In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
D ERRICK C OURTLAND, JOSEPH A DDISON, and
JOHN B ACON,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 09-cr-30101-MJR—Michael J. Reagan, Judge.
A RGUED JANUARY 6, 2011—D ECIDED A PRIL 27, 2011
Before E ASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and C UDAHY and
R OVNER, Circuit Judges.
C UDAHY, Circuit Judge. Defendants Derrick Courtland,
John Bacon and Joseph Addison pleaded guilty to a dog
fighting conspiracy and the district court sentenced them
to varying terms of incarceration above the guidelines
recommendation. Each defendant appeals his sentence,
requesting that this court reverse the district court and
remand for resentencing. We affirm.
2 Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469
I. Facts and Procedural History
This case arises from a loosely-organized dog fighting
conspiracy in the St. Louis metro area called the “Back-
street Truez,” and connected with a kennel of that name.
A combined state and federal investigation led to numer-
ous arrests and indictments and the seizure of over
120 pitbulls, most of which were so aggressive that
the Humane Society destroyed them. At least seven
defendants pleaded guilty to conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371,
based on 7 U.S.C. § 2156, “Animal fighting venture pro-
hibition,” which makes it unlawful inter alia “for any
person to knowingly sponsor or exhibit an animal in an
animal fighting venture.” Seven defendants were sen-
tenced in a consolidated sentencing hearing, and of that
number, three presently appeal. The arguments on ap-
peal relate exclusively to sentencing. This case illus-
trates that innovative procedures can sometimes be
very helpful and are not to be automatically condemned
as without precedent.
In advance of the sentencing hearing, the district
court judge sua sponte submitted his own report on dog
fighting, which he entered into the record as a “sen-
tencing memorandum.” The district court explained in
the memorandum that the document’s purpose was to
fulfill “[the court’s] sentencing obligation, . . . to consider
the ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense’ ” under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The district court judge indicated
that, unlike most crimes with which he dealt, he had
little general knowledge of dog fighting and he felt he
ought to conduct his own research into the subject. He
Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469 3
also stated that the memorandum was “entered well in
advance of the sentencing hearing in the instant case in
order to provide the parties with research the Court
has gleaned outside the record in this case.”
The court’s 22-page memorandum surveyed the
history and the present state of dog fighting, in the
United States and abroad. The memorandum was
marked by a tone of concern and alarm, and it described
a host of the worst abuses in the dog fighting world as
disclosed in various sources. For one example, the memo-
randum stated that “[t]o increase aggression, these dogs
may be starved, have lit cigarettes burned into their coats,
or may be beaten with a variety of crude instruments
including broken bottles, pipes, or even machetes.” The
memorandum directly linked dog fighting with other
crimes, stating “dog fighting is closely associated with
some of the most serious crimes plaguing our society
and may involve people with extensive criminal back-
grounds.” The memorandum occasionally seemed to
portray dog fighting as a threat running to the very heart
of civil society, stating for example that “[b]ecause of the
significant damage the sport causes children, dog fighting
offenses must be treated with the utmost seriousness
in order to avoid a future generation that is devoid of
compassion and anesthetized to violence.” And at one
point, the memorandum seemed to be transformed into
an exercise in post-apocalyptic vision, describing de-
pressed urban areas where “packs of feral dogs patrol
the streets in search of food.”
The district court made it clear that it was not
attributing the worst aspects of dog fighting described in
4 Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469
the memorandum to the defendants before it. In the
opening paragraphs of the memorandum, the judge
wrote “[t]his review of the history and methodology of
dog fighting is generic; that is, it is not meant to be con-
strued as applicable to the cases currently on the Court’s
docket which have their own histories and fact patterns.”
The defendants did not object to the court’s memoran-
dum, and several of them referred to the document
in their own sentencing memoranda. For instance,
Courtland entered a sentencing memorandum arguing
that he was merely a “hobbyist” as opposed to a “profes-
sional handler”—terms defined in the court’s Memoran-
dum.
On June 1, 2010, the district court held a combined
sentencing hearing. The court calculated that the “total
offense level” was eight, a figure that incorporated a two-
point reduction from ten for acceptance of responsibility.
This resulted in a guidelines recommendation of zero to
six months for the defendants with a criminal history
category of one. All three present appellants had a
criminal history category of one, and therefore all
three qualified for a guidelines recommendation of zero
to six months.
The court adduced the following facts. Courtland acted
as “either co-owner or operator or a principal” of Back-
street Truez; he bred dogs and he acted as a referee
during fights and participated in at least three roll
Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469 5
fights.1 Authorities recovered seven pitbulls from
Courtland’s property, all of which were euthanized.
