UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4811
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STACY LAMONT BERRY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Norman K. Moon,
Senior District Judge. (3:09-cr-00019-nkm-1)
Submitted: April 28, 2011 Decided: May 3, 2011
Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles L. Weber, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant.
Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Ronald M. Huber,
Assistant United States Attorney, Elliott J. Casey, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Stacy Lamont Berry challenges his
convictions of Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (2006). Berry contends the district court erred when it
denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal and when it
instructed the jury. For the reasons explained below, we affirm
Berry’s convictions.
This court reviews de novo the district court’s denial
of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v.
Reid, 523 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 2008). This court will uphold
the jury’s verdict “if, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, it is supported by substantial
evidence.” Id. “Substantial evidence is evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In reviewing for substantial evidence, this court considers both
circumstantial and direct evidence and allows the government all
reasonable inferences from the facts shown to those sought to be
established. United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 333 (4th
Cir. 2008).
A conviction under the Hobbs Act requires the
government to prove “(1) the underlying robbery or extortion
crime, and (2) an effect on interstate commerce.” United States
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v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350, 353 (4th Cir. 2003). However, “the
impact on commerce [may be] small, and it may be shown by proof
of probabilities without evidence that any particular commercial
movements were affected.” United States v. Brantley, 777 F.2d
159, 162 (4th Cir. 1985). The interstate commerce requirement
has been broadly interpreted and courts have found it “satisfied
even where the effect on interstate commerce is indirect,
minimal and less than certain,” although the effect must be
“reasonably probable.” United States v. Buffey, 899 F.2d 1402,
1404 (4th Cir. 1990). Moreover, this court has held that
“[d]rug dealing . . . is an inherently economic enterprise that
affects interstate commerce. For this reason, the robbery of a
drug dealer has been found to be the kind of act which satisfies
the ‘affecting commerce’ element of the Hobbs Act.” Williams,
342 F.3d at 355 (internal citation omitted). *
We conclude the Government’s evidence at trial
established that the robbery victims were engaged in the
marijuana trade during the relevant time and that Berry obtained
both marijuana and money as a result of his actions.
Accordingly, the Government presented sufficient evidence from
*
Although Berry argues this court should overrule or ignore
our decision in Williams, we cannot “overrule or reconsider a
precedent set by another panel.” United States v. Najjar, 300
F.3d 466, 486 n.8 (4th Cir. 2002).
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which the jury could determine Berry’s crimes had the required
effect on interstate commerce.
We also conclude the district court correctly
instructed the jury. Berry argues the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995),
requires proof in Hobbs Act prosecutions of a substantial impact
on interstate commerce. We conclude Berry’s argument is
foreclosed by this court’s decision in Williams. There, this
court specifically held that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Lopez did “not disturb our continued application of [the]
minimal effects standard” in Hobbs Act cases. Williams, 342
F.3d at 354. Thus, the district court’s jury instruction
correctly stated the law.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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