In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 09-2326
A UGUSTA E DWARDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
B RIGGS & S TRATTON R ETIREMENT P LAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 2:08-cv-0496-AEG—Aaron E. Goodstein, Magistrate Judge.
A RGUED JANUARY 18, 2011—D ECIDED A PRIL 29, 2011
Before T INDER and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges and
M URPHY, District Judge.
M URPHY, District Judge.
The Honorable G. Patrick Murphy of the Southern District
of Illinois, sitting by designation.
2 No. 09-2326
I. Introduction
The issue presented by this appeal, which arises out of
a suit brought by Plaintiff-Appellant Augusta Edwards
against Defendant-Appellee Briggs & Stratton Retire-
ment Plan (“the Plan”) for benefits due under the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”),
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., is straightforward: whether
the Plan should have excused the fact that Edwards’s ad-
ministrative appeal from a denial of her claim for dis-
ability benefits by the Plan was approximately eleven
days late. The issue concerns, of course, whether
Edwards exhausted her administrative remedies as a
predicate to filing suit under ERISA in federal court.
Finding that Edwards failed to exhaust, the district court
dismissed the case on summary judgment. Because we
find no error in the district court’s decision, the decision
is affirmed.
II. Background and Procedural History
It is undisputed that the Plan is an employee welfare
benefit plan and that Edwards is a participant in the
Plan, all within the meaning of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(1), (7). Edwards, an employee of the Wisconsin-
based Briggs & Stratton Company (“Briggs & Stratton”),
ceased working in November 2005 due to a variety of
ailments, including cervical radiculopathy, bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome, and ulnar nerve compression.
Edwards was treated by, inter alia, Dr. James Stoll, an
orthopedic surgeon. On August 9, 2007, Edwards made
a claim for disability retirement benefits under the Plan,
No. 09-2326 3
basing the claim upon Stoll’s opinion that Edwards is
totally and permanently disabled, cannot return to
Briggs & Stratton, and cannot perform any work at
all. The Plan retained its own medical consultant,
Dr. Richard Fritz, a specialist in internal medicine, to
evaluate Edwards’s claim. Fritz opined that Edwards is
not totally and permanently disabled. On September 26,
2007, the Plan denied Edwards’s claim for disability retire-
ment benefits and on September 29, 2007, Edwards was
notified of the denial of her claim. The letter informing
Edwards of the denial of her claim advised Edwards
that she had 180 days from receipt of the letter to
appeal the denial of benefits to the Plan’s Retirement
Committee. The requirement that an appeal from a
denial of Plan benefits must be made within 180 days
from receipt of a denial letter is contained in the
Plan document.
On October 9, 2007, Edwards wrote to the Plan to
request copies of the records relied upon by the Plan in
denying her claim for benefits and advised the Plan
that “[a]fter I get these things [the records], I’ll decide
whether or not to appeal.” Upon receipt of the records
as requested, Edwards retained counsel to bring an
appeal to the Plan from the denial of her claim for bene-
fits. On February 4, 2008, the Plan received a letter from
Edwards’s counsel requesting a copy of the Plan docu-
ment and advising the Plan that Edwards’s counsel
would be filing an administrative appeal on Edwards’s
behalf “soon.” On February 8, 2008, Elizabeth Mlekush,
the Plan administrator, answered the letter, sending a
copy of the Plan document as requested and advising
4 No. 09-2326
Edwards’s counsel that Edwards’s appeal letter must
be received by the Plan by March 31, 2008.1
After receiving a vocational report, dated March 27,
2008, from Anne Repaci, Edwards brought her appeal to
the Plan. Edwards’s appeal letter was supported by
Repaci’s report and a medical assessment of Edwards by
Stoll dated September 11, 2007, and opened by saying,
“We [Edwards and her counsel] hereby appeal your
September 26, 2007 decision.” Unfortunately, Edwards’s
appeal letter was not received by the Plan until
April 11, 2008, that is, eleven days after the March 31
deadline specified by Mlekush in her letter of Feb-
ruary 8, 2008, and fifteen days after the actual dead-
line of March 27, 2008. In the appeal letter, Edwards
acknowledged that her appeal was untimely, but offered
no explanation for the delay in bringing the appeal. The
Plan refused to consider Edwards’s appeal on the
grounds that the appeal was untimely. The letter
informing Edwards of the original denial of her claim
for benefits advised Edwards that she had the right
to bring an action under ERISA following an adverse
determination of her claim for benefits on appeal.
