United States v. Papagno

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 21, 2010 Decided April 26, 2011

No. 09-3002

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
APPELLEE

v.

VICTOR PAPAGNO,
APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:08-cr-00259)

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was
A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Jeremy S. Barber, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C.
Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III and
Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: GRIFFITH and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and
EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.
 2
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge
KAVANAUGH.

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: Victor Papagno had a goal:
to collect two of every kind of computer or, as he phrased it,
to build the “Noah’s Ark of Computer land.” Unable to buy
such a collection, he decided to steal it. Over 10 years, he
pilfered 19,709 pieces of computer equipment from his
employer, the Naval Research Laboratory.

After he was caught, Papagno pled guilty and was
sentenced to 18 months in prison.

At sentencing, the Government requested that the Court
order Papagno to pay the Naval Research Laboratory about
$160,000 in restitution. That amount would cover the costs
the Laboratory incurred in conducting an internal
investigation of the wrongdoing. The Government argued
that such restitution was required under the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4). That
Act mandates restitution to certain crime victims “for lost
income and necessary child care, transportation, and other
expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or
prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings
related to the offense.” Id.

The question in this case is whether the costs of the Naval
Research Laboratory’s internal investigation constituted
“necessary . . . expenses incurred during participation in the
investigation or prosecution of the offense.” The District
Court agreed with the Government that the costs of the
internal investigation qualified under that statute. The Court
therefore ordered Papagno to pay restitution for the $160,000
expended by the Laboratory during its internal investigation.
 3
The statute authorizes restitution for “necessary . . .
expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or
prosecution of the offense.” We do not read that text to
authorize restitution for the costs of an organization’s internal
investigation, at least when (as here) the internal investigation
was neither required nor requested by the criminal
investigators or prosecutors. In our view, an internal
investigation that is neither required nor requested by criminal
investigators or prosecutors does not entail the organization’s
“participation in the investigation or prosecution of the
offense.” Id. (emphasis added). Our conclusion is supported
by the existence of other restitution statutes – not applicable
here – in which Congress provided for restitution in terms that
plainly cover the costs of an internal investigation. Our
conclusion is further buttressed by the statutory term
“necessary”: The costs of an internal investigation cannot be
said to be necessary if the investigation was neither required
nor requested by criminal investigators or prosecutors.

We reverse the District Court’s judgment ordering
restitution.

I

Victor Papagno was a computer specialist employed by
the Naval Research Laboratory in the District of Columbia.
In 1997, he began to steal from the Laboratory. Papagno
apparently thought nobody would notice when he took home
computer equipment.

For 10 years, Papagno stole computers, monitors,
printers, and other items. He stockpiled them in his basement,
a friend’s father’s basement, another friend’s storage locker,
and a two-story, four-car, 2,775-square-foot detached garage
Papagno built to store his collection. By August 2007, he had
 4
taken home 19,709 pieces of computer equipment – an
average of 37 items per week, every week, for 10 years. The
Naval Research Laboratory apparently never noticed that its
property was missing.

The Naval Criminal Investigative Service – in essence,
the Navy’s equivalent of the FBI – first learned of the theft in
2007. The NCIS was tipped off by Papagno’s wife – as might
be expected, now his ex-wife. Investigators then obtained a
search warrant and discovered the medley of machines
Papagno had collected. The subsequent criminal prosecution
of Papagno was conducted by the United States Attorney’s
Office for the District of Columbia. Prosecutors from that
office eventually filed an information, and Papagno pled
guilty.

Meanwhile, the Naval Research Laboratory recovered
almost everything that Papagno stole. For reasons that remain
unclear, however, the Laboratory then spent an additional
$159,183.15 on an elaborate 3,500-hour internal investigation
regarding property that was worth as little as $120,000. There
is no evidence suggesting that the criminal investigators from
the NCIS or the prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney’s Office
asked the Naval Research Laboratory to conduct its internal
investigation. The Government does not dispute that
Laboratory officials ordered the internal investigation “for
their own purposes.”

At sentencing, the Government argued that the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act required Papagno to pay
for the costs of the Naval Research Laboratory’s internal
investigation. The District Court agreed with the Government
and ordered Papagno to reimburse the Naval Research
Laboratory for the $159,183.15 cost of its internal
investigation. The issue on appeal concerns statutory
 5
interpretation; our review of the District Court’s interpretation
is de novo. See United States v. Ventura, 565 F.3d 870, 875
(D.C. Cir. 2009); see also Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v.
Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714 (1986) (if an appellate court
“believe[s] that the District Court’s factual findings [are]
unassailable, but that the proper rule of law was misapplied to
those findings, it [may] reverse[] the District Court’s
judgment”); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287
(1982) (“if a district court’s findings rest on an erroneous
view of the law, they may be set aside on that basis”); HARRY
T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF
REVIEW 5 (2007).