Bacon was significantly involved in the dog fighting
conspiracy, and trained and possibly bred pitbulls.
Moreover, based on Bacon’s allocution, the court con-
cluded that Bacon did not believe he had done any-
thing wrong. The authorities removed over thirty pit
bulls from a property that he shared with a non-ap-
pealing conspirator, of which thirteen were euthanized.
Addison was a co-owner of Backstreet Truez, and he
bred fighting dogs and refereed fights. Once, when one
of Addison’s dogs lost a fight, he electrocuted her in
front of the crowd. Authorities removed fifty-nine pit
bulls from his property, of which twenty-four were
euthanized.
Immediately before pronouncing sentences, the court
spoke about its pre-sentencing memorandum, stating
as follows:
I have written a detailed order with respect to the
history and background of dog fighting in an effort
not only to educate myself but to give background
regarding dog fighting in general. It was not then,
nor is it now, intended to cover the details of your
respective cases. This is, however, the first dog
fighting case that I have encountered in my ten years
on the bench. I handle a lot of drug and gun cases
1
A “roll fight” is a sort of sparring match. Dog fighters
conduct them to determine the potential of the dog and to
expose it to different fighting styles.
6 Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469
and I don’t need to write a dissertation about those,
I deal with them all the time, but so that you and
your attorneys would have the benefit of my
research, since it was not part of the record, I did
make it part of the record and place[d] you on notice
in advance.
The court first sentenced all of the defendants to a 3-year
term of supervised release and imposed on each a
$100 mandatory special assessment. The court then ad-
dressed each defendant individually and imposed a
term of incarceration. Courtland received an eighteen-
month sentence, and Bacon received a sixteen-month
sentence. The court found that Addison deserved the
“extraordinary cruelty” departure described in U.S.S.G.
§ 2E3.1, application note 2,2 as a result of his electro-
cution of his defeated dog. He received a twenty-four
month sentence. On June 14, 2010, the defendants timely
appealed, raising the following issues 3 for our review:
(1) Whether the sentencing judge’s memorandum
conflicts with Article III of the Constitution or violates
the constitutional principle of separation of powers;
(2) Whether the court should remand the sentencing
because the court’s memorandum contained little
2
The application note provides, “[i]f the offense involved
extraordinary cruelty to an animal that resulted in, for example,
maiming or death to an animal, an upward departure may
be warranted.”
3
The issues have been reworded for ease of discussion.
Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469 7
more than extraneous evidence and inflammatory
comments;
(3) Whether the sentences imposed in this case
are procedurally unsound because the district court
departed upward without providing an adequate
explanation for the upward departures;
(4) Whether the defendants’ sentences are substan-
tively unreasonable.
II. Applicable Law
As we explain in greater depth below, it is not clear
exactly what legal principles govern the court’s sen-
tencing memorandum. Nevertheless, we comment briefly
on the legal principles the defendants invoke.
The defendants have raised arguments related to
Article III of the Constitution, which provides that “[t]he
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may . . . establish.” The Supreme Court has
recognized a “broad prohibition upon the courts’ exercise
of ‘executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial
nature,’ . . . to maintain the separation between the Judi-
ciary and the other branches of the Federal Government
by ensuring that judges do not encroach upon executive
or legislative authority or undertake tasks that are more
properly accomplished by those branches.” Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 680-81 (1988) (internal citation omit-
ted). Accordingly, we have emphasized that judges
may not take on a role properly occupied by prosecutors.
8 Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469
See In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2003).
However, we view this present effort of a judge to
inform himself of the subject before him as raising no
issues of separation of powers. So this objection goes
nowhere.
The defendants also direct us to our recent opinion in
United States v. Figueroa, 622 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2010). In
that case, we reversed the district court because during
the sentencing hearing, the district court engaged in an
“extraneous and inflammatory” lecture, id. at 740-41,
which included “a number of comments about [Figueroa’s
native] Mexico and . . . Mexico’s contribution to drug
and immigration issues in the United States,” id. at 743,
and “reveal[ed] an odd focus on nation-states and
national characteristics,” id. We concluded that even
though Figueroa had been sentenced at the bottom of
the guidelines, we had “no way of knowing how, if at all,
these extraneous considerations influenced Figueroa’s
sentence.” Id. at 744. Accordingly, we vacated the sen-
tence and remanded for resentencing by a different judge.
With respect to sentencing matters unrelated to the
district court’s “sentencing memorandum,” the present
case calls on us to apply the familiar framework for
reviewing district court sentencing decisions. We first
consider whether the district court committed any pro-
cedural error, and then consider whether the sentence
was substantively unreasonable. See United States v.
