UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4616
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARLON ROBERTS, a/k/a Bobby,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:07-cr-00395-CCB-6)
Submitted: April 28, 2011 Decided: May 2, 2011
Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Cordell A. Hull, Yamilet Hurtado, PATTON BOGGS, LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney,
James Thomas Wallner, Assistant United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Marlon Roberts appeals from his convictions and
resulting 121-month sentence after pleading guilty to conspiracy
to distribute and possess with intent to distribute
methamphetamine and conspiracy to launder money. Counsel has
filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for
appeal but raising the issues of whether counsel was ineffective
in persuading Roberts to enter into a guilty plea and whether
counsel was ineffective in failing to secure an even further
reduced sentence. We affirm.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel generally
are not cognizable on direct appeal. United States v. King, 119
F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997). Rather, to allow for adequate
development of the record, a defendant generally must bring his
claims in a 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2010) motion. Id.;
United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir. 1994).
However, ineffective assistance claims are cognizable on direct
appeal if the record conclusively establishes ineffective
assistance. United States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th
Cir. 1999); King, 119 F.3d at 295.
To demonstrate ineffective assistance, a defendant
must show that his “counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness,” and that the error was
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“prejudicial to the defense” such that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692, 694 (1984).
In the context of a plea agreement, where a defendant claims
ineffective assistance, the prejudice prong is satisfied where
the defendant shows that “there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Counsel can be found ineffective for giving advice
that leads to an involuntary guilty plea. In Hill, the Supreme
Court held that, in order to prove ineffective assistance of
counsel in that context, the defendant had to prove: (1) that
counsel’s errors were below a standard of reasonable competence,
and (2) that but for those errors, the defendant would not have
pleaded guilty, but would have instead proceeded to trial. “[A]
guilty plea is constitutionally valid if it ‘represents a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative choices
of action open to the defendant.’” United States v. Moussaoui,
591 F.3d 263, 278 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)).
Here, the record does not conclusively show that
counsel was ineffective for advising Roberts to enter into the
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plea agreement. Our review of the record also indicates that
Roberts’ guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Finally, the
record does not conclusively demonstrate ineffective assistance
related to sentencing.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Roberts, in writing, of the right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Roberts requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Roberts. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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