United States v. Albertson

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________

No. 09-1049
_______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

RANDY A. ALBERTSON,

Appellant
_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 4-06-cr-00177-001)
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III
_______________

Argued September 23, 2010
_______________

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO
and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : May 04, 2011)
Salvatore C. Adamo, Esquire (Argued)
289 Town Center Boulevard, Suite 300
Easton, PA 18040

Counsel for Appellant

William C. Simmers, Esquire
Office of United States Attorney
240 West Third Street, Suite 316
Williamsport, PA 17701

Theodore B. Smith, III, Esquire (Argued)
Office of United States Attorney
228 Walnut Street
P.O. Box 11754
220 Federal Building and Courthouse
Harrisburg, PA 17108

Counsel for Appellee

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

We consider once again what are appropriate
computer-related supervised release conditions for child
pornography offenders. Appellant Randy Albertson pled
guilty to one count of receiving child pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B). The District Court
sentenced him to 60 months’ imprisonment (the minimum

2
mandated) and 20 years’ supervised release with eight special
conditions. On appeal, Albertson challenges the
reasonableness of the 20-year term and three of the special
conditions of his supervised release, including a restriction on
internet access, mandatory computer monitoring, and a
restriction on his association with minors. As we agree with
Albertson only that a wholesale ban on his internet use is
broader than necessary to accomplish the sentencing goals of
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), we affirm the duration of the supervised
release term and the association-with-minors restriction,
vacate and remand the internet restriction, and remand the
monitoring requirement for adaption to a more tailored
internet restriction.

I. Background

Albertson’s problem with child pornography surfaced
in 2005 when his wife discovered a pornographic image in his
dresser drawer. Despite the family’s efforts to monitor his
computer access thereafter, Albertson, a former prison guard,
continued viewing child porn online. In addition, in 2006,
Albertson’s wife (they are now divorced) reported to the local
police that he had molested her teenaged daughter (his then-
stepdaughter). 1 Consequently, the police searched the family
computer. They found over 700 images of child porn, some
of which featured pre-pubescent children.

Albertson was charged in a two-count superseding
indictment with receipt and possession of child pornography,
1
He was arrested for aggravated indecent assault, indecent
exposure, and indecent assault of a person less than 16 years
of age. These charges were pending at the time of
Albertson’s federal sentencing hearing and he has since been
convicted of the indecent assault charge.

3
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B). He pled guilty to the receipt count and
stipulated to 39 pornographic images. Receipt of child porn
carries a mandatory minimum of five years’ imprisonment, 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1), and that minimum was the jail term
imposed here. Five years’ supervised release is also required.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). In the plea, the parties agreed to a
supervised release term of up to 25 years (with the parties
able to argue at sentencing the appropriate term).

At his 2008 sentencing hearing, Albertson himself
argued to the Court as follows:

I found court cases—and this is through a
Voeker (phonetic) case that I found that
involves two individuals, a Crandon and a
Lloyd (phonetic), both received out of the Third
Circuit here under five year sentences for
supervised release, the Lloyd being, they’re—
from what I’ve read out of their cases, you
know, they don’t even compare to my case, my
background, or anything that I have ever done
as far as law enforcement is concerned. I ask
that you, you know, review that and think about
even less time than five years [of supervised
release] because those two cases, Crandon and
Lloyd, they got less than five out of this district.
I ask for the same thing.
The Government requested the maximum supervised
release term permitted by the plea agreement—25 years. It
stated the nature of the offense and the relevant conduct—that
over 700 pornographic images were found (including pre-
pubescent images) on Albertson’s computer, his wife’s
discovery of an image, and his failure to abide by his family’s
informal restrictions on his computer use.

4
 After imposing the 60-month prison term, the Court
decided on a 20-year term of supervised release with eight
special conditions. Its primary considerations were the
seriousness of the offense, the goal of “deter[ring
Albertson’s] conduct in the future,” and the need “to protect
the public.” On these bases, it found “that an extended term
of supervised release is appropriate.”

