upholding a special condition restricting contact with
minors where defendant was convicted solely of possessing
child pornography, but where other facts in the record
indicated that defendant was a danger to children). Given the
risk Maurer presents, we believe that this special condition
shares a nexus to the goals of deterrence and protection of the
public and does not involve a greater deprivation of liberty
than is necessary in this case.

Finally, we do not believe that this restriction, which
permits the Probation Office to approve exceptions, amounts
to an excessive delegation of authority. “Probation officers
have broad statutory authority to advise and supervise
probationers, and to „perform any other duty that the court
may designate.‟” Pruden, 398 F.3d at 250 (citing 18 U.S.C. §
3603(10)). However, because probation officers are
nonjudicial officers, they may not “decide the nature or extent
of the punishment imposed upon a probationer.” Id. (citation
omitted). We think that the special condition restricting
Maurer‟s contact with children delegates authority to
probation that is in accord with the Probation Office‟s
ministerial role.

26
 Maurer points us to our decisions in Heckman and
Voelker in arguing that the condition restricting his contact
with minors is an improper delegation of authority. Both of
these cases, however, are distinguishable. In Heckman, we
vacated a condition of supervised release which required the
defendant to “follow the directions of the United States
Probation Office regarding any contact with children of either
sex under the age of 18.” 592 F.3d at 411. We interpreted
this condition as delegating complete discretion over
Heckman‟s contact with minors to the Probation Office and
therefore concluded that the condition was improper. Id. In
contrast, the condition at issue here sufficiently defines the
contours of the prohibition, as it specifically prohibits “any
contact with children of either sex, under the age of 18,”
rather than leaving to probation the primary determination of
which children, if any, Maurer may associate with. (J.A. at 5
(emphasis added).) The fact that Probation may nonetheless
determine exceptions does not amount to an impermissible
delegation, as the nature and extent of the punishment
remains predetermined by the District Court.

In Voelker, we vacated as an “unbridled delegation of
authority” a condition with specific terms that more closely
resemble the terms of the condition imposed in Maurer‟s
case.13 489 F.3d at 154. Maurer contends that our holding in
Voelker compels the same outcome here. We disagree. Our
decision in Voelker was driven by two critical facts that are

13
The condition in Voelker read as follows: “The
defendant shall not associate with children under the age of
18 except in the presence of a responsible adult who is aware
of the defendant‟s background and current offense and who
has been approved by the probation officer.” 489 F.3d at 143.

27
not present in the case before us. First, Voelker had two
young children. Id. at 153. Second, the special condition
barring contact with minors was of lifetime duration. Id. at
146. Thus, by imposing a general prohibition with exceptions
to be provided by probation, the sentencing court delegated to
Voelker‟s probation officer the “sole authority for deciding if
[he] will ever have unsupervised contact with any minor,
including his own children, for the rest of his life.” Id. at 154.
Moreover, the record in Voelker‟s case prevented us from
supplying a presumption that the condition would not apply to
Voelker‟s own children. Id.

Whereas the condition at issue in Voelker infringed
upon the relationship with the defendant‟s own children,
Maurer‟s condition is of more limited effect given his age and
circumstances. Each of Maurer‟s children is an adult. Thus,
the restriction on association with minors does not trigger the
concern that animated our determination in Voelker.
Moreover, whereas the condition in Voelker was of lifetime
duration, the condition at issue here lasts only five years.
Absent the unique concerns present in Voelker, we do not find
that the condition restricting Maurer‟s association with
children amounts to an excessive delegation of authority.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we will affirm Maurer‟s
sentence and the two challenged special conditions of
supervised release.

28