UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4681
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLES RAYNARD WRIGHT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
District Judge. (3:08-cr-00125-FDW-1)
Submitted: April 28, 2011 Decided: May 2, 2011
Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard L. Brown, Jr., LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD L. BROWN, JR.,
Monroe, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Raynard Wright pled guilty to possession of a
firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2006), and was sentenced as an armed career criminal to the
statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 180 months.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006). On appeal, Wright’s counsel has
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), questioning whether the district court erred in finding
that Wright was an armed career criminal. Wright has filed a
pro se supplemental brief addressing the same issue and also
claiming that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Under § 924(e), if a defendant violates § 922(g) and
has sustained three prior convictions for violent felonies
committed on occasions different from one another, the district
court must sentence the defendant to a minimum term of fifteen
years of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). We have reviewed
the record and conclude that the district court did not err in
determining that Wright had sustained at least three prior
convictions for violent felonies, committed on occasions
different from one another and, therefore, was properly
sentenced as an armed career criminal.
In his supplemental pro se brief, Wright asserts that
his attorney was ineffective for failing to challenge the
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validity of the indictment. However, unless an attorney’s
ineffectiveness is conclusively apparent on the face of the
record, ineffective assistance claims are not generally
addressed on direct appeal. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d
424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d
192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999) (providing standard and noting that
ineffective assistance of counsel claims generally should be
raised by motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255). We find that
counsel’s ineffectiveness is not conclusively apparent on the
face of this record and thus decline to consider this claim.
In accordance with Anders, we have thoroughly examined
the entire record for any potentially meritorious issues and
have found none. Therefore we affirm Wright’s conviction and
sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Wright, in
writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Wright requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Wright. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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