[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 4, 2011
No. 11-10351
JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-00049-MP-GRJ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JESUS MANUEL ZOLA-AGUILAR,
a.k.a. Jesus Manuel Zola-Aguilar,
a.k.a. Jesus Manuel-Sola,
a.k.a. Jesus Sola-Avila,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(May 4, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jesus Manuel Zola-Aguilar appeals his sentence of imprisonment for 13
months following his plea of guilty for being an illegal alien in possession of a
firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). Zola-Aguilar argues that his sentence is
procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to state explicitly that
the sentence is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” id. § 3553(a), to
achieve the goals of sentencing. Zola-Aguilar maintains that the district court
violated the requirement, id. § 3553(c), that it state its reasons for the sentence it
entered. We affirm.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential standard of
review for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct.
586, 591 (2007).
Zola-Aguilar’s argument fails. The Supreme Court has ruled that, under
section 3553(c), “[t]he sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the
appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007). We have stated that “the
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requirement of § 3553(c)(1) does not mean that a sentencing court must incant the
specific language used in the guidelines.” United States v. Bonilla, 463 F.3d
1176, 1182 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither must the
district court state that it has considered each sentencing factor. Id.
Zola-Aguilar’s argument would require district courts to “incant the specific
language” of section 3553(a) in contravention of our express holding that such
recitations are unnecessary. Id.; see also United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324,
1330 (11th Cir. 2005) (an acknowledgment that the district court has considered
the defendant’s arguments and the factors in section 3553(a) is ordinarily
sufficient). The record establishes that the district court exercised its authority and
imposed a sentence that was “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to comply
with the purposes of sentencing because the district court explicitly stated that it
had considered the statutory factors and the applicable guidelines and policy
statements, as well as Zola-Aguilar’s previous illegal reentries. The district court
did not abuse its discretion. Zola-Aguilar’s sentence in the middle of the guideline
range is reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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