UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4604
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TYQUAN JACKSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:09-cr-00352-HEH-1)
Submitted: April 7, 2011 Decided: May 3, 2011
Before DAVIS and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H.
Pratt, Mary E. Maguire, Assistant Federal Public Defenders,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United
States Attorney, Michael A. Jagels, Special Assistant United
States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tyquan Jackson appeals his conviction and eighty-month
sentence, following a jury trial, for possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
On appeal, Jackson contends that there was insufficient evidence
to sustain the jury’s verdict. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of a Fed. R. Crim.
P. 29 motion for acquittal de novo. United States v. Reid, 523
F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 2008). “A defendant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction bears a
heavy burden.” United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067
(4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will
uphold a jury’s verdict “if, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government, it is supported by substantial
evidence.” Reid, 523 F.3d at 317. Substantial evidence is
“evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Alerre, 430
F.3d 681, 693 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In resolving issues of substantial evidence, we do
not reweigh the evidence or reassess the factfinder’s
determination of witness credibility, see United States v.
Brooks, 524 F.3d 549, 563 (4th Cir. 2008), and “can reverse a
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conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the prosecution’s
failure is clear.” United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 394
(4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2006), the Government must prove that: (1) Jackson was a
convicted felon; (2) Jackson knowingly possessed a firearm; and
(3) the firearm traveled in interstate commerce. See United
States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 136 (4th Cir. 2001). Jackson
stipulated that he had been convicted of a felony and that the
firearm traveled in interstate commerce. Thus, the Government
only had to prove Jackson’s knowing possession.
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Government, we hold that there was sufficient evidence
from which the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that Jackson possessed a gun. The jury heard from a police
officer who saw Jackson holding a gun, as well as from several
other officers who observed Jackson’s nervous behavior,
described his attempt to flee from them, and saw the gun at the
scene. Because we cannot say that the officers’ testimony was
inherently improbable or incredible, we decline to reassess the
jury’s credibility determinations. See United States v. Close,
349 F.2d 841, 848-49 (4th Cir. 1965).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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