UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5105
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
OMAR HAKEEN GRANT, a/k/a Omar Hakeem Grant, a/k/a Omar Hakim
Grant,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:08-cr-00829-PMD-1)
Submitted: April 28, 2011 Decided: May 2, 2011
Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Gordon Baker, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Sean Kittrell,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Omar Hakeen Grant pled guilty to possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2006). He was sentenced to eighty-four
months’ imprisonment. Grant’s counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
that, in her opinion, there are no meritorious issues for
appeal, but questioning whether the district court adequately
complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Grant’s guilty
plea and whether the sentence imposed is reasonable. Although
advised of his right to do so, Grant has not filed a pro se
supplemental brief. The Government declined to file a response.
We affirm.
Because Grant did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, we review the Rule 11 hearing for
plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th
Cir. 2002). “To establish plain error, [Grant] must show that an
error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error
affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Muhammad,
478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Our review of the record
leads us to conclude that the district court fully complied with
Rule 11 and that Grant’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary,
and supported by an independent factual basis.
2
We also conclude that Grant’s sentence is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable. We review a sentence
for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). The first step in this review requires us to ensure
that the district court committed no significant procedural
error. United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir.
2008). In determining the procedural reasonableness of a
sentence, this court considers whether the district court
properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range,
considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, analyzed any
arguments presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained
the selected sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We then consider
the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, taking into
account the totality of the circumstances. United States v.
Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). A sentence
within the Guidelines range is accorded an appellate presumption
of reasonableness. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346-56
(2007). We have reviewed the record and conclude that Grant’s
within-Guidelines sentence is both procedurally and
substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Grant in writing of his
3
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Grant requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Grant. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4