Albertson appeals three of the special conditions. 2 He
was: banned from “associat[ing] with children under the age
of 18 (with the exception of his children) except in the
presence of an adult who has been approved by the Probation
Officer” (Special Condition 4); barred from “us[ing] a
computer with access to any ‘on-line computer service’
without the prior written approval of the probation officer”
(Special Condition 5); and required to submit to an initial
inspection, and subsequent inspections, of his computer and
to allow the installation of monitoring or filtering software
(Special Condition 7). The District Court did not discuss the
details of these conditions nor did it provide specific reasons
for imposing them. On appeal, Albertson argues they subject
him to a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary. He
relies principally on our decision in United States v. Miller,
594 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2010). There, as here, we were
confronted with a ban on internet use that was imposed on a
child porn offender as a special condition of his supervised
release. We concluded that the internet ban—which was
imposed for life—was overbroad.

2
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C § 3231,
which provides the district courts of the United States with
original jurisdiction over crimes against the laws of the
United States. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

5
 II. Waiver

In his opening brief, Albertson argues solely that the
20-year supervised release term is unreasonable. He neither
raises nor refers to the conditions of his supervised release. It
is only in his reply brief that he addresses those conditions
and argues they are unlawful in light of Miller. Thus, we
address a threshold question of waiver.

Albertson’s reason for his untimeliness was that our
decision in Miller was filed one day after his opening brief.
He informed us that it had not occurred to him to challenge
his conditions prior to our analysis in that case. According to
the Government, however, Albertson’s failure to challenge
the conditions of his supervised release in his opening brief
waived the argument. It urged us to strike the reply brief or,
at least, consider the argument waived. Rather than strike the
reply, we granted the Government’s request to file a sur-
reply.
It is standard practice that an appellant must state all
issues raised on appeal in the opening brief. See Fed. R. App.
P. 28(a)(5); Third Cir. Local App. R. 28.1(a)(1). Indeed, it is
essential to our review that the appellant properly present all
issues in his opening brief. “It is well settled that an
appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening
brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.” United
States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005); see, e.g.,
In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Inst.
for Scientific Info., Inc. v. Gordon & Breach, Sci. Publs.,
Inc., 931 F.2d 1002, 1011 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding waiver
because “[n]owhere in the ‘Statement of the Issues Presented’
or the ‘Argument’ section of plaintiff’s appellate brief are [the
district court’s] conclusions questioned”). For these reasons,
“we usually refrain from addressing an argument or issue not
properly raised and discussed in the appellate briefing.”

6
Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 403
(3d Cir. 2010) (Cowen, J., dissenting).

However, the rule does yield in “extraordinary
circumstances.” See Simmons v. City of Phila., 947 F.2d
1042, 1065 (3d Cir. 1991). Though our case law repeats the
rule—waiver absent extraordinary circumstances—we have
yet to flesh out the extraordinary circumstance exception. We
find instructive an approach set out by one of our sister courts
of appeals. In In re Kane, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
acknowledged, as we do, that it lacked explicit standards for
“what constitutes such extraordinary circumstances.” 254
F.3d 325, 331 (1st Cir. 2001). It did, however, identify
certain factors as “obvious” ones to consider: “whether there
is some excuse for the failure to raise the issue in the opening
brief; how far the opposing party would be prejudiced; and
whether failing to consider the argument would lead to a
miscarriage of justice or undermine confidence in the judicial
system.” Id.

We agree and adopt these principles. Applied to the
facts of Albertson’s case, we believe the balance weighs in
favor of reviewing the merits of the challenge to his
supervised release conditions.

With respect to the first factor, we appreciate that
Albertson’s reason for failing to raise the issue in his opening
brief is not compelling. As noted, his counsel stated at
argument that, prior to Miller, he had not realized that a
challenge to the conditions might succeed. This might be true
as a subjective matter. Objectively, however, the basis for
Miller already existed in a line of cases, discussed below,
concerning computer-related conditions of supervised release
that were imposed on child porn offenders. Thus, standing
alone, the first factor does not cut against waiver.