On June 9, 2008, Edwards filed suit against the Plan
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) in federal district
court in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. With the consent of the
parties, the case was assigned to a magistrate judge for
1
In fact, in her February 8 letter Mlekush overstated the
appeal deadline by four days: 180 days from Edward’s receipt
of the original denial of benefits was March 27, 2008.
No. 09-2326 5
disposition. On cross-motions for summary judgment,
the magistrate granted summary judgment for the Plan
and denied Edwards’s motion for summary judgment.
This appeal followed.
III. Analysis
As an initial matter, we note the applicable standard
of review. A grant of summary judgment is reviewed
de novo. See Ruiz v. Continental Cas. Co., 400 F.3d 986, 989
(7th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate when
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Where, as here, the district court
was faced with cross-motions for summary judgment,
“our review of the record requires that we construe
all inferences in favor of the party against whom the
motion under consideration is made.” Hendricks-
Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 1998).
A denial of benefits normally is reviewed de novo
“unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fidu-
ciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for
benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). In
such a case, the denial of benefits is reviewed under
an “arbitrary and capricious” standard. Hess v. Reg-Ellen
Mach. Tool Corp. Employee Stock Ownership Plan, 502
6 No. 09-2326
F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2007).2 Under the arbitrary and
capricious standard, the reviewing court must ensure
only that a plan administrator’s decision “has rational
support in the record.” Semien v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
436 F.3d 805, 812 (7th Cir. 2006). “Put simply, an admin-
istrator’s decision will not be overturned unless it is
‘downright unreasonable.’ ” Davis v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 444 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sisto v.
Ameritech Sickness & Accident Disability Benefit Plan, 429
F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2005)). However, “[r]eview under
the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard is not
a rubber stamp and deference need not be abject.” Hackett
v. Xerox Corp. Long-Term Disability Income Plan, 315
F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, we will
uphold the plan’s decision “as long as (1) ‘it is possible
to offer a reasoned explanation, based on the evidence,
for a particular outcome,’ (2) the decision ‘is based on a
reasonable explanation of relevant plan documents,’ or
(3) the administrator ‘has based its decision on a con-
sideration of the relevant factors that encompass the
important aspects of the problem.’ ” Hess v. Hartford
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 274 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Exbom v. Central States, Se. & Sw. Areas Health &
Welfare Fund, 900 F.2d 1138, 1142-43 (7th Cir. 1990)).
Under ERISA, “[a] civil action may be brought . . . by a
participant . . . to recover benefits due to him under the
2
Here it is undisputed that the Plan document vests the
Plan administrator with discretion. Thus, the arbitrary and
capricious standard applies.
No. 09-2326 7
terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms
of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
Although 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) “provide[s] that an
aggrieved party may file a civil action to redress alleged
ERISA violations, [the statute] do[es] not state whether
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a precondition
to filing that action.” Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797
F.2d 458, 466 (7th Cir. 1986). However, because ERISA
directs employee benefit plans to provide adequate
written notice of the reasons for denials of claims by
plan participants and to create procedures for the review
of such denials of claims, we have interpreted ERISA
as requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies as
a prerequisite to bringing suit under the statute. See
Powell v. A.T. & T. Commc’ns, Inc., 938 F.2d 823, 826
(7th Cir. 1991) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1133).
The requirement of exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies in ERISA cases serves several purposes. Exhaustion
encourages informal, non-judicial resolution of disputes
about employee benefits. “[T]he institution of . . . adminis-
trative claim-resolution procedures was apparently
intended by Congress to help reduce the number
of frivolous lawsuits under ERISA; to promote the con-
sistent treatment of claims for benefits; to provide a
nonadversarial method of claims settlement; and to
minimize the cost of claims settlement for all concerned.”
Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1244-45 (7th Cir.