Hall, 608 F.3d 340, 346 (7th Cir. 2010).
As to the procedural inquiry, we ask whether the sen-
tencing court erred by “failing to calculate (or
Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469 9
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a)
factors . . . or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence—including an explanation for any deviation
from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (U.S. 2007). But recent case law indicates
that the sentencing court need not frame its explanation
of a sentence in terms of a departure from the guide-
lines range, but may instead focus on the appropriateness
of the sentence under § 3553. United States v. Bartlett, 567
F.3d 901, 909 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Nelson v. United States,
129 S. Ct. 890 (2009)); see also United States v. Vaughn,
614 F.3d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 2010). Questions of procedural
error are reviewed de novo. See Hall, 608 F.3d at 346.
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sen-
tence for an abuse of discretion, even when it is outside
the guidelines. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. There is no pre-
sumption of unreasonableness merely because a sen-
tence is outside of the suggested guidelines range but
rather we ordinarily give the sentencing court deference
if “the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as a whole, justify
the extent of the variance from the guidelines.”
United States v. Wise, 556 F.3d 629, 632-33 (7th Cir. 2009).
Under this analysis, “[t]he farther the judge’s sentence
departs from the guidelines . . . the more compelling the
justification based on factors in section 3553(a) that the
judge must offer in order to enable the court of appeals
to assess the reasonableness of the sentence imposed.”
United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005).
Again, however, after Bartlett a court’s explanation may
be sufficient even if not framed in terms of a departure
from the guidelines.
10 Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469
III. Discussion
A. The Sentencing Memorandum
At the outset, we disagree with the Government that
arguments relating to the court’s memorandum have
been waived. As described above, the court entered the
sentencing document on its docket as a memorandum
and opinion, and referred to it in court as an “order.” We
accept the court’s characterizations, which connote
finality, at face value. Under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 51(a), “[e]xceptions to rulings or orders of the
court are unnecessary.” See also Bartlett, 567 F.3d at 910
(“[T]he rules do not require a litigant to complain about a
judicial choice after it has been made.”). Instead, preserv-
ing a claim is ordinarily accomplished by raising the issue
in advance of the ruling. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b). More-
over, “[i]f a party does not have an opportunity to object
to a ruling or order, the absence of an objection does not
later prejudice that party.” Id. Here, the record does not
reveal to what extent the defendants were on notice of
the court’s impending filing, and in any case under
these unusual circumstances we could not ask them to
anticipate the contents of the document.
Turning to the merits, we observe that court’s memoran-
dum is apparently sui generis; it is not entirely clear
what rule or precedent might govern its propriety. See
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate Judge:
Ethical Limits on Independent Research, 28 R EV. L ITIG. 131,
169 (2008) (“Principles relevant to judicial research come
from the worlds of ethics, evidence, procedure, and the
Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469 11
Constitution.”). The court obviously did not apply
the strictures of judicial notice under Federal Rule of
Evidence 201,4 but the material in the memorandum
was not treated as judicially noticed fact.5 Fortunately,
we need not find a home in legal taxonomy for the
court’s memorandum.
As indicated, we reject the defendants’ assertion that
the district court’s filing exceeded the powers of the
judiciary established in Article III of the Constitution. We
emphatically decline this invitation to set limits on a
judge’s powers to educate himself on matters relevant
to sentencing. We find nothing in the cases cited by the
defendants or in our own research that directs such
restrictions,6 and we are unwilling to recognize sig-
4
That rule requires in relevant part that a judicially noticed
fact be “either (1) generally known within the territorial juris-
diction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).
5
The judicial notice rule “governs only judicial notice of
adjudicative facts.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(a). “Adjudicative facts
are simply the facts of the particular case.” United States v.
Wolny, 133 F.3d 758, 764 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting advisory
committee notes to Rule 201).
6
Indeed, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), which the
defendants cite for language highlighting the importance of
the separation of powers, concluded that the separation of
powers principle was not offended by the judiciary’s assump-
(continued...)
12 Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469
nificant limitations on the judicial branch in establishing
a perspective on charged crimes—particularly little-known
crimes.
Moreover, the defendants’ citation of Figueroa is com-
pletely unpersuasive. There is no indication that any
agitated or expansive language here about broad social
problems associated with dog fighting had any direct
application to these sentences. Here, the judge repeatedly
stated that the material in its memorandum was not
being attributed to the defendants. We certainly accept
the court’s representation. See, e.g., Lucini Italia Co. v.