7
 However, the second two factors do weigh against
waiver. The Government would suffer no prejudice in this
case. Not only was it permitted to file a sur-reply, but it then
failed to pursue meaningfully its waiver argument in the sur-
reply. This indicates that it would not be prejudiced
significantly by our review of the merits.

Lastly, the miscarriage of justice factor is “somewhat
similar to the ‘plain error’ rule, which is applied in the
context of appeals from criminal trials, and allows appellate
courts to consider defects at the trial level even when the
defendant has failed to lodge an appropriate objection.”
Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 169 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998)
(Roth, J., concurring) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)). In other
words, we may consider an issue, despite the fact that it was
improperly raised on appeal, if the District Court plainly erred
in such a way as to affect the appellant’s substantial rights.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Thielemann, 575
F.3d 265, 270 n.9 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993)). “[E]ven where plain
error exists [that affects substantial rights], our discretionary
authority to order correction is to be guided by whether the
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Knight,
266 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2001). If forced to ignore the
challenge in this case, we turn a blind eye to supervised
release conditions that are directly contrary to the line of
cases, discussed below, governing the propriety of internet
restrictions for child porn offenders in this Circuit. To do so
would seriously “undermine confidence in the judicial
system.” In re Kane, 254 F.3d at 331. Accordingly, on

8
balance, the In re Kane factors we adopt tilt in favor of our
review of the merits. 3
III. The Special Conditions of Supervised Release

Because we conclude that Albertson’s arguments are
not waived, we turn to the merits of his appeal. 4 A sentencing

3
Our reasoning in Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001), also counsels
against waiver. In that case, involving an interlocutory appeal
of a class certification issue, the defendants contended that
the plaintiffs had not preserved the issue of superiority—a
criterion for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3)—because they did not address the issue in
their initial brief. We rejected the waiver argument because
“[a]lthough the plaintiffs d[id] not address superiority directly
in their brief, they raise[d] the issue specifically in their reply
brief, and the facts and arguments on superiority [we]re
present throughout their [opening] brief.” Id. at 191 n.35. As
such, “[w]e believe[d] that the issue of superiority was
implicit in the plaintiffs’ opening brief and was thus
adequately raised on appeal.” Id. Though a challenge to the
special conditions of supervised release is perhaps not so
obviously subsumed within a reasonableness challenge as is
the issue of superiority in a class action certification case, to
the extent that it is, our reasoning in Newton weighs against
waiver.
4
We agree with the Government that, because Albertson did
not object to the special conditions of supervised release at
sentencing, our review is for plain error. United States v.
Warren, 186 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999).

9
judge has wide discretion in imposing terms of supervised
release. Subsections 3583(d)(1) and (2) authorize a
sentencing court to impose conditions of supervised release
provided they are reasonably related to the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors 5 and involve “no greater deprivation of
liberty than is reasonably necessary” to fulfill the purposes set
out in that provision. See United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d
241, 248 (3d Cir. 2005). Accordingly, as the Sentencing
Commission acknowledges, we review the reasonableness of
a supervised release term against the § 3553(a) factors,
recognizing that “the primary purpose of supervised release is
to facilitate the integration of offenders back into the
community rather than to punish them.” U.S. Sentencing

5
The factors include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the
defendant; (2) the need for the sentence
imposed . . . (B) to afford adequate deterrence
to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public
from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to
provide the defendant with needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective
manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4)
the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range
established for [the offense as set forth in the
Guidelines] . . . ; (5) any pertinent policy
statement . . . [;] (6) the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the
need to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense.

10
Comm’n, Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release
8-9 (2010). Notably, in addition to the sentencing goals
enumerated, § 3553(a) also requires parsimony—that “[t]he
court impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary.”

A. The Internet Ban & the Monitoring Requirement

According to Albertson, the requirements that he not
use a computer with any form of “online” access unless pre-
approved by his probation officer, and the attendant
monitoring of his computer usage, are disproportionate to his
criminal history and offense characteristics. Thus, he argues,
they are overbroad.

