NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 11a0284n.06
No. 09-2411
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED
May 03, 2011
LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
ROBERT LEE BAILEY, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
v. ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
) MICHIGAN
CHRISTOPHER GOLLADAY, et al., )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
Before: SUTTON and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges; and HOOD, Senior District
Judge.*
PER CURIAM. Robert Lee Bailey appeals from the district court’s order accepting the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and granting summary judgment for the defendants
on qualified immunity grounds. The district court found that Bailey’s Eighth Amendment rights
were not violated and that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
For the reasons that follow, the district court’s order of judgment is AFFIRMED in part,
REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
At all relevant times, Bailey was incarcerated at the Alger Maximum Correctional Facility in
Munising, Michigan. In his pro se complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he avers that the
*
The Honorable Joseph M. Hood, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
defendants, Corrections Officers Christopher Golladay, John Duvall, Kirt Mahar, Matthew Storey,
and John Forrest, violated his right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment because they subjected
him to excessive force in an incident initially between him and Golladay on January 14, 2006, arising
out of Bailey’s possession of a betting slip, an item of contraband.
Golladay ordered Bailey to hand over the betting slip. Bailey refused to comply with the order,
instead tearing up the betting slip and flushing the pieces down the toilet. Golladay ordered Bailey
and his cell mate out of their cell so that he could search the cell and pat them down. Bailey was
escorted to the television room, and Golladay returned to search for contraband with Correction
Officer Roy Headley. Approximately 20 minutes later, Headley ordered Bailey and his cell mate to
return to their cell. Bailey returned to his cell to discover a number of his personal items had been
damaged or destroyed. Upset, Bailey reported Golladay’s behavior to Golladay's supervisor,
identified only as Sergeant Burk. At some point, Bailey exited his cell, whereupon Sergeant Burk
ordered Bailey to return to his cell and stated that he, Burk, would be there shortly to resolve the
complaint. Upon arriving in the hallway outside his cell, Bailey realized that Golladay had entered
his cell again.
The parties dispute whether Bailey or Golladay initiated physical contact after Bailey entered
his cell. It is undisputed, however, that Bailey ran toward his cell. Video footage of the incident then
shows Golladay forcing Bailey to the floor of the hallway outside of the cell. Bailey alleges that
Golladay struck him with a closed fist to the jaw then grabbed Bailey's wrist and propelled him out
of the cell, slamming him into a concrete wall, and knocking the wind out of him.
In the hallway, Golladay put Bailey up against the wall, began punching his ribs, and then
rammed his head into Bailey's abdomen and chest. Bailey admits that he continued to resist
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Golladay’s efforts to subdue him until other officers arrived. Bailey only stopped fighting after
several officers restrained him. Bailey, however, alleges that when Storey arrived, he grabbed
Bailey's arms and held them securely while Duvall began to punch Bailey in the upper torso. Storey
then placed Bailey in handcuffs. While Bailey was immobilized on his stomach, Golladay told Bailey
that he was going to kill him. Subsequently, Bailey alleges Golladay, Forrest, Mahar, Storey and
Duvall struck Bailey in the face and head numerous times with their feet and their fists. Bailey claims
that Mahar punched and kneed him in the back.
Subdued, Bailey was escorted to the segregation unit by defendants Duvall, Storey, Forrest,
and an unnamed officer, all of whom allegedly physically threatened Bailey and used excessive force
while transporting him to segregation. Bailey’s brief describes the scene as follows:
Racial slurs were being shouted at [Bailey] throughout this whole transfer. [Bailey’s]
head was being held down forcibly to the point of actual choking by Defendants
Story and Forrest, and as the Segregation unit doorway was approached, these
Defendants intentionally slammed [Bailey’s] head into the dividing structure causing
[Bailey] dizziness, faintness, and the inability to maintain normal balance. [Bailey]
was carried into the Segregation unit where he was thrown into a caged shower on
C-wing where he laid semi-conscious, battered and abused, on the filthy shower stall
floor and allowed to suffer unnecessarily from the extreme pain of the beating.
[Bailey] continually asked for medical treatment, even as the excruciating pain from
the beating and from the slamming into the door left him in and out of consciousness.
[Bailey] was left on the filthy concrete shower floor for approximately one hour until
he was rousted [sic] conscious by officers and a nurse.
Bailey was treated in the emergency room and diagnosed with two black eyes, nerve damage
to his left eye, multiple contusions to his head and body, a possible fracture to his left wrist, nerve
damage to his left wrist, and permanent scars.