1983) (quoting Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567
(9th Cir. 1980)). “Congress intended fund trustees to
have primary responsibility for claim processing, as
8 No. 09-2326
evidenced by the specific requirement in [ERISA] . . . of
a claim and appeal procedure for every employee
benefit plan. To make every claim dispute into a federal
case would undermine the claim procedure con-
templated by the Act.” Challenger v. Local Union No. 1 of
Int’l Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, 619
F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 1980). “[T]he trustees of covered
benefit plans are granted broad fiduciary rights and
responsibilities under ERISA . . . and implementation of
the exhaustion requirement . . . enhance[s] their ability
to expertly and efficiently manage their funds by pre-
venting premature judicial intervention in their decision-
making processes.” Kross, 701 F.2d at 1245 (quoting
Amato, 618 F.2d at 567).
Additionally, the requirement of exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies helps to prepare the ground for litiga-
tion in case administrative dispute resolution proves
unavailing. Compelling parties to exhaust administra-
tive remedies can help a court by requiring parties, in
advance of bringing suit, “to develop a full factual re-
cord” and by enabling the court to “take advantage of
agency expertise.” Janowski v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters Local No. 710 Pension Fund, 673 F.2d 931, 935
(7th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1222
(1983). “[A] primary reason for the exhaustion require-
ment . . . is that prior fully considered actions by pension
plan trustees interpreting their plans and perhaps also
further refining and defining the problem in given cases,
may well assist the courts when they are called upon to
resolve the controversies.” Kross, 701 F.2d at 1245 (quoting
Amato, 618 F.2d at 568). See also Ames v. American Nat’l
No. 09-2326 9
Can Co., 170 F.3d 751, 756 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that,
through internal plan procedures, “the facts and the
administrator’s interpretation of the plan may be
clarified for the purposes of subsequent judicial review”).
“[T]he decision to require exhaustion as a prerequisite
to bringing suit is a matter within the discretion of the
trial court . . . . [T]his determination will only be dis-
turbed on appeal if the lower court has clearly abused
its discretion—in other words, if the lower court’s deci-
sion ‘is obviously in error.’ ” Salus v. GTE Directories
Serv. Corp., 104 F.3d 131, 138 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp., 79 F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir.
1996)). See also Zhou v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 295
F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e review a district
court’s decision to dismiss a complaint on exhaustion
grounds for an abuse of discretion.”). An ERISA
plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies
may be excused where there is a lack of meaningful
access to review procedures, or where pursuing
internal plan remedies would be futile. See Stark v. PPM
Am., Inc., 354 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2004); Robyns v.
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 F.3d 1231, 1236
(7th Cir. 1997); Wilczynski v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 93
F.3d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 1996); Smith v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield United of Wis., 959 F.2d 655, 658-59 (7th Cir. 1992).
In this instance it is undisputed that Edwards’s
appeal from the Plan’s original denial of benefits
was untimely, nor does Edwards argue that she lacked
meaningful access to review procedures or that pur-
suing administrative remedies would be futile. Instead
10 No. 09-2326
Edwards argues that the untimeliness of her appeal
should be excused because she was in “substantial com-
pliance” with administrative review procedures under
the Plan. In general the doctrine of substantial com-
pliance means that a plan administrator who has
violated a technical rule under ERISA, such as regula-
tions governing the contents of letters denying claims
for benefits, may be excused for the violation if the ad-
ministrator has been substantially compliant with the
requirements of ERISA. See, e.g., Halpin v. W.W. Grainger,
Inc., 962 F.2d 685, 693-94 (7th Cir. 1992); Brown v. Retirement
Comm. of Briggs & Stratton Ret. Plan, 797 F.2d 521,
535-36 (7th Cir. 1986). In cases in which the substantial
compliance doctrine applies, a plan administrator, not-
withstanding his or her error, is given the benefit of
deferential review of the administrator’s determination
about a claim under the arbitrary and capricious
standard (assuming, of course, that the plan document
vests the administrator with discretion), rather than
more stringent de novo review. See, e.g., Rasenack v. AIG
Life Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 1311, 1317 (10th Cir. 2009).