II

The relevant statute in this case requires restitution “for
lost income and necessary child care, transportation, and other
expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or
prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings
related to the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4). The
question is whether the costs of the Naval Research
Laboratory’s internal investigation were “necessary . . .
expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or
prosecution of the offense.” Id. (emphasis added).

A

We begin with an overview of the statutory landscape
with respect to restitution.

Federal courts may order restitution only when statutes
authorize restitution. Until 1982, federal law authorized
restitution only as part of a defendant’s probation. That
changed when Congress passed and President Reagan signed
the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982. Pub. L. No.
 6
97-291 § 3579, 96 Stat. 1248, 1253 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663). A product of the victims’ rights movement that had
picked up steam in the 1970s, that Act provides federal courts
with discretionary authority to order restitution to victims of
most federal crimes. See John W. Gillis & Douglas E.
Beloof, The Next Step for a Maturing Victim Rights
Movement: Enforcing Crime Victim Rights in the Courts, 33
MCGEORGE L. REV. 689, 690 (2002). The statute authorizes
restitution for three categories of costs: (1) the value of lost
property; (2) the expenses of recovering from bodily injury,
such as medical expenses; and (3) funeral costs. See Pub. L.
No. 97-291 § 3579(b)(1) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(1))
(lost property); id. § 3579(b)(2) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663(b)(2)) (bodily injury); id. § 3579(b)(3) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3663(b)(3)) (funeral costs).

Legislation enacted in 1994 authorized another category
of costs in a § 3663 restitution order. That new provision
empowers courts to “reimburse the victim for lost income and
necessary child care, transportation, and other expenses
related to participation in the investigation or prosecution of
the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the
offense.” Pub. L. No. 103-322 § 40504, 108 Stat. 1796, 1947
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(4)). That language, as we
will explain, is similar to the language employed in the
mandatory restitution statute at issue in this case.

In 1996, Congress passed and President Clinton approved
the statute at issue here – the Mandatory Victims Restitution
Act. Pub. L. No. 104-132 § 204, 110 Stat. 1214, 1227 (1996)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A). As its title indicates, that
Act requires restitution in certain federal cases involving a
subset of the crimes covered by the Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982. (Recall that under the 1982 Act,
restitution is discretionary, not mandatory.) The subset of
 7
crimes subject to mandatory restitution includes certain
violent crimes and property crimes. For the crimes to which it
applies, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996
requires restitution for the same four categories of costs
covered by the 1982 discretionary Victim and Witness
Protection Act, as amended: (1) lost property; (2) the
expenses of recovering from bodily injury, such as medical
expenses; (3) funeral costs; and (4) “lost income and
necessary child care, transportation, and other expenses
incurred during participation in the investigation or
prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings
related to the offense.” Id.

A 2008 statute granted courts additional discretionary
authority to order restitution. Pub. L. No. 110-326 § 202, 122
Stat 3560, 3561 (2008). That provision authorizes restitution
to victims of identity theft – but only to victims of identity
theft – in “an amount equal to the value of the time reasonably
spent by the victim in an attempt to remediate the intended or
actual harm incurred by the victim from the offense.” 18
U.S.C. § 3663(b)(6). Language of that sort, as we will
explain further below, would cover the costs of an internal
investigation.

To sum up so far, the legislation enacted in 1982, 1994,
1996, and 2008 has created the following regime for
restitution:

• For a broad range of federal crimes, there are four
categories of costs subject to discretionary restitution,
one of which is “lost income and necessary child care,
transportation, and other expenses related to
participation in the investigation or prosecution of the
offense or attendance at proceedings related to the
offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663.
 8
• For a subset of those federal crimes, the same four
categories of costs are subject to mandatory
restitution, one of which again is “lost income and
necessary child care, transportation, and other
expenses incurred during participation in the
investigation or prosecution of the offense or
attendance at proceedings related to the offense.” 18
U.S.C. § 3663A.
• For federal identity theft crimes, there are five
categories of costs subject to discretionary restitution
– the four categories for the broad range of federal
crimes listed above and a fifth kind, “the time
reasonably spent by the victim in an attempt to
remediate the intended or actual harm incurred by the
victim from the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(6). 1