As noted above, we have recently dealt with a similar
question in Miller, in which a child porn offender was
sentenced to a lifetime term of supervised release that banned
access to the internet. In ruling that the condition was
overbroad, we reviewed our case law on “supervised release
conditions restricting computer and internet usage for child
pornography offenders.” 594 F.3d at 185; see Thielemann,
575 F.3d 265; United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139 (3d Cir.
2007); United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386 (3d Cir.
2003); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir.
1999); see also United States v. Maurer, No. 10-3049, 2011
WL 1519201 (3d Cir. Apr. 22, 2011).

Taken together, the Miller-Crandon line of cases
yields three themes. First, though not at issue here, a
complete ban on the use of a computer and internet will rarely
be sufficiently tailored to the § 3553(a) factors. Our opinion
in Voelker illustrates this point. There, the defendant was
banned from using all computers for life following a plea to
receiving child pornography. We ruled that the “outright
lifetime ban” on computers was “the antithesis of a narrowly

11
tailored sanction, a greater deprivation of liberty than [was]
reasonably necessary, and not reasonably related to the
factors set forth in . . . § 3583.” Miller, 594 F.3d at 185
(quoting Voelker, 489 F.3d at 144-45) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

Second, moving along the spectrum of restrictiveness,
a complete ban on internet access, except with prior approval
of probation, may be permissibly imposed temporarily on
those offenders who have used or have clearly demonstrated a
willingness to use the internet as a direct instrument of
physical harm. For instance, in Thielemann, Crandon, and
Maurer the defendants used or demonstrated a willingness to
use the internet to solicit, communicate with, or abuse a
minor in conjunction with child porn offenses. In
Thielemann, the defendant encouraged his online chat
companion to abuse sexually a minor girl in front of a
webcam. Moreover, Thielemann had several persons
involved, and was the hub of the offensive conduct. See 575
F.3d at 268, 269 n.4. Similarly, in Crandon the defendant
used the internet to communicate, arrange to meet, and have
sexual relations with a minor girl. In Maurer, the defendant
expressed an interest in sexual contact with minors while
using the internet in the attempt to arrange a sexual encounter.
Thielemann and Crandon both used the internet to encourage
or otherwise initiate the sexual abuse of a minor, as
distinguished from solely accessing pornographic sites.
Maurer clearly demonstrated a willingness to use the internet
for these same purposes. We upheld, in their cases,
conditions that proscribed all internet access for ten, three,
and five years, respectively.

Finally, where the child porn offense does not involve
a “live” component (that is, direct involvement or
communication, including the attempt or demonstrated
willingness to have direct involvement or communication,

12
with a putative victim via the internet), the district courts
should consider whether a tailored internet limitation is
feasible. In Freeman, for example, the defendant pled to
possessing and receiving child porn. There, as here, he had
also molested children in the past. But absent the direct link
between the internet and the abuse, we concluded that a
blanket ban was overbroad. We noted that “[t]here is no need
to cut off [a child porn offender’s] access to email or benign
internet usage when a more focused restriction, limited to
pornography sites and images, can be enforced by
unannounced inspections of material stored on [the
offender’s] hard drive or removable disks.” Miller, 594 F.3d
at 186 (quoting Freeman, 316 F.3d at 392) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Building from these themes, we set out in Miller three
factors for assessing whether a supervised release condition is
overbroad. We consider the scope of the condition first with
respect to substantive breadth and second with respect to its
duration. Miller, 594 F.3d at 187 & n.9 (noting the similar
factor-based approach adopted in United States v. Heckman,
592 F.3d 400, 405-08 (3d Cir. 2010)). Third, we assess “the
severity of the defendant’s criminal conduct and the facts
underlying the conviction, with a particular focus on whether
the defendant used a computer or the internet to solicit or
otherwise personally endanger children.” Miller, 594 F.3d at
187.
Because we are mindful of the interplay between
prison time and the term of supervised release, we now add it
as a fourth factor. As a general matter, we agree with the
Government that a district court may find it proper to impose
a longer term of supervised release to follow a relatively

13
shorter term of imprisonment. 6 In this context, we believe
that the proportion of a supervised release restriction to the
total period of restriction (including prison time) is also
relevant to our review.