Edwards has not cited any decision in which we
have employed the substantial compliance doctrine to
excuse an untimely appeal from an administrative
denial of benefits by an ERISA plan. Instead, we have
recognized that ERISA plans have an interest in “finality
of decisions” regarding claims for benefits that militates
against reopening a plan’s administrative claim pro-
cess willy-nilly. Tegtmeier v. Midwest Operating Eng’rs
Pension Trust Fund, 390 F.3d 1040, 1047 (7th Cir. 2004).
Correspondingly, we have held that an ERISA claimant’s
No. 09-2326 11
failure to file a timely administrative appeal from a
denial of benefits “is one means by which a claimant
may fail to exhaust her administrative remedies.”
Gallegos v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 210 F.3d 803, 808
(7th Cir. 2000). In the context of a previous case in-
volving, as here, a plan that had fixed a 180-day dead-
line for filing administrative appeals, we held that
“[u]nambiguous terms of a pension plan leave no room
for the exercise of interpretive discretion by the
plan’s administrator.” Wagner v. Allied Pilots Ass’n Dis-
ability Income Plan, 383 Fed. Appx. 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Call v. Ameritech Mgmt. Pension Plan, 475
F.3d 816, 822-23 (7th Cir. 2007)).3 Thus, “[t]he administrator
must implement and follow the plain language of the
plan, in so much as they are consistent with the statute.
This includes a deadline that is consistent with the reg-
ulations governing ERISA claims.” Id. (citation omitted).
In this case, the Plan has fixed a clear deadline of 180
days for filing administrative appeals from denials of
benefits, and the Plan has the right to enforce that dead-
line. Also, though counsel for the Plan conceded at oral
argument in this appeal that it is within the Plan adminis-
trator’s discretion to entertain an untimely appeal, Ed-
3
The 180-day deadline for filing administrative appeals under
the Plan, as also in Wagner, is derived from a regulation promul-
gated by the United States Department of Labor pursuant to
ERISA requiring that an ERISA plan “[p]rovide claimants
at least 180 days following receipt of a notification of an ad-
verse benefit determination within which to appeal the deter-
mination.” 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(3)(i).
12 No. 09-2326
wards has never offered an explanation for the untimeli-
ness of her appeal that would warrant such an exercise
of discretion in her favor. Finally, it seems consistent
neither with the policies underlying the requirement
of exhaustion of administrative remedies in ERISA cases
nor with judicial economy to import into the exhaustion
requirement the substantial compliance doctrine. To so
hold would render it effectively impossible for plan
administrators to fix and enforce administrative dead-
lines while involving courts incessantly in detailed, case-
by-case determinations as to whether a given claimant’s
failure to bring a timely appeal from a denial of benefits
should be excused or not. Accordingly, we conclude
that Edwards’s failure to file a timely administrative
appeal from the Plan’s initial denial of benefits is not
excused on grounds of substantial compliance.
Just as we decline to import the substantial compliance
doctrine into the matter of administrative deadlines
under ERISA, so too we find Edwards’s reliance on Wis-
consin’s “notice-prejudice” statute to be misplaced.
Under the statute in question, where a policy of liability
insurance requires an insured to give notice of claims to
an insurer, “failure to give any notice required by the
policy within the time specified does not invalidate a
claim made by the insured if the insured shows that it
was not reasonably possible to give the notice within the
prescribed time and that notice was given as soon as
reasonably possible.” Wis. Stat. § 632.26(1)(b). The
statute provides further that “[f]ailure to give notice as
required by the policy . . . does not bar liability under the
policy if the insurer was not prejudiced by the failure,
No. 09-2326 13
but the risk of nonpersuasion is upon the person claiming
there was no prejudice.” Id. § 632.26(2). Edwards argues
that, as a matter of Wisconsin law, the Plan is required to
show prejudice as a result of Edwards’s delay in filing
her administrative appeal before denying the appeal as
untimely.
It is the case, of course, that in some instances a state
notice-prejudice rule may require a plan administrator
to show prejudice as a result of a participant’s failure to
give notice of a claim as required under a plan. See
UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 372 (1999)
(applying California law). In this case, however, the Plan
is not an insured plan, and the benefits at issue are dis-
ability benefits, not liability insurance, which is the type
of insurance governed by the Wisconsin statute. Also,
as the Plan points out, state notice-prejudice rules
typically apply only to initial denials of benefits. “There
is no . . . federal case that has applied a notice-prejudice
rule outside the initial review context” and “[t]o extend
the notice-prejudice rule to ERISA appeals would
extend the rule substantially beyond its previous uses.”
