[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-14623 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar APRIL 26, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-00258-ODE-LTW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GASPAR CASTANEDA-PELEAZ,
llllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(April 26, 2011)
Before WILSON, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gaspar Castañeda-Peleaz appeals his 37-month sentence, imposed at the
high end of the applicable Guideline range, after pleading guilty to one count of
re-entry of a deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2).
Castañeda now contends that his 37-month sentence was substantively
unreasonable because the district court placed undue weight on and improperly
relied on his prior criminal conduct, which had already been included in
calculating his Guideline range. Upon review of the record and consideration of
the parties’ briefs, we affirm Castañeda’s sentence.
Castañeda’s sentence fell at the top of the applicable 30–37 month range,
and we ordinarily expect guideline sentences to be reasonable. United States v.
Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Moreover, Castañeda’s
37-month sentence was also well below the 20-year statutory maximum penalty.
See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the
statutory maximum).
The district court did emphasize Castañeda’s prior criminal convictions.
However, the court also explicitly or implicitly referenced several other 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors. For example, the court inquired about sentences for defendants
in illegal re-entry cases with a criminal history category V. § 3553(a)(6). The
court also discussed the need for deterrence, the need to protect the community,
and the hope that incarceration would help Castañeda deal with his alcohol
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addiction. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C), (D). To Castañeda’s benefit, the district court
considered that Castañeda’s family resides in Mexico, but ultimately determined
that his family was not a sufficient deterrent to prevent a future attempt to re-enter
the United States.
Therefore, although the court placed emphasis on Castañeda’s prior
convictions, it did not do so “single-mindedly” to the detriment of the other
§ 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir.
2006) (holding a sentence unreasonable when the court focused “single-mindedly”
on restitution). The weight to be given any particular factor is left to the sound
discretion of the district court absent a clear error of judgment. United States v.
Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008). Because Castañeda’s sentence was
supported by the § 3553(a) factors, the court did not commit a clear error of
judgment in weighing those factors. As the district court did not abuse its
discretion, we affirm the sentence as reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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