We now apply these factors to Albertson’s case. First,
we note that the restrictiveness of the internet condition
mirrors those in Thielemann and Crandon—no internet access
unless preapproved by probation—a restriction that we
recognize as sweepingly broad and, indeed, too broad unless
the defendant has used the internet as an instrument of harm.
See also Maurer, 2011 WL 1519201, at *7 (recognizing that,
in addition to direct physical harm, an “expressed interest in
minors, . . . coupled with [a] demonstrated willingness to use
the internet as a means for arranging sexual encounters,
presents a tangible risk to children,” and thus supports as
reasonable a total internet ban). As one of our sister courts of
appeals has said, “such a ban renders modern life—in which,
for example, the government strongly encourages taxpayers
to file their returns electronically, where more and more
commerce is conducted on-line, and where vast amounts of
government information are communicated via website—
exceptionally difficult.” United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872,
878 (7th Cir. 2003). This aspect of the scope factor favors
Albertson.

The duration of the supervised release term has an
interesting twist. We recognize that his 20-year term is
shorter than the lifetime bans imposed in both Miller and

6
We do not imply, however, that, if there is a longer prison
term, a shorter term of supervised release is necessarily
appropriate.

14
Voelker. 7 However, the length of the term must be
considered relative to the defendant’s age. We do not believe
that there is a meaningful distinction between the lifetime ban
we struck down in Miller and the 20-year term imposed here.
Miller was 60 at the time of his sentencing and Albertson was
42. Assuming an 80-year life expectancy, the combined
duration for each is essentially the same. 8

Turning to the conduct factor, the aforementioned
cases show that a key consideration is whether the defendant
used the internet “to actively contact a child and solicit sexual
contact.” Miller, 594 F.3d at 188. Albertson did not. With
this in mind, we repeat what we said in Miller: “While we do
not intend to minimize the serious harm caused by possession
of child pornography, [Albertson’s] use of the internet poses a
danger that differs in both kind and degree from the conduct
in Crandon and Thielemann.” Id. Thus, this factor favors
Albertson.

However, Albertson’s relatively short incarceration
sentence suggests that the length of the supervised release
term is reasonable. Though we do not set a bright-line rule,
we find no fault with Albertson’s sentence having a lengthy

7
It is longer than those imposed in Thielemann, Freeman,
Crandon, and Maurer. These defendants received supervised
release terms of ten, five, three, and five years, respectively.
8
See U.S. Nat’l Cntr. for Health Stat., Expectation of Life and
Expected Deaths by Race, Sex, and Age: 2006, tbl. 105,
available at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s010
5.pdf. According to that chart, Albertson’s life expectancy is
78 and Miller’s 80.

15
“tail”—that is, his term of supervised release comprises 80%
of the total 25-year period of restriction on his liberty.

With these factors in context, we approve the 20-year
term of supervised release in itself, but the internet restriction
condition fails for overbreadth because it is too restrictive. If
the District Court had a reason for imposing the type of
internet restriction that we have typically reserved for
offenders such as those in Crandon and Thielemann, it failed
to state that reason. Accordingly, we can do little more than
“flounder in the zone of speculation.” United States v. Loy,
191 F.3d 360, 371 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Thus we remand.

In contrast to the internet use restriction, Albertson’s
computer monitoring condition—which requires him to
submit his computer to inspections, and allow installation of
monitoring or filtering software—would be generally
acceptable if the internet restriction to which it applies is
narrowly tailored and reasonable. Moreover, the condition’s
requirement that Albertson submit to initial and subsequent
computer “examinations” finds statutory support in 18 U.S.C.

16
§ 3583(d)(3). 9 Hence the inspections, coupled with the
required installation of monitoring or filtering software, are
reasonable methods of enforcing a more targeted internet
restriction. For these reasons, we discern no fault with
similar monitoring conditions (that allow computer
inspections and the installation of monitoring or filtering
software) paired with a more tailored internet restriction.