Chang v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 247 Fed. Appx.
875, 878 (9th Cir. 2007). Like the Chang court, we are “not
inclined to make such a significant and unprecedented
extension of the rule.” Id. Finally, as already has been
noted, Edwards never has explained the reason for the
untimeliness of her administrative appeal and there-
fore has not shown either that it was not reasonably
possible to give notice within the prescribed time or
that notice was given as soon as reasonably possible.
14 No. 09-2326
Thus, the Wisconsin notice-prejudice rule does not
render Edwards’s administrative appeal timely.
To the extent Edwards contends that the letter she
wrote to the Plan in October 2007 and the letter her
counsel wrote to the Plan in February 2008 should be
construed as appeals or at least as having put the
Plan under a duty to inquire whether Edwards wished
for the letters to be construed as appeals, we find no
merit in this contention. It is true that, in some in-
stances, a plan participant’s letter to a plan may be con-
strued as an appeal. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 818, 826-27 (10th Cir. 2008) (concluding
that the defendant insurer was on notice that the
claimant was appealing the insurer’s decision to deny
benefits where a letter from the claimant’s counsel to
the insurer clearly stated that the claimant was ap-
pealing the insurer’s decision to deny payment of benefits
and outlined the general basis of the claimant’s appeal,
even though counsel also requested the entire claim
file and requested sixty days to present additional infor-
mation to the insurer). In this case, however, the letters at
issue cannot reasonably be construed as notices of appeal.
Edwards’s October 2007 letter, as already has been
discussed, merely advised the Plan that, once Edwards
received copies of the records relied upon by the Plan
in denying Edwards’s original claim for benefits,
Edwards would “decide whether or not to appeal.”
Similarly, the February 2008 letter sent by Edwards’s
counsel to the Plan only advised the Plan that Edwards
would bring an appeal “soon.” Thus, the October 2007
No. 09-2326 15
letter simply suggested that Edwards might bring an
appeal, depending on the contents of the administrative
record, while the February 2008 letter unambiguously
expressed an intention to appeal, but was not itself a
request for review. See Swanson v. Hearst Corp. Long Term
Disability Plan, 586 F.3d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir. 2009) (a
letter to a plan that “merely expressed an ‘intention to
appeal’ ” was not itself an appeal). In sum, neither letter
reasonably could be regarded by the Plan administrator
as a notice of appeal.4
Finally, with respect to Edwards’s claim that the Plan’s
refusal to entertain her administrative appeal was moti-
vated by a conflict of interest, we are cognizant, of
course, of the conflict of interest that exists when, as in
4
As to whether either Edwards’s October 2007 letter or her
counsel’s February 2008 letter put the Plan under a duty to
inquire whether Edwards wished for one or both of the letters
to be construed as an appeal, we find that they did not. It is
the case, as Edwards points out, “that fiduciaries cannot shut
their eyes to readily available information when the evidence
in the record suggests that the information might confirm
the beneficiary’s theory of entitlement and when they have
little or no evidence in the record to refute that theory.” Gaither
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 394 F.3d 792, 807 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding
that a plan administrator was arbitrary and capricious in
denying a plan participant’s claim that use of prescription
narcotics rendered the participant disabled from the perfor-
mance of his occupation, and thus eligible for benefits under
the plan, without investigating the claim). However, neither
of the letters at issue put any sort of evidence before the Plan.
16 No. 09-2326
this case, a plan administrator has both the discretionary
authority to determine eligibility for benefits and the
obligation to pay benefits when due. See Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 108 (2008). In such
cases, the standard of review remains the same, that is,
arbitrary and capricious; as the Glenn Court noted, citing
Firestone, precisely because it is quite common for an
ERISA plan administrator also to be the payor of claims,
courts should be hesitant to “adopt[ ] a rule that in
practice could bring about near universal review by
judges de novo—i.e., without deference—of the lion’s
share of ERISA plan claims denials.” Id. at 116.