Grappolini, 288 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 2002) (taking
the district court at its word about an argument it stated
it did not consider). In fact, the sentencing hearing in
the present case was routine except for the unusual
number of defendants. If this were a drug possession
case, a court’s comments about related pervasive social
problems would be taken as routine. Here, the judge
carefully and serially distinguished the evidence related
to each of seven co-conspirators. The arguably inflam-
matory language of the memorandum was absent from
6
(...continued)
tion of sentencing rulemaking duties, in view of the central
“role that the Judiciary always has played, and continues to
play, in sentencing.” Id. at 390-91. Also of possible relevance
to the present case, the Mistretta Court stated, “[o]ur constitu-
tional principles of separated powers are not violated . . . by
mere anomaly or innovation.” Id. at 385.
Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469 13
the imposition of the respective sentences.7 The judge
hewed to the § 3553 factors.
Judges generally are under no obligation to relate all
they have learned about a species of crime from what-
ever source to those accused of the crime in ques-
tion. We note with approval that the district court was
concerned with giving the parties the opportunity to com-
ment on the general reference material it consulted. To
do so here was in keeping with the spirit of, but not
required by, the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges in the sense that the Code of Conduct requires
judges to give parties an opportunity to respond to ex parte
communications.8 If the judge in this case had read
the same background material and not informed the
parties (which is common practice, and not objectionable),
it might not have reflected such a sensitive respect
for the adversary process. Nevertheless, we do not rule
7
The main manifestation of the court’s memorandum at the
sentencing hearing was that the court and parties used the
conventions of “hobbyist” versus “professional” to describe
the depth of the defendants’ immersion in the dog fighting
scene. These terms appeared in the court’s memorandum,
where they were defined. The court and the parties used
these terms fluidly, and without referencing the definitions
in the court’s memorandum. We are not troubled by the
use of these terms, which appear to have served as an
innocuous shorthand to aid in the task of distinguishing
among the seven co-conspirators.
8
Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 3A(4);
see also ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.9(A)(1)(b).
14 Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469
out the possibility that where there has been a “litany of
inflammatory remarks,” Figueroa, 622 F.3d at 744, we
cannot be as certain as we are here that they did not
influence the sentence. In other words, relevant to our
affirmance is our confidence that the district court
did not attribute to the defendants the evils related in
the “sentencing memorandum.” On the whole, we
believe the district court’s recourse to, and handling of
a “sentencing memorandum” was unusually sensitive
to the rights of the parties and provided them and the
court with an appropriate perspective on the sentencing
task.
B. Sentencing Procedure and
Substantive Reasonableness
We turn now to the defendants’ argument that the
court erred with respect to the sentences themselves, and
we first address the procedural questions. As a threshold
matter, no one argues that the district court improperly
calculated the guidelines range.9 And we do not credit
9
We note that for a moment during the sentencing hearing, the
court seemed to be saying that the appropriate offense level
was ten, the base offense level prescribed in U.S.S.G.
§ 2E3.1(a)(2), instead of eight, the base level less the two-point
reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Other than pointing
this out in a footnote, App.’s Br. 25 n.6, the defendants do not
make any argument that the court applied an erroneous
guideline range, and we believe the court did not. The court
(continued...)
Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469 15
the argument that the defendants have raised—that the
district court inadequately justified its imposition of an
above-guidelines sentence.
It is clear that the district court was concerned with
the lack of incremental punishment for conspiracy in the
sentencing guidelines. The court stated:
The Guidelines in this case . . . are deficient in that
they do not account for multiple dogs, multiple fights,
or the injuries that the dogs suffered. Under the Guide-
lines, if you had one dog, one fight, you are looking at
the same Guideline range as if you had 100 and 100
fights and they all had to be euthanized. . . . That
simply does not make sense because there is no incre-
mental punishment. There are no specific offense
characteristics in the guidelines that allow for en-
hancements regarding the length of the conspiracy,
the number or circumstances surrounding the actual
fights, or as I said, the number of dogs involved.
Likewise, there is no enhancement for being a facilita-
tor or sponsor of the fight[.]
The district court’s sentencing decisions were clearly
informed by its concern about the inadequacy of the
guidelines and the factors it believed were important
but ignored. The court tallied the total number of dogs
attributed to each defendant, as well as the number of
those that had to be euthanized. The court also kept
9
(...continued)
had previously identified the “total offense level” for the
defendants as eight.