9
It provides:
The court may order, as an explicit condition of
supervised release for a person who is a felon
and required to register under the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act, that the
person submit his person, and any property,
house, residence, vehicle, papers, computer,
other electronic communications or data storage
devices or media, and effects to search at any
time, with or without a warrant, by any law
enforcement or probation officer with reasonable
suspicion concerning a violation of a condition
of supervised release or unlawful conduct by the
person, and by any probation officer in the
lawful discharge of the officer’s supervision
functions.
This language bears more so on Special Condition 6—
which requires Albertson to submit to searches of his
computer upon reasonable suspicion—that he does not
challenge. However, we believe that it also supports
the propriety of the monitoring condition, which is
similar. See Miller, 594 F.3d at 188 n.10 (discussing
the interplay of the two types of special conditions).

17
 To sum up, in a time where the daily necessities of life
and work demand not only internet access but internet
fluency, sentencing courts need to select the least restrictive
alternative for achieving their sentencing purposes. In this
case, the District Court may achieve that purpose through an
internet prohibition and monitoring requirement to assure that
Albertson does not engage in offensive conduct. 10 We thus
vacate both conditions and remand for that Court to fashion a
“comprehensive, reasonably tailored scheme.” Miller, 594
F.3d at 188. 11

10
In Freeman, we suggested that a ban on porn sites and
images might be appropriate instead. 316 F.3d at 392. We
also note that “a prohibition on joining social networks
frequented by children would serve to guard against
recidivism without unjustly constraining [Albertson’s] liberty
interests.” Case Note, Criminal Law—Supervised Release—
Third Circuit Approves Decade-Long Internet Ban for Sex
Offender.—United States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265 (3d
Cir. 2009), 123 Harv. L. Rev. 776, 783 (2010).
11
We ask the District Court to state the safety benefits that
will inure to the public from the internet restriction given the
First Amendment concerns at stake. See Loy, 237 F.3d at 264
(noting that any ban must be directly related to the goals of
protecting the public, deterrence, and rehabilitation, in
addition to being narrowly tailored).

18
 B. The Associational Condition

Albertson claims there is no support in the record for
imposing a prohibition on associating with minors under age
18 (except his family). While it is true that “[a] district court
must state the reasons in open court for imposing a particular
special condition so that the appellate court is not left to
speculate about the reasons,” Miller, 594 F.3d at 184, (and
that was not done here), we may “[n]evertheless . . . affirm
the condition if our own review of the record reveals any
viable basis for the restriction.” Id. at 189 (quoting Voelker,
489 F.3d at 144) (internal quotation marks omitted). At the
time of his sentencing, Albertson had been charged with,
among other things, indecent assault of his then-13- or 14-
year-old step-daughter, and has since been convicted of that
crime. There is thus ample support in the record for this
condition. Its propriety is further corroborated by our
approval of a nearly identical condition in Miller. 594 F.3d at
190. Though Albertson’s condition does not explicitly allow
for “casual encounters,” as did the one in Miller, we conclude
that such a proviso is implicit in the condition: “At this point,
it is well established that associational conditions do not
extend to casual or chance meetings.” Id. at 191 n.11
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly,
we believe the association-with-minors condition is
adequately supported by the record and consistent with the
goals set forth in § 3553(a) as they are incorporated into
§ 3583(d). 12

12
Albertson also challenges the reasonableness of the 20-year
term on the remaining conditions of his supervised release—
both the general conditions and those special ones not dealt
with above. The appellant has the burden of demonstrating
unreasonableness. United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324,

19
 * * * * *

We affirm the duration of the 20-year supervised
release term and the challenged associational restriction.
However, we vacate and remand for further proceedings on
the internet restriction (Special Condition 5). We believe that
a monitoring requirement is a reasonable means of enforcing
a well-tailored internet restriction, but remand that condition
(Special Condition 7) as well for any adjustments required in
light of the re-fashioned internet restriction.

332 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). For the
rationale already noted as to the duration of the internet ban,
Albertson has not met that burden.

20