See also Black v. Long Term Disability Ins., 582 F.3d 738,
745 (7th Cir. 2009) (“While we must take [the plan’s]
conflict of interest into account, [the plan administrator]
remains entitled to the deference normally afforded
under the arbitrary and capricious standard.”).
In the wake of Glenn, we have acknowledged that,
notwithstanding the deference owed to the decisions of an
ERISA plan administrator under Firestone, “a conflict of
interest . . . is a given in almost all ERISA cases.” Marrs v.
Motorola, Inc., 577 F.3d 783, 789 (7th Cir. 2009). “It is thus
not the existence of a conflict of interest . . . but the gravity
of the conflict, as inferred from the circumstances, that
is critical.” Id. (emphasis in original). We have held also,
[T]he gravity of the conflict, and thus the likelihood
that the conflict influenced the plan administrator’s
decision, should be inferred from the circumstances
of the case, including the reasonableness of the pro-
cedures by which the plan administrator decided
No. 09-2326 17
the claim, any safeguards the plan administrator has
erected to minimize the conflict of interest, and the
terms of employment of the plan administrator’s
staff that decides benefit claims.
Majeski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 590 F.3d 478, 482
(7th Cir. 2009) (citing Marrs, 577 F.3d at 789). In Glenn
the Court suggested that a plan’s conflict of interest
might prove to be “tiebreaking” in a case where “circum-
stances suggest a higher likelihood that [the conflict]
affected the benefits decision, including, but not limited
to, cases where an insurance company administrator has
a history of biased claims administration.” 554 U.S. at 117.
In this case, as discussed, the Plan adopted a rea-
sonable deadline for the filing of administrative appeals
from denials of benefits, and it likewise was reasonable
for the Plan to enforce that deadline in Edwards’s case,
given that, as also has been discussed, Edwards never
offered any explanation for her delay in filing her ap-
peal. With respect to safeguards erected by the Plan
to minimize conflicts of interest and the terms of employ-
ment of the Plan administrator, the evidence is that
Mlekush, the Plan administrator, has no contact with
Briggs & Stratton’s financial advisors and receives no
incentives to deny claims. As the Glenn Court observed,
a plan’s conflict of interest “should prove less
important (perhaps to the vanishing point) where the
administrator has taken active steps to reduce potential
bias and to promote accuracy, for example, by walling
off claims administrators from those interested in
firm finances, or by imposing management checks
18 No. 09-2326
that penalize inaccurate decisionmaking irrespective of
whom the inaccuracy benefits.” 554 U.S. at 117. In sum,
we find that the Plan’s conflict of interest is not
impermissibly grave. Said differently, this is not the sort
of close case in which the Plan’s conflict of interest tips
the balance in Edwards’s favor.
We conclude that the Plan’s refusal to entertain Ed-
wards’s untimely administrative appeal was not ar-
bitrary and capricious, nor was it an abuse of discretion
for the district court to require exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies in this case. Because Edwards failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies before bringing
suit under ERISA, the district court properly granted
summary judgment in favor of the Plan.5
5
Because we find that Edwards failed to exhaust her adminis-
trative remedies, we need not reach the issue of whether the
Plan’s denial of Edwards’s original claim for benefits was
arbitrary and capricious. We note that after oral argument in
this appeal, Edwards submitted to us pursuant to Rule 28(j) of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 28(e) of the
Circuit Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit a copy of the recent decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct.
1197 (2011). In Henderson, the Court found that a provision of
the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102
Stat. 4105 (1988) (codified, as amended, in various sections of
38 U.S.C.), governing the time for bringing appeals to the
United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims was not
jurisdictional in nature. See 131 S. Ct. at 1206. It is not at all
clear what relevance, if any, Henderson has to this ERISA case.
(continued...)
No. 09-2326 19
IV. Conclusion
The decision of the district court granting summary
judgment in favor of the Plan as to Edwards’s claim
under ERISA and denying Edwards’s motion for sum-
mary judgment is A FFIRMED.
5
(...continued)
We have never treated the requirement of exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies in ERISA cases as being jurisdictional
and instead, as already has been noted, we consistently have
held that the decision to require exhaustion in a given case
is committed to a district court’s discretion.
4-29-11