B

The issue in this case concerns the fourth category of
costs covered by the 1996 mandatory statute: “lost income
and necessary child care, transportation, and other expenses
incurred during participation in the investigation or
prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings
related to the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4). We must
determine the meaning of “necessary . . . expenses incurred

1
In addition to the Victim and Witness Protection Act and the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, several other statutes authorize
restitution for specific offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 43(c) (damaging
or interfering with an enterprise involving animals); 18 U.S.C.
§ 228(d) (child support violations); 18 U.S.C. § 1593 (peonage,
slavery, and trafficking in persons); 18 U.S.C. § 2248 (sex crimes);
18 U.S.C. § 2259 (sexual exploitation of children); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2264 (domestic violence); 18 U.S.C. § 2327 (telemarketing
fraud); 21 U.S.C. § 853(q) (amphetamine and methamphetamine
offenses).
 9
during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the
offense.”

To begin with, the singular “offense” referred to in
§ 3663A(b)(4) is of course the criminal offense of conviction.
The singular “investigation or prosecution” of “the offense” is
therefore the criminal investigation and prosecution that is
usually conducted by the FBI or other federal investigators
and the local United States Attorney’s office. The
Government does not argue otherwise.

The central question here concerns the statutory term
“participation.” The Government argues that “participation in
the investigation or prosecution of the offense” means
anything that significantly assists the criminal investigation or
prosecution. The Government posits that the Naval Research
Laboratory’s internal investigation of Papagno’s wrongdoing
constituted “participation in the investigation or prosecution
of the offense” because it assisted the criminal investigators
or prosecutors.

We disagree with the Government’s effort to equate the
terms “assistance” and “participation.” In common parlance,
the two terms are not equivalent. The company that provides
electricity to power the sound system at our oral arguments
assists the proceedings, but its employees are not ordinarily
said to have participated in the oral argument. Engineers who
design soldiers’ weapons aid the war effort, but the engineers
are not thought to participate in the war; rather, they are said
to provide support. Fans at a basketball game might help the
home team win the game (and earn the title “sixth man”), but
even the fans who wear jerseys and are given the choke sign
by the opposing team’s star player do not participate in the
game. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UrtVZftjbhk.
A health insurance company may pay for a patient’s
 10
operation, but the insurer does not participate in the operation
at the hospital. The hardy Bostonians who hold cups of water
on the side of the road help runners in the marathon, but they
do not themselves participate in the race. The officers who
provide security at a Taylor Swift show certainly assist, but
no one would say that they participate in the performance.

The dictionary definition of “participation” is the “act of
taking part or sharing in something.” AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1319 (3d ed. 1996);
see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1229 (9th ed. 2009)
(“The act of taking part in something, such as a partnership, a
crime, or a trial.”).

Consistent with common parlance and the dictionary
definition, the Supreme Court has rejected the proposition that
“aid” equals “participation.” In Reves v. Ernst & Young, for
example, the Court considered whether the word “participate”
– as used in RICO – is a synonym for “aid and abet.” 507
U.S. 170, 178-79 (1993). The Court held that “participate”
does not cast so broad a net: Individuals do not “participate
. . . in the conduct of . . . affairs” simply because they “aid and
abet” the affairs. Id. at 179. Instead, the Court recognized
that “‘participate’ appears to have a narrower meaning.” Id.
at 178. It added that the “common understanding of the word
‘participate’” is “‘to take part in.’” Id. at 179 (quoting
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1646
(1976)). In Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v.
Yeskey, the Supreme Court again defined “participate” as to
“have a share in common with others; to partake; share, as in
a debate.” 524 U.S. 206, 211 (1998) (quoting WEBSTER’S
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1782 (2d ed. 1949)).

Applying the common understanding and dictionary
definition, as well as the Supreme Court’s precedents, we
 11
conclude that the Naval Research Laboratory was not
participating in the criminal investigation or prosecution of
Papagno when it conducted its internal investigation. 2 The
criminal investigators and prosecutors neither required nor
requested the Laboratory’s internal investigation. Indeed, the
Government itself acknowledged that Laboratory officials
conducted the internal investigation “for their own purposes.”
The possibility that the Laboratory’s internal investigation
might later assist the criminal investigation or prosecution –
for example, in plea negotiations – does not mean those who
conducted the internal investigation were somehow taking
part in the separate, criminal investigation or prosecution
conducted by the criminal investigators and prosecutors.