II. Standard of Review
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We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. Lockett v. Suardini, 526
F.3d 866, 872 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Int’l Union v. Cummins, Inc., 434 F.3d 478, 483 (6th Cir.
2006)). Thus, a grant of summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden to show the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This burden is met simply by
showing the court that there is an absence of evidence on a material fact on which the nonmoving
party has the ultimate burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then
shifts to the nonmoving party to “come forward with some probative evidence to support its claim.”
Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994). The court's function is not to weigh
the evidence but to decide whether there are genuine issues for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Multimedia 2000, Inc. v. Attard, 374 F.3d 377, 380 (6th Cir. 2004).
In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, the evidence should be construed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party when deciding whether there is enough evidence
to overcome summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 885
(6th Cir. 2004).
III. Discussion
Government officials, performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Estate of Dietrich v. Burrows,
167 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 1999). “Whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity
depends on whether the plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated and whether those rights were
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clearly established.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Dorsey v. Barber,
517 F.3d 389, 394 (6th Cir. 2008); see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16
(2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). A court may exercise its discretion when
determining which prong to address first in light of the circumstances. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818.
When making a qualified immunity analysis, the facts must be interpreted in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. “Summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine factual dispute relating
to whether the defendants committed acts that allegedly violated clearly established rights.”
Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Buckner v. Kilgore, 36 F.3d
536, 540 (6th Cir. 1994)).
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain against
prisoners.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 319 (1986)). “Although prison discipline may require that inmates endure relatively greater
physical contact, the Eighth Amendment is nonetheless violated if the ‘offending conduct reflects
an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Id. at 383 (quoting Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d
1034, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995)).
The prisoner must satisfy both an objective and a subjective component with respect to this
inquiry. Id. at 383. In the context of a prison disturbance, the analysis “ultimately turns on ‘whether
force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992)
(quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21). This showing will satisfy the subjective component required
for a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Williams, 631 F.3d at 383. To make this determination,
the court may “evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the
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amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts
made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S.
at 321) (internal quotations omitted). The objective component requires “the pain inflicted to be
sufficiently serious.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298
(1991)). However, the seriousness of the injuries is not dispositive. Id. This is a “contextual”
inquiry that is “responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S.
at 8-9).
The district court, after reviewing several videos of the alleged incident, determined that
Bailey initiated the incident by barging into the cell and that the force used by the defendants to
restrain Bailey and to control the situation that Bailey had created was necessary and reasonable
under the circumstances. The district court noted that Bailey had to be restrained by several officers
and only stopped his aggressive behavior when he was completely restrained. The district court
determined that the defendants had not violated the Eighth Amendment and, accordingly, that they
were entitled to qualified immunity.
To the extent that the defendants Golladay, Forrest, Mahar, Storey and Duvall were acting
to bring Bailey under control, this Court completely agrees with the district court. Bailey instigated
the disturbance in the cell block area, which involved several other inmates and resulted in injuries
to four corrections officers. The disturbance could have easily escalated, but the corrections officers
were able to quash the violence quickly and effectively. To the extent that the corrections officers
used force to subdue and restrain Golladay, that use of force was made by the corrections officers
in a good faith effort to maintain discipline. It is clear that the corrections officers only used as much
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force as necessary and reasonably calculated to respond to the reasonable threat perceived by the
corrections officers. We affirm the district court’s opinion in this regard.
However, the district court did not address Bailey’s allegations that his Eighth Amendment
right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment was violated by the conduct of defendants Duvall,
Storey, Forrest, and the unnamed officer after he was restrained and as he was being transported to
the shower in the segregation unit. Bailey alleges that, as the defendants were transporting him to
the segregation unit, they were using racial slurs and making physical threats while causing him to
choke. Additionally, he alleges that they intentionally and repeatedly banged his head into the steel
entrance to the unit. Interpreting the facts in a light most favorable to Bailey, as this Court must,
these alleged actions are sufficient to demonstrate unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
unrelated to any legitimate penological purpose upon a prisoner once he is restrained and compliant.
Johnson v. Perry, 106 F. App’x 467, 469 (6th Cir. 2004) (“An unprovoked application of force to
a handcuffed and shackled prisoner would violate clearly established law under the Eighth
Amendment.”); see Pelfrey, 43 F.3d at 1037.
As there is a factual dispute as to whether such force was used against Bailey after he was
restrained and had become cooperative, the district court erred in determining that Defendants
Duvall, Story, Forrest and the unnamed officer were due qualified immunity for the actions taken
while transporting Bailey to the segregation unit.
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED
in part and REVERSED in part. The matter is REMANDED to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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