10-1144-cv
Taylor v. Housing Authority of the City of New Haven
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term 2010
(Argued: April 11, 2011 Decided: May 4, 2011)
Docket No. 10-1144-cv
REBECCA TAYLOR, deceased, by and through
Holly Wazyluk, her personal representative,
KARL HUNTER, and HEIWA SALOVITZ,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN, JIMMY MILLER,
individually, KAREN DUBOIS-WALTON, individually and as
Executive Director of the Housing Authority, DAVID
ALVARADO, ILONA LEFFINGWELL, LOUISE PERSALL, ROBERT SOLOMON, and
JASON TURNER, as officials and board members of the
Housing Authority,
Defendants-Appellees.*
Before:
KEARSE, MINER, and CHIN, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from a judgment entered March 29, 2010, in
the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut (Arterton, J.) finding in favor of defendants-
appellees on all claims and decertifying the class.
AFFIRMED.
*
The Clerk of the Court is directed to revise the
official caption to conform to the above.
JENNIFER CHILDRESS VICKERY, Law Office of
Jennifer Vickery, New Haven,
Connecticut, for Plaintiffs-
Appellants.
DONN A. SWIFT, Lynch, Traub, Keefe &
Errante, New Haven, Connecticut,
for Defendants-Appellees.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs-appellants, Rebecca Taylor, Karl
Hunter, and Heiwa Salovitz ("plaintiffs"), commenced this
action, alleging that defendants-appellees, the Housing
Authority of the City of New Haven ("HANH") and a group of
HANH officials ("defendants"), discriminated against them in
administering New Haven's Housing Choice Voucher ("Section
8") program, in violation of plaintiffs' rights under the
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d); the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988 (the "FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f);
and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §
794; and regulations promulgated thereunder, 24 C.F.R. §§
8.28, 100.204. After a nine-day bench trial, the district
court entered judgment on March 29, 2010, finding in favor
of defendants on all claims and vacating its earlier class
certification order. See Taylor v. Hous. Auth. of New Haven
(Taylor II), 267 F.R.D. 36, 75-76 (D. Conn. 2010), vacating
Taylor v. Hous. Auth. of New Haven (Taylor I), 257 F.R.D. 23
(D. Conn. 2009). The facts and procedural history of this
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case are fully set forth in the district court's opinion in
Taylor II, familiarity with which is assumed.
On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the district
court's (1) conclusion that 24 C.F.R. §§ 8.28 and 100.204
may not be privately enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2)
analysis of Taylor's intentional discrimination claim under
the FHAA; (3) factual findings regarding the provision of
Section 8 services to the class; (4) rulings on certain
discovery issues; and (5) decertification.
This Court has not addressed the private
enforceability of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") regulations at issue here or the private
enforceability of agency regulations generally since the
Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275 (2001). The Sandoval Court held that a regulation may
be privately enforced if it "invoke[s] a private right of
action that Congress through statutory text created." Id.
at 291. In other words, a right of action "can extend no
further than" the personal right conferred by the plain
language of the statute. Taylor II, 267 F.R.D. at 42-43;
see Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002);
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291 ("Agencies may play the sorcerer's
apprentice but not the sorcerer himself."); see also Mark H.
v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 935 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Sandoval
instructs that whether the § 504 regulations are privately
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enforceable will turn on whether their requirements fall
within the scope of the prohibition contained in § 504
itself.").
We adopt the district court's carefully considered
and thorough discussion of these issues. See Taylor II, 267
F.R.D. at 40-47, 52-54; see also Three Rivers Ctr. for
Indep. Living, Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of Pittsburgh, 382 F.3d
412, 418-32 (3d Cir. 2004) (reaching analogous conclusions
with respect to HUD regulations at 24 C.F.R. §§ 8.22, .23,
and .26).
We have considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments
and conclude that they are without merit, for the reasons
articulated in Taylor II. Accordingly, the judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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