The oddity of the Government’s argument becomes even
more apparent when we consider that an organization’s
internal investigation could begin either before or after the
criminal investigation begins. If assisting the criminal
investigation were alone enough to constitute “participation”
in the criminal investigation, as the Government argues, then
even an internal investigation that preceded the criminal
investigation could qualify as “participation.” That result
seems anomalous at best: After all, one cannot ordinarily be
participating in something that has not yet begun.

Our reading of the term “participation” to exclude an
organization’s internal investigation – at least one that has not
been required or requested by criminal investigators or
prosecutors – is further buttressed by Congress’s 2008
amendment to the discretionary restitution statute. As we
2
An “internal investigation” is a term generally used when an
organization asks an attorney, investigator, or auditor to look into
suspected wrongdoing within the organization and determine, for
example, what went wrong, whom to hold accountable, and how to
prevent recurrence of the problem.
 12
noted above, Congress in 2008 authorized restitution for “an
amount equal to the value of the time reasonably spent by the
victim in an attempt to remediate the intended or actual harm
incurred by the victim from the offense.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663(b)(6). That kind of language encompasses the
reasonable costs of an organizational victim’s internal
investigation, even if the internal investigation was neither
required nor requested by the criminal investigators or
prosecutors. Such language would authorize the restitution
the Government is seeking in this case, if it applied to
Papagno’s crime. But it doesn’t. Congress limited that new
provision to identity theft crimes. And Congress did not add
similar language to the mandatory restitution statute at issue
in this case. As the Supreme Court has often stated, when
“Congress includes particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Kucana v.
Holder, 130 S.Ct. 827, 838 (2010). 3 We thus must assume
3
The dissimilar language need not always have been enacted
at the same time or found in the same statute. For example, the
Supreme Court pointed to language in the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (enacted
in 1980) when it interpreted the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (enacted in 1976) to exclude reimbursement for
certain environmental cleanup costs. The Court reasoned that
Congress “demonstrated in CERCLA that it knew how to provide
for the recovery of cleanup costs, and . . . the language used to
define the remedies under RCRA does not provide that remedy.”
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996); see also
United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 129 S.Ct.
2230, 2235 (2009) (when “Congress includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion”); Dean v. United
States, 129 S.Ct. 1849, 1854 (2009) (same); Nken v. Holder, 129
 13
Congress acted intentionally (in 2008 and before) in deciding
when to authorize restitution for costs of the kind associated
with internal investigations. See generally Central Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 176-77 (1994).

One final and additional problem with the Government’s
position: The statute here authorizes restitution only for
“necessary” costs. It is difficult – indeed, impossible – to
argue that an internal investigation neither required nor
requested by criminal investigators was an expense necessary
for the Naval Research Laboratory’s participation in the
investigation or prosecution of the offense. In our view, the
term “necessary” further demonstrates the problems with the
Government’s interpretation of this statutory provision.

Under the above analysis, the next question becomes:
What costs do qualify as “necessary . . . expenses incurred
during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the
offense”? We think that standard would clearly encompass,
for example, the costs associated with a victim’s wearing a
wire, at the FBI’s request, to a meeting with a witness. It
would also include the expense involved in producing
documents in response to a subpoena or document request. In
those examples, however, the victim is at least doing
something required or requested by the criminal investigators
or prosecutors. We have trouble seeing how a victim can be

S.Ct. 1749, 1759 (2009) (same); Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S.Ct.
1058, 1065 (2009) (same); Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex
rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 671 (2008) (same); Lopez v. Gonzales,
549 U.S. 47, 55 (2006) (same); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,
578 (2006) (same); Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. v. White,
548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006) (same principle); S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine
Board of Environmental Protection, 547 U.S. 370, 384 (2006)
(same).
 14
said to participate in the criminal investigation or prosecution
when (as here) it is conducting its own internal investigation
for its own purposes – an internal investigation neither
required nor requested by criminal investigators or
prosecutors. 4

To be clear, although we hold today that the statute does
not reach the costs of an internal investigation that was not
required or requested by the criminal investigators or
prosecutors, we do not mean to suggest that the statute always
covers the costs of one that was. We leave open whether and
under what circumstances the costs of an internal
investigation would be covered if required or requested by
criminal investigators or prosecutors. 5