16 Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469
track of the number of dog fights in which the
defendants participated, and the approximate duration
of the defendants’ involvement in dog fighting. The court
discussed, where applicable, the leadership role of each
defendant in the dog fighting enterprise. Finally, the
court considered sentences imposed in the Eastern
District of Missouri for other participants in the same
conspiracy, with an eye toward avoiding unwarranted
disparities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
While we express no opinion on the district court’s
apparent belief that the guidelines are per se deficient
with respect to large dog fighting conspiracies, we agree
that the court’s sentencing considerations were proper,
and together constituted permissible rationale for
imposing an above-guidelines sentence. The number of
dogs, the number of fights, the defendant’s leadership
role in the criminal enterprise and the duration of the
misconduct can surely be considered part of the “nature
and circumstances of the offense” of conspiracy under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). And of course, the court’s assessment
of the § 3553 factors is the proper basis for any above-
guidelines sentence. See Dean, 414 F.3d at 730-31 (“[T]he
guidelines, being advisory, can be trumped by section
3553(a), which as we have stressed is mandatory.”).1 0
10
We disagree with the defendants’ position that the judge did
not provide adequate individualized reasons for departing
from the guidelines. First, the district court is not necessarily at
fault for declining to explain a sentence from the perspective
of the guidelines, as long as it explains the sentence properly
(continued...)
Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469 17
We must address one defendant’s case individually.
No one contests that the court appropriately applied the
“extraordinary cruelty” departure described in U.S.S.G.
§ 2E3.1, application note 2, to Addison in connection
with his electrocuting a defeated dog. But Addison
argues that he received a longer sentence than a
non-appealing co-conspirator who participated in the
same electrocution. This is unpersuasive. The other
co-conspirator was a comparatively peripheral member
of the conspiracy. In particular, he apparently did not
10
(...continued)
under the § 3553 factors. Bartlett, 567 F.3d at 909 (“The court
must take the Sentencing Commission’s views into account, but
a sentence cannot be called ‘unreasonable’ just because the
judge explains why he chose that sentence, rather than ex-
plaining his decision from the Guidelines’ perspective.”). The
defendants do nothing to reconcile their position with Bart-
lett. Second, the grounds for imposing an above-guidelines
sentence may be equally applicable to the multiple defendants
because of their joint involvement in a common crime. See, e.g.,
United States v. Coe, 220 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, the
court clearly indicated that the circumstances of the crime
justify an above-guidelines sentence. It would elevate form
over substance to require the court to reiterate that logic
before imposing each sentence, because the court’s individual-
ized § 3553 considerations for each defendant fit obviously
within the court’s earlier-described rationale for imposing
above-guidelines sentences. Cf. United States v. Amato, 15 F.3d
230, 237 (2d Cir. 1994) (court’s joint sentencing memorandum
did not offend a defendant’s right to an individualized sen-
tence).
18 Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469
own or breed fighting dogs. There is nothing per se im-
proper about a sentencing disparity among co-con-
spirators, or even between the two of seven to whom
a specific departure provision applies. See generally
United States v. Gooden, 564 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir.
2009) (“We do not view the ‘discrepancy between sen-
tences of co-defendants as a basis for challenging a sen-
tence’ and will disturb a sentence only if it creates an
unwarranted sentence disparity between similar defen-
dants nationwide.”) (citing United States v. Omole, 523
F.3d 691, 700 (7th Cir. 2008)); United States v. Simpson, 337
F.3d 905, 909 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[A] disparity among
co-defendants’ sentences is not a valid basis to challenge
a guideline sentence otherwise correctly calculated.”)
(citing United States v. Simmons, 218 F.3d 692, 696 (7th
Cir. 2000)).11
Having reviewed each defendant’s sentence and the
court’s rationale for imposing an above-guidelines sen-
tence, we conclude that the court properly justified its
sentences.
The defendants’ argument of substantive unreasonable-
ness, which we review for an abuse of discretion, see United
States v. Miller, 601 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2010), is equally
unavailing. It is true that the brevity of the sentences
recommended in the guidelines enables the defendants
to complain that their actual sentences are an impressive
multiple of guidelines recommendations. This is not
11
The similar arguments relating to Courtland and Bacon fail
for the same reasons.
Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469 19
irrelevant, but it is also relevant that the amounts by
which the sentences exceeded the guidelines were not
extreme when viewed in absolute terms. Defendant
Addison received the greatest above-guidelines incre-
ment in absolute terms, an overage of 18 months, and
that was partly based on a finding that he qualified for
an “extraordinary cruelty” departure under U.S.S.G.
§ 2E3.1, application note 2, for electrocuting a defeated
dog. In view of the court’s justifications as discussed
above, we do not consider the district court to have
abused its discretion by imposing substantively unrea-
sonable sentences. In fact, overall we believe the sen-
tencing judge did a highly commendable job in dealing
with a crime not well known to him or to large sectors
of the public.
For the foregoing reasons, we A FFIRM the judgments of
the district court.
4-27-11