UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5126
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRY DEWAYNE COMPTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District
Judge. (1:02-cr-00098-jpj-pms-1)
Submitted: April 15, 2011 Decided: April 27, 2011
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Brian J. Beck,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Abingdon, Virginia, for
Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Jennifer
R. Bockhorst, Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Terry Dewayne Compton appeals from the twenty-one-
month sentence he received upon the revocation of his supervised
release. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Compton pleaded guilty in 2002 to knowingly possessing
stolen mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (2006). In 2003,
Compton was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment and three
years’ supervised release. Compton’s supervised release began
in September 2007.
In February 2010, Compton’s probation officer filed a
revocation petition, alleging several supervised release
violations: (1) the unauthorized use of a debit card belonging
to Kristen Hammonds, 1 in violation of the prohibition on
committing other crimes; (2) unauthorized travel to Texas, in
violation of the prohibition on leaving the judicial district
without permission; and (3) failing to appear in Dickerson
County (Virginia) General Sessions District Court, resulting in
issuance of a warrant, in violation of the prohibition on
committing further crimes. These actions also resulted in the
revocation of Compton’s state probation, for which the Circuit
1
Compton used Ms. Hammonds’ debit card at Wal-Mart on two
occasions, purchasing a total of $175 worth of goods.
2
Court for Washington County (Virginia) sentenced Compton to
twenty-four months’ imprisonment.
The probation officer determined that the most serious
violation was a Grade B violation which, coupled with his
category VI criminal history, resulted in a policy statement
range of twenty-one to twenty-seven months’ imprisonment. See
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) §§ 7B1.1(a)(2),
7B1.4(a) (2003), p.s.. At the revocation hearing, Compton
admitted the alleged violations. 2 When queried by the court,
defense counsel agreed that any sentence the court might impose
would run consecutive to the previously imposed state sentence.
The court found that Compton had violated his
supervised release, adopted the policy statement calculations
and the resulting sentencing range, and imposed a twenty-one-
month sentence. The court ordered the sentence to run
consecutive to any previously imposed sentence. The court also
ordered an additional three-year term of supervised release.
Relying on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors that
informed its sentencing decision, the court explained that
Compton was a “constant offender” whose mental impairments and
limited intellectual capabilities made it difficult to deter him
2
The parties did not dispute the probation officer’s
calculations under the relevant Chapter Seven advisory policy
statements, and no such issues are raised on appeal.
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from crime. Thus, the court opined that the objectives of
protecting the public from Compton’s crimes and deterring future
criminal conduct were best met through incarceration. Compton
timely appealed from the entry of judgment.
Compton first asserts the district court committed
reversible procedural error by failing to respond to his
argument for a concurrent sentence. Compton further challenges
the adequacy of the district court’s explanation for imposing a
consecutive sentence.
As the parties acknowledge, the “plainly unreasonable”
standard set forth in United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
437-38 (4th Cir. 2006) controls. 3 This court will affirm a
sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is
within the governing statutory range and not plainly
unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439-40. “When reviewing
whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must
first determine whether it is unreasonable at all.” United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010); see
United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). A
3
To the extent that Compton asks this court to revisit the
standard of review of revocation sentences established in
Crudup, we decline the invitation. One panel of this court
cannot “overrule or reconsider a precedent set by another
panel.” United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 486 n.8 (4th
Cir. 2002).
4
supervised release revocation sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the district court considered the Chapter Seven
advisory policy statements and the § 3553(a) factors applicable
to the proceeding. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2006); Crudup, 461
F.3d at 439.
We reject Compton’s challenges to the procedural
reasonableness of his sentence. The district court committed no
procedural error in ordering that Compton’s twenty-one-month
sentence be served consecutive to his previously imposed state
sentence. The policy statement set forth in USSG § 7B1.3(f)
specifically states that —
Any term of imprisonment imposed upon the revocation
of . . . supervised release shall be ordered to be
served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment
that the defendant is serving, whether or not the
sentence of imprisonment being served resulted from
the conduct that is the basis of the revocation
of . . . supervised release.
Thus, in imposing a consecutive sentence, the district court
deferred to this advisory policy statement. Such deference,
while not required, was more than proper. See Thompson, 595
F.3d at 547; see also Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656-57. We further
reject Compton’s contention that the district court needed to
more fully explain why it adhered to this clear policy
statement, because such a position places an unwarranted
obligation on sentencing courts. See, e.g., Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-57 (2007) (“[W]hen a judge decides
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simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so
will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.”).
This court recognized in Thompson that it would “be
hard-pressed to find any explanation for within-range,
revocation sentences insufficient given the amount of deference
we afford district courts when imposing these sentences.”
Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547. Here, the district court explained
that the need to protect the public and to deter Compton from
future crimes supported a sentence within the properly
calculated policy statement range. Accordingly, we discern no
procedural error in the district court’s explanation.
Compton next argues the sentence is substantively
unreasonable because it is excessive given the underlying
criminal conduct. This argument fails, however, because the
governing statute expressly restricts the sentencing court from
considering the seriousness of the underlying conduct in
determining the violation sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)
(enumerating the § 3553(a) sentencing factors that should be
considered in fashioning a revocation sentence, but omitting
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) — the need for the sentence to reflect the
seriousness of the offense). Rather, the revocation sentence is
designed to punish the defendant’s failure to abide by the terms
of his supervised release. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438. Here,
Compton admitted to six violations of the terms of his
6
supervised release, which reflected Compton’s serious disregard
for his supervision.
A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if
the district court stated “a proper basis” for concluding the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d
at 440. The court plainly did so here. Accordingly, we
conclude that the court’s within-policy statement range sentence
was substantively reasonable.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court’s revocation judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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