It is true that Papagno’s activities caused, in some
Palsgrafian sense, the costs incurred by the Naval Research
Laboratory for its internal investigation. But this particular
restitution provision – unlike some others – does not afford a
right to reimbursement for all costs caused in some sense by
the defendant. This is not a consequential damages statute.
This text has a narrower focus. We cannot distort the
language of this statute to achieve an objective that its text
does not reach. Congress of course remains free to alter or

4
Costs incurred from attending FBI interviews, grand jury
proceedings, and trial proceedings also qualify for restitution under
§ 3663A(b)(4). The statute explicitly provides restitution for those
costs by specifying coverage for “attendance at proceedings related
to the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4).
5
It is not particularly common for criminal investigators to ask
an organization to conduct an internal investigation. Criminal
investigators tend to think such activity can compromise the
criminal investigation or subsequent prosecution – for example, by
multiplying witness statements.
 15
update the statute, as it has done with restitution statutes on
several occasions.

In reaching our conclusion, we recognize that several
other courts of appeals have taken a broader view of the
restitution provision at issue here. See, e.g., United States v.
Amato, 540 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Elson,
577 F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hosking, 567
F.3d 329 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Stennis-Williams,
557 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2009). We have carefully considered
the reasoning of those decisions but respectfully disagree.

***

We hold that the costs of the Naval Research
Laboratory’s internal investigation were not “necessary . . .
expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or
prosecution of the offense” for purposes of the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act. We reverse the District Court’s
judgment ordering restitution.

So ordered.
 16
APPENDIX

§ 3663. Order of restitution

***

(b) The order may require that such defendant –

(1) in the case of an offense resulting in damage to or
loss or destruction of property of a victim of the
offense –

(A) return the property to the owner of the
property or someone designated by the owner;
or

(B) if return of the property under subparagraph
(A) is impossible, impractical, or inadequate,
pay an amount equal to the greater of –

(i) the value of the property on the date of
the damage, loss, or destruction, or

(ii) the value of the property on the date of
sentencing,

less the value (as of the date the
property is returned) of any part of the
property that is returned;

(2) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury
to a victim including an offense under chapter 109A
or chapter 110 –
 17
(A) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary
medical and related professional services and
devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and
psychological care, including nonmedical care
and treatment rendered in accordance with a
method of healing recognized by the law of the
place of treatment;

(B) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary
physical and occupational therapy and
rehabilitation; and

(C) reimburse the victim for income lost by such
victim as a result of such offense;

(3) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury
also results in the death of a victim, pay an amount
equal to the cost of necessary funeral and related
services;

(4) in any case, reimburse the victim for lost
income and necessary child care, transportation,
and other expenses related to participation in the
investigation or prosecution of the offense or
attendance at proceedings related to the offense;

(5) in any case, if the victim (or if the victim is
deceased, the victim’s estate) consents, make
restitution in services in lieu of money, or make
restitution to a person or organization designated by
the victim or the estate; and

(6) in the case of an offense under sections
1028(a)(7) or 1028A(a) of this title, pay an amount
equal to the value of the time reasonably spent by
 18
the victim in an attempt to remediate the intended
or actual harm incurred by the victim from the
offense.

***

§ 3663A. Mandatory restitution to victims of certain
crimes

***

(b) The order of restitution shall require that such
defendant –

(1) in the case of an offense resulting in damage to or
loss or destruction of property of a victim of the
offense –

(A) return the property to the owner of the
property or someone designated by the owner;
or

(B) if return of the property under subparagraph
(A) is impossible, impractical, or inadequate,
pay an amount equal to –

(i) the greater of –

(I) the value of the property on the date
of the damage, loss, or destruction; or

(II) the value of the property on the
date of sentencing, less
 19
(ii) the value (as of the date the property is
returned) of any part of the property that is
returned;

(2) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury
to a victim –

(A) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary
medical and related professional services and
devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and
psychological care, including nonmedical care
and treatment rendered in accordance with a
method of healing recognized by the law of the
place of treatment;

(B) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary
physical and occupational therapy and
rehabilitation; and

(C) reimburse the victim for income lost by such
victim as a result of such offense;

(3) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury
that results in the death of the victim, pay an amount
equal to the cost of necessary funeral and related
services; and

(4) in any case, reimburse the victim for lost
income and necessary child care, transportation,
and other expenses incurred during participation
in the investigation or prosecution of the offense or
attendance at proceedings related to the offense.

***