United States v. Wright

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4681

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

CHARLES RAYNARD WRIGHT,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
District Judge. (3:08-cr-00125-FDW-1)

Submitted: April 28, 2011 Decided: May 2, 2011

Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard L. Brown, Jr., LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD L. BROWN, JR.,
Monroe, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Charles Raynard Wright pled guilty to possession of a

firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

(2006), and was sentenced as an armed career criminal to the

statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 180 months.

18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006). On appeal, Wright’s counsel has

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), questioning whether the district court erred in finding

that Wright was an armed career criminal. Wright has filed a

pro se supplemental brief addressing the same issue and also

claiming that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.

Finding no error, we affirm.

Under § 924(e), if a defendant violates § 922(g) and

has sustained three prior convictions for violent felonies

committed on occasions different from one another, the district

court must sentence the defendant to a minimum term of fifteen

years of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). We have reviewed

the record and conclude that the district court did not err in

determining that Wright had sustained at least three prior

convictions for violent felonies, committed on occasions

different from one another and, therefore, was properly

sentenced as an armed career criminal.

In his supplemental pro se brief, Wright asserts that

his attorney was ineffective for failing to challenge the

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validity of the indictment. However, unless an attorney’s

ineffectiveness is conclusively apparent on the face of the

record, ineffective assistance claims are not generally

addressed on direct appeal. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d

424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d

192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999) (providing standard and noting that

ineffective assistance of counsel claims generally should be

raised by motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255). We find that

counsel’s ineffectiveness is not conclusively apparent on the

face of this record and thus decline to consider this claim.

In accordance with Anders, we have thoroughly examined

the entire record for any potentially meritorious issues and

have found none. Therefore we affirm Wright’s conviction and

sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Wright, in

writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the

United States for further review. If Wright requests that a

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must

state that a copy thereof was served on Wright. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

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adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED