In Re Global Industrial Technologies, Inc.

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________

No. 08-3650
_____________

In re: GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
et al.,

Debtors.
------------------------------

HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY;
FIRST STATE INSURANCE COMPANY CO;
TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY;
CENTURY INDEMNITY COMPANY, as successor to
CIGNA Specialty Company, formerly known as California
Union Insurance Company; WESTCHESTER FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY, for itself and for International
Insurance Company (now known as TIG Insurance Company)
(by operation of novation all rights and obligations under the
policies have been transferred from International Insurance
Co. to Westchester Fire Insurance Co.); NATIONAL UNION
FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA;
INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF
PENNSYLVANIA; LEXINGTON INSURANCE
COMPANY; AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE
COMPANY, and any other entities related to American
International Group, Inc. that engaged in business
 transactions with the Reorganizing Debtors,

Appellants
_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 07-cv-1749)
District Judge: Honorable Gary L. Lancaster
_______________

Argued May 21, 2009

Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and NYGAARD, Circuit
Judges.

Reargued En Banc October 13, 2010
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SCIRICA, AMBRO,
FUENTES, SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES, JORDAN,
VANASKIE, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Filed: May 4, 2011)
_______________

Craig Goldblatt [ARGUED]
Danielle M. Spinelli
Seth P. Waxman
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr
1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20006
Counsel for Appellants
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company,
First State Ins Co., and Twin City Fire Ins.

2
John D. Demmy
Stevens & Lee
1105 N. Market Street - #700
Wilmington, DE 19801
Counsel for Appellants
Century Indemnity Co. and
Westchester Fire Ins.

Michael S. Davis
Zeichner, Ellman & Krause LLP
575 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Beverly Weiss Manne
Tucker Arensberg, PC
1500 PPG Place
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Counsel for Appellants
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA,
Insurance Company of Pennsylvania,
Lexington Insurance Company and
American Home Assurance Company

Douglas A. Campbell
David B. Salzman
Campbell & Levine
3300 Grant Street - #1700
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Elihu Inselbuch
Caplin & Drysdale
375 Park Avenue – 35th Fl.
New York, NY 10152

3
Peter V. Lockwood [ARGUED]
Kevin C. Maclay
Caplin & Drysdale
One Thomas Circle, NW - #1100
Washington, DC 20005
Counsel for Appellee,
Official Committee of Asbestos Creditors

Robert G. Sable
Sally E. Edison
Nicholas E. Meriwether
McGuire Woods LLP
625 Liberty Avenue – 23rd Fl.
Pittsburgh, PA 15222

James J. Restivo [ARGUED]
Paul M. Singer
David Ziegler
Reed Smith
225 Fifth Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Counsel for Appellee,
Global Industrial Technologies Inc.

Gary Philip Nelson
Sherrard, German & Kelly, P.C.
28th Fl., Two PNC Plaza
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Counsel for Philip A. Pahigian,
Legal Representative of Future Silica
Claimants against Global Industrial
Technologies, Inc., et alia
_______________

4
 OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, First State
Insurance Company, and Twin City Fire Insurance Company
(collectively, “Hartford”1); Century Indemnity Company and
Westchester Fire Insurance Company (collectively,
“Century”2); and National Union Fire Insurance Company of
Pittsburgh, PA, Insurance Company of the State of
Pennsylvania, Lexington Insurance Company, American
Home Insurance Company, and other entities related to
American International Group, Inc. (collectively, “AIG”)
appeal from an order entered by the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denying
Hartford and Century standing to challenge the confirmation
of a plan of reorganization filed by Global Industrial
Technologies, Inc. (“GIT”) and affirming the plan‟s
confirmation.3 Among other things, the District Court,

1
The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., is a
parent corporation of all three insurers but is not party to this
appeal.
2
Century Indemnity Company and Westchester Fire
Insurance Company are both subsidiaries of parent company
ACE Limited, which is not participating in this appeal.
3
The appellees are GIT, the Official Committee of
Asbestos Creditors and Unsecured Trade Creditors, and the
Legal Representatives for Future Asbestos and Silica
Claimants. In this opinion, when referring to arguments made

5
following the reasoning of the Bankruptcy Court, determined
that Hartford and Century lacked standing to participate in
bankruptcy proceedings concerning GIT‟s Chapter 11
reorganization. Because we conclude that Hartford and
Century meet the standing requirements to be heard in those
proceedings and that further factual development may aid in
the resolution of other issues raised on appeal, we will vacate
the District Court‟s order and have the case remanded to the
Bankruptcy Court. The decision we announce is no more far-
reaching than this: when a federal court gives its approval to a
plan that allows a party to put its hands into other people‟s
pockets, the ones with the pockets are entitled to be fully
heard and to have their legitimate objections addressed. In
short, they at least have bankruptcy standing.4

by all of the appellees, we attribute them simply to GIT for
convenience.
4
We note at the outset our disagreement with our
dissenting colleagues‟ characterization of this case as one that
developed in the District and Bankruptcy Courts “with the
full participation of the excess insurers.” (Dissent slip op. at
1.) If the insurers, including appellants Harford and Century,
had been granted standing by the Bankruptcy Court, it could
rightly be said that they had had full participation. But,
though they had some opportunity to voice their objections,
as is more fully described herein, they were denied standing
to object to GIT‟s plan of reorganization. That refusal to give
them their proper place at the litigation table is the whole
point of this appeal.

6
I. Background

This case arises from Chapter 11 petitions filed in
2002 by GIT and certain of its subsidiaries. GIT was formed
in 1995 as a publicly traded holding company for several
businesses, including manufacturers and sellers of refractory
products.5 In 1998, as part of its strategy to grow and develop
its refractory business, GIT acquired A.P. Green Industries,
Inc. (“APG”),6 a long-time manufacturer and seller of
refractory products.

Before the mid-1970s, some of the products that APG
manufactured had asbestos as an ingredient. Although APG
had stopped including asbestos in its products by 1976, its
prior asbestos use triggered an avalanche of personal injury
lawsuits. Beginning in the 1980s and continuing through
early 2002, APG spent approximately $448 million in
resolving over 200,000 asbestos-related claims. In addition to
those claims, APG had, as of February 2002, approximately
235,000 additional asbestos-related claims still pending
against it. From the portion of those pending claims that had
been liquidated, APG had unpaid obligations totaling $491
million.

During that same period, APG also faced silica-related
personal injury claims, though on a vastly smaller scale.
5
Refractory products are “construction-type materials
specifically designed and manufactured for use in high-
temperature applications.” (App. at 87)
6
For convenience, we refer to APG and its related
entities collectively as “APG.”

7
From 1977 to 2002, APG dealt with 23 silica-related lawsuits.
Travelers Indemnity Company spent approximately $312,000
settling or litigating those suits on APG‟s behalf, with APG
contributing $50,000 towards settlement of one of the suits.
As of February 2002, APG had one silica-related suit, a class
action consisting of 169 claims, pending against it in Texas
state court.

In February of 2002, GIT, APG, and certain related
entities (collectively, the “debtors”) sought protection under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code because of adverse
business conditions and the staggering number of asbestos-
related claims pending against them. The debtors did not
identify silica-related liability as a motivation for seeking
bankruptcy relief.

For their plan of reorganization (the “Plan”) to relieve
them of asbestos-related liability, the debtors needed to obtain
approval of the Plan by 75% of the then-current asbestos
claimants.7 While the record is less than clear, it seems that,
to solicit the required votes, the debtors necessarily reached
out to those asbestos claimants‟ attorneys, many of whom
also represented persons with silica-related claims against
other companies.8 The availability of hundreds of millions of

7
Under 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb), at least
75% of a debtor‟s asbestos claimants must support an
asbestos settlement trust, if a reorganization plan containing
such a trust is to be confirmed.
8
We have before acknowledged that “[t]he realities of
securing favorable votes from thousands of claimants to meet
the 75% approval requirement forces debtors to work closely

8
dollars of insurance coverage was evidently assumed and
ultimately featured prominently in the debtors‟ proposed
Plan. The Plan called for entry of a channeling injunction
(the “Asbestos Injunction”) pursuant to which asbestos-
related claims that had or could be brought against the debtors
would instead be channeled to a trust specifically created to
assess and resolve claims (the “APG Asbestos Trust”).9 The
Plan also called for entry of an injunction (the “Silica
Injunction”) channeling silica-related claims to a silica trust
(the “APG Silica Trust”; together with the APG Asbestos
Trust, the “Trusts”).10 Insurance was to fund both Trusts,

with the few attorneys who represent large numbers of injured
claimants.” In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 680 (3d
Cir. 2005).
9
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524(g), a bankruptcy court
may enjoin asbestos-related litigation against a debtor or
qualifying third party and channel the claims into a settlement
trust if the court determines (1) “the debtor is likely to be
subject to substantial future demands for payment arising out
of” asbestos-related claims; (2) “the actual amounts, numbers,
and timing of such future demands cannot be determined”;
and (3) “pursuit of such demands outside the [trust] is likely
to threaten the [reorganization] plan‟s purpose to deal
equitably with claims and future demands.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 24(g)(2)(B)(ii).
10
While § 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code only
expressly authorizes the establishment of a trust and the entry
of a channeling injunction to address asbestos liability,
several courts have concluded that trusts and channeling
injunctions may be authorized under § 105(a) and
§ 1123(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code to address other mass

9
either in the form of cash from APG‟s settlement of disputes
involving certain insurance policies or, with respect to the
APG Silica Trust, in the form of insurance coverage under
certain policies to be assigned to the APG Silica Trust by
APG.11 Hartford and Century were among the insurers whose
policies were to be assigned to the APG Silica Trust.12

tort liabilities where a trust and channeling injunction would
play “an important part in the debtor‟s reorganization plan.”
SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir.
1992) (authorizing channeling injunction for securities class
action claims); see also Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow
Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648 (6th
Cir. 2002) (authorizing channeling injunction for silicone
breast implant claims); Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H.
Robbins Co.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989) (authorizing
channeling injunction for Dalkon Shield birth control device
claims). Under the debtors‟ proposed Plan, only silica claims
based on pre-petition exposure would be channeled to the
APG Silica Trust. Claims based on post-petition exposure
were to become the responsibility of the reorganized debtors.
11
Several insurers disputed their obligations under
policies issued to APG. APG subsequently reached
settlement agreements with those insurers, releasing them
from liability under their policies. In exchange, APG
received approximately $365.6 million, of which $31.5
million was to be used to fund the APG Silica Trust. The
APG Silica Trust was otherwise to be funded by the
assignment of certain insurance policies that debtors believe
provide coverage for silica-related liabilities.
12
Because we are only concerned at this point with

10
 Regarding the rights of Hartford, Century, and the
other insurers whose policies were to be assigned to the APG
Silica Trust, the Plan provided that nothing therein or in Plan-
related documents or in the Bankruptcy Court‟s confirmation
order would preclude those insurers from asserting any rights
or defenses under the policies, except those related to “anti-
assignment provisions.” Hartford‟s and Century‟s coverage
obligations to the APG Silica Trust would still be contingent
on the APG Silica Trust incurring liability and any claims for
reimbursement overcoming Hartford‟s and Century‟s
coverage defenses.

For the Plan to be approved as designed (i.e., with the
inclusion of the Silica Injunction), the debtors needed to show
that the Plan‟s resolution of silica-related claims is necessary
or appropriate under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), which, under our
precedent, requires showing with specificity that the Silica
Injunction is both necessary to the reorganization and fair.13
See Gillman v. Continental Airlines (In re Continental
Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a
third-party injunction would only be proper under § 105(a) if

whether the putative injuries inflicted by the APG Silica Trust
and Silica Injunction provide bankruptcy standing for
Hartford and Century, we refer to those injuries only as they
relate to Hartford and Century, even though those injuries
would appear to be common to all insurers whose policies
were assigned to the APG Silica Trust.
13
Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that
“[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
title.” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).

11
the proponents of the injunction demonstrated with specificity
that such an injunction was both necessary to the
reorganization and fair). In practical terms, this meant
showing that the silica-related liability was sufficiently
onerous to jeopardize the debtors‟ reorganization if not
resolved via the Silica Injunction and APG Silica Trust. See
id. at 215 (noting that the debtors had failed to show the
necessity of the injunction where they had not demonstrated
that the success of the reorganization hinged in any way on
the issuance of the injunction).

With that as background, the debtors obtained a list of
silica claimants from another company‟s bankruptcy and then
solicited confirmation votes from those claimants‟ counsel.
An explosion of silica claims ensued. Ultimately, 5,125 votes
for the debtors‟ Plan were cast on behalf of persons alleging
that APG was responsible for their claimed silica-related
injuries. The majority of those votes were submitted by a
handful of law firms, with five law firms accounting for 4,039
votes. Each of the law firms that submitted votes on behalf of
silica claimants also submitted votes on behalf of asbestos
claimants. The requisite majority of both groups of claimants
voted in favor of the Plan.

In June 2006, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on
plan confirmation. Hartford, Century, and AIG (collectively,
the “Objecting Insurers”) objected to the Plan, asserting that
the APG Silica Trust and the Silica Injunction were the
products of collusion with the asbestos claimants‟ counsel
and, under § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, were neither
necessary nor appropriate for the debtors‟ successful
reorganization. In response, the Bankruptcy Court continued
the confirmation hearing and ordered the silica claimants to

12
provide supplemental information regarding their silica-
related diagnoses, their exposure to APG‟s silica products,
and any prior diagnoses of or claims for asbestos-related
diseases. The claimants then provided several thousand
supplemental submissions, many of which were duplicative
or otherwise deficient. Ultimately 4,626 individual silica
claims were recognized to be at issue.14

In October 2006, the Bankruptcy Court resumed the
confirmation hearing, during which the Objecting Insurers
pressed their reasons for questioning the legitimacy of the
silica claims. One set of criticisms stemmed from findings
provided by the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust
(the “Manville Trust”), which was established for asbestos-
related claims associated with the bankruptcy of the Johns-
Manville Corporation. The Manville Trust found that certain

14
At some point after the silica claimant votes were
solicited, Robert G. Taylor II, P.C., withdrew 489 of the 525
silica claimant votes that it had cast, explaining that those
claimants‟ claims had been dismissed in litigation. That left
4,636 silica claimants, from which 4,822 supplemental
submissions were received. The Objecting Insurers
concluded, after reviewing the supplemental submissions, that
196 were duplicates and so, subtracting those from the 4,822
received, conducted their claims analysis with 4,626 unique
claims as their starting point. In contrast, the debtors
apparently subtracted the 489 withdrawn claimants from the
5,125 original claimants and conducted their claims analysis
with 4,636 remaining silica claimants as their starting point.
For our purposes, the discrepancy between the two starting
points is immaterial.

13
physicians‟ diagnoses were not credible and, accordingly, it
banned those physicians.15 The Manville Trust also found
that certain physicians generated a “high volume” of
diagnoses that, at a high rate, proved to be inaccurate.
According to the Objecting Insurers, those Manville Trust
findings are germane here because, of the silica claimants in
the GIT bankruptcy who identified a diagnosing physician or
facility, 56.9% indicate a diagnosis by a physician or facility
that has been banned by the Manville Trust. An additional
27.8% of such claims are suspect, the Objecting Insurers
argued, because they involve diagnoses by two of the
physicians singled out by the Manville Trust for being highly
unreliable.

Another set of criticisms presented to the Bankruptcy
Court stemmed from findings made in the course of
multidistrict litigation involving silica products liability. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, which was charged with handling the multidistrict
litigation, discounted several physicians‟ diagnoses because
of their diagnostic methods, which the Court described as
“rang[ing] from questionable to abysmal.” In re Silica
Products Liability Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 622 (S.D. Tex.
2005). In particular, the Silica Products Court disparaged
silica claims brought by people who had earlier been
diagnosed with an asbestos-related disease or had filed an
asbestos-related claim against an asbestos trust, noting that “a

15
While the record before us is not explicit on this
point, we understand that the “banning” of physicians means
that the Manville Trust would not accept claims supported by
those physicians‟ diagnoses.

14
golfer is more likely to hit a hole-in-one than an occupational
medicine specialist is to find a single case of both silicosis
and asbestosis.”16 Id. at 603.

The Objecting Insurers pointed out to the Bankruptcy
Court – and the debtors acknowledged – that 55.5% of the
silica claims at issue in this case involve diagnoses from
physicians who were discredited by the Silica Products Court.
The Objecting Insurers further pointed out that more than half
of the silica claims are from persons who had either been
diagnosed with an asbestos-related disease or filed an
asbestos-related claim against an asbestos trust or both, thus
making their silicosis diagnoses highly suspect. All told, the
Bankruptcy Court heard evidence questioning the legitimacy
of 91.5% of the silica claims made against the debtors.

Notwithstanding that evidence, the Bankruptcy Court
confirmed the Plan on November 14, 2007, concluding that
the APG Silica Trust and the Silica Injunction were necessary
to the debtors‟ reorganization. The Bankruptcy Court made
no findings as to the legitimacy of the silica claims, but it did
credit the debtors‟ projection of future silica claims and
reasoned that “[w]hether or not [the] claims prove to be
compensable, [the debtors] must address them, either in the
tort system with its inherent risks and the possibility that any

16
As an example, the Court noted the questionable
diagnoses generated by one small diagnostic company, which,
despite the extreme improbability of persons having both
silicosis and asbestosis, had purportedly discovered 4,000
such persons by “park[ing] a van in some parking lots.”
Silica Products, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 603.

15
one judgment could be materially adverse and constitute a
default under its financing covenants, or through a trust.”17

The Bankruptcy Court also determined that Hartford
and Century lacked standing to object to the Plan.18 The
Court rejected Hartford‟s and Century‟s arguments that they
had suffered injury from the Plan, concluding that the
assignment of Hartford‟s and Century‟s policies to the APG
Silica Trust in contravention of the policies‟ anti-assignment
provisions was not injurious because the Bankruptcy Code
and state law rendered those provisions a nullity. The Court
further reasoned that any potential financial harm arising out
of the assignments was too speculative because Hartford and
Century had not contributed and were not required to
contribute “anything” to the APG Silica Trust and would still
be able to assert their coverage defenses and contractual
17
Contrary to the Dissent‟s assertion that “the
Bankruptcy Court … established the facial legitimacy of [the
silicosis] claims” (Dissent slip op. at 1), the Court‟s opinion
shows that it declined to make any findings of legitimacy, and
its solicitation of proffers from the silica claimants cannot
credibly be viewed as an endorsement of the claims. Thus,
even if we accept the Dissent‟s contention that the Objecting
Insurers do not challenge the Bankruptcy Court‟s factual
findings, that does not mean that the facial legitimacy of the
silica claims has been conceded, as the Dissent seems to
suggest. (Id.) Rather, the factual premise of the Objecting
Insurers‟ position on appeal remains that the silica claims are
not legitimate.
18
Because AIG was not just an insurer but also a
creditor, its standing was not contested.

16
rights if ever faced with putative obligations to reimburse the
APG Silica Trust on silica-related claims.19 The District
Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court‟s confirmation of the
plan and its determination that Hartford and Century lacked
standing to challenge the Plan.

In the timely appeal now before us, the Objecting
Insurers challenge both the ruling that Hartford and Century
lacked standing to object to the GIT Plan and the ruling that
the APG Silica Trust and Silica Injunction are lawful.20 Also

19
To say that the Plan does not require Hartford and
Century to contribute “anything” to the APG Silica Trust is
an overstatement because, as outlined above, the Plan calls
for the Hartford‟s and Century‟s policies to be assigned to the
APG Silica Trust, which is certainly “something.” Even if we
were to understand the Bankruptcy Court to mean that
Hartford and Century are not required to contribute any
funds, the reality is that, by requiring Hartford and Century to
provide insurance coverage, the Plan requires them to make
significant contributions to the APG Silica Trust.
20
The Objecting Insurers challenge the Bankruptcy
Court‟s determination that the APG Silica Trust and the Silica
Injunction were necessary to the debtors‟ reorganization and
thus lawful pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105, arguing that the
debtors faced no significant silica-related liability other than
that generated through collusion with the claimants‟ counsel.
Separately, AIG, in its status as a creditor, argues that the
APG Silica Trust violates both 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(a) and
502(b)(1). Specifically, AIG argues that the APG Silica Trust
violates § 502(b)(1) because its distribution procedures permit
payment of claims that could not be paid outside of

17
implicated is the Objecting Insurers‟ standing to bring this
appeal.21

bankruptcy – claims that AIG asserts are precluded in the tort
system because they post-date APG‟s implementation of
safety measures in 2000. AIG argues that those distribution
procedures also violate § 502(a) by divesting AIG, as a party
in interest, of its right to object to the payment of such claims.
21
Although GIT concedes that AIG had standing in the
Bankruptcy Court, GIT contends that AIG fails the more
stringent “persons aggrieved” standard for bankruptcy
appellate standing discussed in In re Combustion
Engineering, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 215 (3d Cir. 2004)
(explaining that “[a]ppellate standing in the bankruptcy
context is more restrictive than Article III standing” and that
“parties involved in bankruptcy proceedings” may
nonetheless lack standing to appeal).

18
II. Discussion22

A. Standard of Review

“In this appeal, we „stand in the shoes‟ of the District
Court and review the Bankruptcy Court‟s decision.” In re
Pransky, 318 F.3d 536, 542 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting In re
Krystal Cadillac Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc., 142 F.3d 631,
635 (3d Cir. 1998)). Accordingly, we review the Bankruptcy
Court‟s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for
clear error. Id. A court‟s decision regarding standing is a
legal conclusion subject to de novo review. Danvers Motor
Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2005).

B. Standing

As alluded to previously, two types of standing are
contested here: Hartford‟s and Century‟s standing to object
to the confirmation of the GIT Plan in the Bankruptcy Court
(“bankruptcy standing”) and the standing of each of the

22
The District Court had original jurisdiction over the
GIT Chapter 11 proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)
and referred the matter to the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 157(a). The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction
over the plan confirmation proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(b). The District Court had jurisdiction over
Hartford‟s appeal of the confirmed reorganization plan under
28 U.S.C. § 158(a). We have jurisdiction over the current
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). Moreover, because
the District Court=s order affirming plan confirmation was a
final order, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

19
Objecting Insurers to appeal that confirmation ruling
(“appellate standing”). However, our disposition of this
appeal treats only the first of those, bankruptcy standing.
Because we conclude that Hartford and Century have
bankruptcy standing and that further development of the
factual record may aid in the resolution of other issues,
including appellate standing, the appropriate remedy is a
remand that will allow the Bankruptcy Court to hear Hartford
and Century and to make a more fully informed decision.
We, therefore, address only bankruptcy standing at this
time.23

23
If it turns out that the Plan is not confirmed, that
would in all likelihood render moot any consideration of other
issues raised by the Objecting Insurers, including their
appellate standing. The “appellate standing” to which we
refer and which we decline to address at this time is standing
to appeal the substance of the bankruptcy court‟s decision.
Standing in that regard is distinct from standing to appeal the
bankruptcy court‟s decision regarding bankruptcy standing.
With respect to the latter, we have stated in a non-bankruptcy
context that “[a] party denied standing to sue, or to intervene,
or to object, may obviously appeal such a determination.” In
re Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. Sec. & Antitrust Litig.,
543 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1976). Applying that principle
in the bankruptcy context makes intuitive sense, since to
require a party to satisfy the more stringent standard for
bankruptcy appellate standing, Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d
at 215, before addressing the question of whether the party
satisfied the more relaxed standard for bankruptcy standing,
PWS Holding, 228 F.3d at 249, would be putting the cart
before the horse. Moreover, it would risk leaving parties in
interest who have been erroneously denied bankruptcy

20
 To object to the confirmation of a reorganization plan
in bankruptcy court, a party must, in the first instance, meet
the requirements for standing that litigants in all federal cases
face under Article III of the Constitution. See Danvers, 432
F.3d at 290-91. A party seeking constitutional standing must
demonstrate an “injury in fact” that is “concrete”, “distinct
and palpable”, and “actual or imminent.” Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). Additionally, the party
must establish that the injury “fairly can be traced to the
challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). We have noted
that “[t]he contours of the injury-in-fact requirement, while
not precisely defined, are very generous.” Bowman v. Wilson,
672 F.2d 1145, 1151 (3d Cir. 1982). The standard is met as
long as the party alleges a “specific, „identifiable trifle‟ of
injury,” id. (quoting United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 686-90, 690
n.14 (1973)), or a “personal stake in the outcome of [the]
litigation,” The Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 360 (3d
Cir. 2000). See In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 685
(3d Cir. 2005) (“Article III standing need not be financial and
only need be fairly traceable to the alleged illegal action.”).

standing, but who do not meet the more stringent
requirements for appellate standing, without legal redress for
that error. We have implicitly adhered to that principle in the
bankruptcy context by resolving bankruptcy standing issues
on appeal without reaching the question of bankruptcy
appellate standing. See, e.g., In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d
1034 (3d Cir. 1985) (addressing, inter alia, a would-be
intervenor's “party-in-interest” standing without reaching the
question of whether he had bankruptcy appellate standing).

21
 Standing in bankruptcy cases is also governed by the
terms of 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b), which provides that “[a] party
in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors‟
committee, an equity security holders‟ committee, a creditor,
an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise
and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this
chapter.” 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). The list of potential parties in
interest in § 1109(b) is not exclusive. On the contrary, that
section “has been construed to create a broad right of
participation in Chapter 11 cases.” In re Combustion Eng’g,
Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 214 n.21 (3d Cir. 2004). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has described
a party in interest as “anyone who has a legally protected
interest that could be affected by a bankruptcy proceeding.”
In re James Wilson Associates, 965 F.2d 160, 169 (7th Cir.
1992). That “party in interest” test comports with our own
definition of a “party in interest” as one who “has a sufficient
stake in the proceeding so as to require representation.” In re
Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042 (3d Cir. 1985). We thus
adopt the test set forth by the Seventh Circuit in James Wilson
as a helpful amplification of our definition in Amatex. Status
as a party in interest is of particular relevance here because
the Bankruptcy Code expressly provides that parties in
interest “may object to confirmation of a plan.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 1128(b).

In applying the teachings of James Wilson and Amatex,
we are guided by our previous statement that “[s]ection
1109(b) must be construed broadly to permit parties affected
by a chapter 11 proceeding to appear and be heard.” Amatex,
755 F.2d at 1042 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The District Court described the Bankruptcy
Code‟s “party in interest” standard as “more exacting” than

22
the constitutional injury-in-fact requirement (App. at 15),24
but we think that is a misunderstanding of the Code.
Persuasive authority indicates that Article III standing and
standing under the Bankruptcy Code are effectively co-
extensive. Compare, e.g., The Pitt News, 215 F.3d at 360
(injury-in-fact requires a “personal stake” in litigation), and
Danvers, 432 F.3d at 291 (same), with Amatex, 755 F.2d at
1042 (party in interest must have a “sufficient stake” in
bankruptcy proceedings). Interpreting the “party in interest”
requirement as an additional obstacle to bankruptcy standing
would frustrate the purpose of § 1109(b), which was intended
to “confer[] broad standing at the trial level,” In re PWS
Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 249 (3d Cir. 2000), and to
“continue[] in [the] tradition” of “encourag[ing] and
promot[ing] greater participation in reorganization cases,”
Amatex, 755 F.2d at 1042.25

24
The District Court drew that proposition from In re
Fuller-Austin Insulation, No. 98-2038-JJF, 1998 WL 812388,
at *3 (D. Del. 1998), an unpublished decision that relies on a
standing analysis in bankruptcy cases under Second Circuit
precedent. However, that precedent established that the test
for appellate standing, not the statutory limitation on
bankruptcy standing, is “more exacting than the constitutional
case or controversy requirement imposed by Article III.”
Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 642 n.2 (2d Cir.
1988). Properly understood, Kane is uncontroversial and in
accord with our own precedent. See, e.g., Combustion Eng’g,
391 F.3d at 215; Travelers Ins. Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 45
F.3d 737, 741 (3d Cir. 1995).
25
Without a contrary signal from Congress, we will
not read a provision that confers a broad right of participation

23
 The question, then, is whether Hartford and Century
have demonstrated some injury-in-fact, i.e., some “specific,
„identifiable trifle‟ of injury,” Bowman, 672 F.2d at 1151, or
“personal stake in the outcome of [the] litigation,” The Pitt
News, 215 F.3d at 360, that is fairly traceable to the GIT

to be a restriction on access to bankruptcy proceedings.
Indeed, some commentators have questioned whether
standing under § 1109(b) is broader than Article III standing.
Paul P. Daley & George W. Shuster, Jr., Bankruptcy Court
Jurisdiction, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 383, 405-06
(2005); see also Nathalie D. Martin, Noneconomic Interests
in Bankruptcy: Standing on the Outside Looking In, 59 OHIO
ST. L. J. 429, 448-51 (1998) (arguing that parties should have
standing to assert non-pecuniary interests in bankruptcy court
and contending that “judges in all fora operate under a world
view that most easily recognizes economic interests over
other interests”). The courts that have considered that
question, however, have determined that bankruptcy standing
is not broader than standing under Article III. E.g., Baron &
Budd, P.C. v. Unsecured Asbestos Claimants Comm., 321
B.R. 147, 158 (D.N.J. 2005); Hobson v. Travelstead (In re
Travelstead), 227 B.R. 638, 649-50 (D. Md. 1998); SWE & C
Liquidating Trust v. Saudi Arabian Oil Co. (In re Stone &
Webster, Inc.), 373 B.R. 353, 361 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007); In
re A.P.I., Inc., 331 B.R. 828, 859-60 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005).
Leaving aside the logical problem in thinking that the
constitutional foundation of all standing could support a yet
broader standing opportunity, there is no occasion for us to
decide the issue here, because, as we discuss, we are satisfied
that Hartford and Century have Article III standing and that
bankruptcy standing is at least that broad.

24
Plan.26 To put it in “party in interest” terms, the question is
simply whether Hartford and Century have legally protected
interests that could be affected by the GIT Plan. Hartford and
Century of course assert that they do. In essence, their
argument is that, as funding sources who will have to address
the liabilities of the APG Silica Trust, they have more than a
trifling injury and certainly have a personal stake in whether
the Plan is approved. GIT, on the other hand, contends that
Hartford and Century do not have standing because the Plan
preserves their coverage defenses and therefore is “insurance
neutral,” thus making pecuniary injury arising out of the Plan
too speculative.27

We addressed the concept of “insurance neutrality” in
Combustion Engineering, holding that certain insurers there
did not have appellate standing to challenge a plan calling for
26
Injury-in-fact and traceability to the GIT Plan cover
the injury and causation elements of Article III standing.
There is no dispute that the third element for Article III
standing, redressability, exists, since the issues raised by
Hartford and Century can be resolved by a ruling in their
favor.
27
GIT also contends, consistent with the Bankruptcy
Court‟s holding, that the anti-assignment provisions in the
Objecting Insurers‟ policies are rendered null by the
Bankruptcy Code and state law. We need not address that
argument here because our holding with respect to Hartford‟s
and Century‟s bankruptcy standing is alone enough to require
remand. Moreover, the discussion of anti-assignment
provisions in Combustion Engineering, 391 F.3d at 218-20,
should suffice.

25
them to fund an asbestos trust because the plan, through its
“neutrality” provision, neither increased the insurers‟ pre-
petition obligations nor impaired their pre-petition contractual
rights under the subject insurance policies. See 391 F.3d at
218. “Insurance neutrality” is a meaningful concept where, as
in Combustion Engineering, a plan does not materially alter
the quantum of liability that the insurers would be called to
absorb. Indeed, in Combustion Engineering, the pre-petition
quantum of asbestos liability was known from four decades of
asbestos litigation, and moving the pre-petition asbestos
claims out of the tort system and into a trust system did not
increase in any meaningful way the insurers‟ pre-petition
exposure to asbestos liability.28 See Combustion Eng’g, 391
F.3d at 200-01.

Here, however, the Plan‟s promise of an APG Silica
Trust appears to have staggeringly increased – by more than
27 times – the pre-petition liability exposure. Thus, on the
record here, it cannot fairly be said that the GIT plan is
“insurance neutral” in the same sense as was the plan at issue
in Combustion Engineering.

28
During the plan negotiations in Combustion
Engineering, an additional 25,000 to 30,000 additional
claimants came forward. 391 F.3d at 205. That number,
while large in the abstract, does not represent a material
increase in pre-petition obligations when one considers that
Combustion Engineering had, from the mid-1970s to 2002,
dealt with hundreds of thousands of asbestos claims. See id.
at 203.

26
 Nor do we think the plan‟s adverse effects on Hartford
and Century are too speculative to be recognized. In Clinton
v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), the Supreme Court
acknowledged the standing of two groups of plaintiffs who
were seeking to challenge the Line Item Veto Act.29 One
group, the City of New York and various healthcare
providers, claimed an injury stemming from the President‟s
veto of a statutory provision forgiving the State of New York
a healthcare-related, multi-billion-dollar tax debt to the
United States. Id. at 425-26. Without that forgiveness, the
City and the healthcare providers were required to make
retroactive tax payments to the State, unless the Department
of Health and Human Services granted a request that the State
had made for a waiver of the debt. Id. at 422, 430. The
federal Government argued that the injury was too
speculative to create standing because the State‟s waiver
request was still pending. Id. at 430. But the Supreme Court
disagreed, comparing the veto to

the judgment of an appellate court setting aside
a verdict for the defendant and remanding for a
new trial of a multibillion dollar damages claim.
Even if the outcome of the second trial is
speculative, the reversal, like the President‟s
cancellation, causes a significant immediate

29
The Line Item Veto Act of 1996, 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-
692 (1996), gave the President power to cancel certain types
of statutory provisions that had been signed into law. See
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 420-21, 436. The Supreme Court
ultimately held the Act to be unconstitutional as a violation of
the Presentment Clause, Article I, § 7. See id. at 447-48.

27
 injury by depriving the defendant of a favorable
final judgment. The revival of a substantial
contingent liability immediately and directly
affects the borrowing power, financial strength,
and fiscal planning of the potential obligor.

Id. at 430-31.

The second group of plaintiffs in Clinton was a
farmers‟ cooperative representing potato growers and an
individual member of that cooperative. Those plaintiffs
challenged the veto of a limited tax benefit that Congress had
enacted to enable the transfer of commodity processing
facilities to farmers‟ cooperatives. Id. at 425, 432. Again, the
Government contended that the plaintiffs‟ injuries were too
speculative, this time because there was no guarantee that,
absent the veto, the cooperative would have been able to
purchase a processing facility. Id. at 430-32. And, again, the
Court rejected the Government=s argument. Id. at 432. The
President, according to the Court, had deprived the
cooperative of a “statutory bargaining chip, ... inflict[ing] a
sufficient likelihood of economic injury to establish standing
under our precedents.” Id. (citations omitted).

By acknowledging the standing of the New York
healthcare providers and New York City, as well as the
farmers‟ cooperative, the Supreme Court established that an
injury‟s having a contingent aspect does not necessarily make
that injury incognizable under Article III. Clinton recognizes
that a tangible disadvantage to the affected party can lead to
standing.30

30
The Dissent would restrict Clinton solely to cases of

28
 Here, the plan‟s creation of the APG Silica Trust led to
a manifold increase in silica-related claims. That constitutes
a tangible disadvantage to Hartford and Century, which,
despite having their coverage defenses available, will be
faced with coverage obligations to the APG Silica Trust in a
world that recognizes the existence of over 4,600 silica-
related claims, as opposed to a pre-Plan world that recognized
only 169. Indeed, the Plan-triggered explosion of new claims
creates an entirely new set of administrative costs, including
the investigative burden of finding any meritorious suits in
the haystack of potentially fraudulent ones. Those costs will
be enormous, even if Hartford and Century never pay a single

judicial review of legislation. Nothing in Clinton itself
warrants that limitation, nor does the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
that the Dissent cites. That decision, Newdow v. Roberts, 603
F.3d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2010), distinguished Clinton from the
controversy then before the D.C. Circuit by noting that the
plaintiffs in Newdow were not asking the Court to serve as an
interpreter of statutory text but were objecting to religious
elements in President Obama‟s inaugural ceremony. Not
surprisingly, the D.C. Circuit observed that a “decision
committed to the executive discretion of the President or the
personal discretion of the President-elect” is far different
from a statute, as was at issue in Clinton. Id. at 1012. We
certainly agree that “[a] court-whether via injunctive or
declaratory relief-does not sit in judgment of a President's
executive decisions.” That, however, has nothing to do with
the standing issue before us, contrary to the implication of the
Dissent.

29
dollar of indemnity.31 Accordingly, even if Hartford‟s and
Century‟s ultimate liability is contingent, the harm to
Hartford and Century from the Plan is hardly too speculative
for them to be parties in interest.

The suspect circumstances surrounding the creation of
the APG Silica Trust and the questionable provenance of the
silica-related claims also fall in favor of recognizing Hartford
and Century as parties in interest. We held in Congoleum that
insurers had appellate standing to raise an issue regarding
disqualification of counsel, reasoning that the issue
“implicate[d] the integrity of the bankruptcy court proceeding
as a whole” and would “affect the fairness of the entire
bankruptcy proceeding.” 426 F.3d at 685. In addition, we
noted that granting standing to those insurers was appropriate,

31
The real and immediate cost of exponentially
increased liability exposure and new administrative burdens is
ignored by our dissenting colleagues, who claim that “[t]he
fact that the policies are unchanged by the Reorganization
Plan is dispositive.” (Dissent slip op. at 5.) Even on the
Dissent‟s terms, however, focusing just on contract law, it is
not accurate to say that the contract language alone is the be-
all and end-all for resolving a dispute. “The important
question is whether an unanticipated circumstance has made
performance of the promise vitally different from what should
reasonably have been within the contemplation of both parties
when they entered into the contract. If so, the risk should not
fairly be thrown upon the promisor.” City of Littleton v.
Employers Fire Ins. Co., 453 P.2d 810, 812 (Colo. 1969)
(quoting 6 Williston, Contracts § 1931 (rev. ed.)).

30
since it was “highly unlikely that any of the parties other than
the insurers” would raise the issue. Id. at 687.

Here, the integrity of the bankruptcy proceeding is
called into question by nonfrivolous allegations of collusion
between GIT and the asbestos claimants‟ counsel in
negotiating the establishment of the APG Silica Trust and
Silica Injunction. Not to put too fine a point on it, the
assertion is that GIT sold out Hartford, Century, and
similarly-situated insurers by setting up a system in which
they would pay for newly ginned-up silica claims in exchange
for the asbestos claimants casting their votes in favor of the
GIT Plan. It is a profoundly serious charge and not without
record support. Moreover, it is a charge that apparently no
one has an incentive to pursue, other than the insurers slated
to provide coverage to the APG Silica Trust. Since the
circumstances in Congoleum gave rise to the “more
restrictive” appellate standing for the insurers there, id. at
685, we think the circumstances here, which may be more
disturbing, certainly give rise to bankruptcy standing for
Hartford and Century.32

32
The Dissent evidently dismisses our standing
analysis as founded on nothing more than a naïve concern
about some largely imagined and contingent occurrence of
the sort common to insurers‟ risk-taking. (See Dissent slip
op. at 6-7 (“[T]o say that an insurance company is worried
that its risk for future indemnity obligations might be larger
than it projected when it established the insurance policy is
another way of describing the leitmotif of the insurance
industry within the normal course of business.”).) Whatever
else the normal course of the insurance business may entail,
though, it certainly ought not include judicial approval for

31
 In sum, we conclude that Hartford and Century have
legally protected interests as insurers on policies to be
transferred to the APG Silica Trust and that their interests are
affected by the GIT Plan such that they should have an
opportunity to challenge the Plan in the Bankruptcy Court.
Recognizing Hartford‟s and Century‟s bankruptcy standing is
particularly appropriate because the challenges they want to
bring implicate the integrity of the bankruptcy process.

We are aware that, although the Bankruptcy Court
denied Hartford and Century standing, it considered many of
the issues that Hartford and Century press in regard to the
APG Silica Trust and Silica Injunction. But Hartford‟s and
Century‟s entitlement to appear as parties in interest remains,
even if the Bankruptcy Court may have considered some of
the issues previously. Furthermore, while we appreciate the
analysis evident in the Bankruptcy Court‟s opinion, we think
that, on this record, a more searching review of Hartford‟s
and Century‟s allegations of collusion between the debtors
and counsel for the silica claimants is warranted.33 On

liability manufactured by and for the benefit of the insured, as
is the central concern in this appeal. That concern goes
unaddressed by the Dissent, despite our precedent in
Congoleum, and should be sufficient itself to demonstrate that
the Dissent‟s cry of “staggering” implications for Article III
standing (Dissent slip op. at 8) is greatly exaggerated.
33
The Dissent insists that the Bankruptcy Court has
already conducted the most searching review possible.
(Dissent slip op. at n.2.) It is theoretically possible that that
will turn out to be true, but we are not prepared to say so in
advance, as does the Dissent. Rather, we accept the logical

32
remand, the Bankruptcy Court should make sufficient
findings regarding those allegations so that, in the event there
is a further appeal, a determination can be made on whether
there is a legitimate basis for concluding that the APG Silica
Trust and Silica Injunction are necessary to the reorganization
and fair.34

Because of the need to supplement the factual record,
we defer consideration of the merits of the Objecting
Insurers‟ arguments regarding the lawfulness of the APG
Silica Trust and Silica Injunction, which are questions that
can best be answered in the first instance by the Bankruptcy
Court after all of the parties have had a full opportunity to

proposition that a party, granted standing and a full
opportunity to participate, may add something meaningful to
the record on which the Bankruptcy Court is called to make a
decision. We do not denigrate the work done by the
Bankruptcy Court already, but neither do we believe it has
done all that is necessary, including rendering some judgment
regarding the allegations of fraud and collusion advanced by
the Objecting Insurers.
34
If it approves a plan of reorganization for GIT that
includes a channeling injunction and trust for silicosis claims,
the Bankruptcy Court may also need to address the
procedures by which the trust calls for claim funds to be
distributed. For example, it may be advisable to examine
whether those procedures would require claims to be paid
based upon proof of exposure and diagnosis alone, without
regard to any affirmative defenses available under state law,
and, if so, whether those procedures would then cause the
trust to violate 11 U.S.C. § 502, as argued by AIG.

33
present evidence and argument.35 We likewise decline at this
time to address whether the Objecting Insurers‟ have
appellate standing, as it is unnecessary to our decision
regarding bankruptcy standing and also because the
Bankruptcy Court‟s disposition on remand may alter the
analysis.36

III. Conclusion

Because Hartford and Century meet the standing
requirements prescribed by Article III and the Bankruptcy
Code, they must be afforded the opportunity to be heard
concerning whether it is lawful to channel silica-related
35
The Dissent questions whether we generally oppose
the use of settlement trusts to address mass tort liability. We
of course do not, but do question the record support to date
for the establishment of such a trust in this case.
36
In examining whether parties are “persons
aggrieved” for purposes of appellate standing in a bankruptcy
case, we are particularly concerned with separating those who
are “directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by an order or
decree of the bankruptcy court,” from “the myriad of parties
… indirectly affected by every bankruptcy court order.”
Combustion Eng’g, 391, F.3d at 214-15 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Because we cannot now know the contours
of any revised order the Bankruptcy Court might issue on
remand, any inquiry into the directness or indirectness of the
Objecting Insurers‟ injury would be premature. Should this
same issue arise again after remand, however, we trust that
the implications of our decision in Congoleum will be taken
into account.

34
claims against GIT into a settlement trust in the context of
GIT‟s reorganization. Thus, we will vacate the District
Court‟s order and require remand of the matter to the
Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

35
In re Global Industrial Technologies, No. 08-3650

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judges
SCIRICA, FUENTES, and FISHER join, dissenting.

The majority’s grant of standing to parties who have
no injury, either actual or contingent, is a departure from the
well-established requisite of an injury in fact, and it has broad
deleterious implications for the jurisprudence of Article III
standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
564 n.2 (1992). To be clear, nothing in the record—amassed
over five years with the full participation of the excess
insurers—and nothing in the Reorganization Plan itself,
substantiates the excess insurers’ claims that they have
incurred or will incur an injury in fact as a result of Global’s
petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code.

Moreover, fully aware of past abuse in the realm of
silicosis claims in unrelated cases in other courts, the
Bankruptcy Court in this case established the facial
legitimacy of claims by requiring a proffer of information
from claimants under penalty of perjury. Most importantly,
Hartford, Century and AIG have conceded any challenge to
the court’s factual findings in this regard.1 Relying upon

1
In their reply brief Hartford and Century conceded
their challenges to assertions of the Bankruptcy Court’s
factual error, clarifying that: “the [B]ankruptcy [C]ourt erred
in granting the §105 injunction not because its findings of fact
were erroneous, but rather because it failed to make - and on
the record could not make - the specific and concrete findings
to support the showing of “necessity” that Continental
these findings, and those regarding the reorganized entity’s
financial viability (that are also unchallenged by the excess
insurers), the Bankruptcy Court already established the
necessity of the Silica Trust.2 Finally, from a practical
perspective, the majority’s remand will needlessly delay an
already protracted proceeding to rehash a record that is
already complete, a move that may very well imperil

requires.” (Emphasis added.) AIG fully adopted the
arguments of Hartford, and did not provide any indication to
this Court that it disagrees with this particular statement. I
note also that references to “Hartford,” “Century” and “AIG”
are consistent with their use in the majority opinion.
2
I reject the multiple inferences throughout the
majority opinion that the Bankruptcy Court conducted
anything less than a thorough, responsible investigation into
every claim raised by the insurers. Indeed, the suggestion
that the Bankruptcy Court should, on remand, conduct a
“more searching review of Hartford and Century’s
allegations” belies the record in this case. Having failed to
impress the Bankruptcy Court with its claims of rampant
fraud and collusion through nothing more than bald,
unsubstantiated inference, the majority now apparently seeks
to give these insurers a second bite of the apple to make a
case that is fatally flawed. Unless the majority is suggesting
that Bankruptcy Court should provide a forum for their
premature coverage claims—an instruction that would raise
further justiciability issues—it is my position that it has
conducted an admirable, exhaustive review. For that reason, I
believe that a section 105 injunction would be warranted even
if Hartford and Century had standing.

2
financing on which the reorganized entity is relying to
succeed. This contravenes the intent of the Bankruptcy Code,
and seriously undermines a process authorized by Congress to
address asbestos claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).3 For all of
these reasons, I dissent.

The excess insurers conjure up an injury through the
Plan’s supposed impact on the insurance contracts. However,
three technical amendments to the Reorganization Plan,
explicitly considered by the Bankruptcy Court, ensure that the
contractual relationship between the insurers and insured
emerges post-reorganization unchanged.

4.4.1 No Preclusion from
Asserting Claims, etc. Nothing in
the GIT Plan, in any of the Plan
Documents, or in the
Confirmation Order shall preclude
any Entity from asserting in any
proceedings any and all claims,
defenses, rights, or causes of

3
If the central issue for the majority is a general
opposition to the use of settlement trusts to resolve claims of
this sort, I regard Congress as the proper forum for resolving
such concerns rather than the judiciary. See Lloyd Dixon,
Geoffrey McGovern, & Amy Coombe, Asbestos Bankruptcy
Trusts: An Overview of Trust Structure and Activity with
Detailed Reports on the Largest Trusts, Rand, Institute for
Civil Justice (2010). To be sure, numerous questions persist
in the complex realm of asbestosis and silicosis claim
litigation. Yet, we must work with the statutes, our
precedent, and the record as it is, not as we wish it to be.

3
action that it has or may have
under or in connection with any of
the APG Silica Trust Policies,
except claims, defenses, rights or
causes of action held by an insurer
that are based on or arise out of
any “anti-assignment”
provision(s) in such policies.
Subject to the foregoing, and to
the provisions of Section 4.4.2
and 4.4.3, nothing in the GIT
Plan, in any of the Plan
Documents, or in the
Confirmation Order shall be
deemed to waive any claims,
defenses, rights or causes of
action that any Entity has or may
have under the provisions, terms,
conditions, defenses and/or
exclusions contained in the APG
Silica Trust Policies, including
(but not limited to) any and all
such claims, defenses, rights or
causes of action based upon or
arising out of any APG Silica
Trust Claim that is liquidated,
resolved, discharged, channeled
or paid in connection with the
GIT Plan.

4.4.2 No Impairment of Rights.
Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary in the GIT Plan, in any of

4
the Plan Documents, or in the
Confirmation Order, nothing in
the GIT Plan, the Plan Documents
or the Confirmation Order
(including any other provision
that purports to be preemptory or
supervening) shall in any way
operate to, or have the effect of,
impairing any insurer’s legal,
equitable or contractual rights
under the APG Silica Trust
Policies in any respect other than
the enforcement of any “anti-
assignment” provision(s) in such
policies. Subject to the foregoing,
the rights of the insurers shall be
determined according to the terms
of the APG Silica Trust Policies,
as applicable.

4.4.3 No Assertion of
Preclusion, etc. Notwithstanding
anything to the contrary in the
GIT Plan, in any of the Plan
Documents, or in the
Confirmation Order, under no
circumstances shall any person or
Entity be permitted to assert issue
preclusion or claim preclusion,
waiver, estoppel, consent, or any
other legal or equitable theory
against any insurer under any
APG Silica Trust Policy as to the

5
 existence, enforceability or
amount of any APG Silica Claim
or Demand on the basis of the
submission, valuation, resolution
and/or payment of any APG Silica
Trust Claim by the APG Silica
Trust. The submission of an APG
Trust Claim by a claimant, and
valuation, resolution and/or
payment of an APG Silica Trust
Claim by the APG Silica Trust,
shall be wholly without prejudice
to any and all rights of the parties
in all other contexts or forums,
and shall not be deemed (unless
otherwise determined by a Court
of competent jurisdiction) to be a
triggering event for liability under
any APG Silica Trust Policy.

Third Amended Plan of Reorganization of Global Industrial
Technologies, Inc., ET AL., 23, December 8, 2005, ECF No.
7827. The record contains lengthy, substantive, discussion of
these provisions, making clear the intent of the Trustee to
mirror the language used in In re Combustion Engineering,
Inc., which we characterized as insurance-neutral. 391 F. 3d
190, 218 (3d Cir. 2004). The majority distinguishes the
instant case from Combustion Engineering by asserting that
the “quantum of liability” post-petition for the excess insurers
is proportionately larger in this case. Yet, leaving aside for
the moment the fact that the record does not support an
assertion of increased liability for the excess insurers, the
majority fails to explain how this is even relevant to the

6
analysis. Combustion Engineering’s characterization of these
provisions as insurance-neutral is integral to its holding and
must be followed here. As a result, the majority errs factually
and as a matter of law by implying that the Reorganization
Plan causes an injury in fact to the excess insurers by
modifying the terms of the insurance contracts.4

Therefore, even if we accept the worst-case scenario
posited by Hartford and Century, where the Silica Trust
actually settles claims in excess of the thirty-five million
dollar fund established in the Plan, and it submits claims of
indemnity that the excess insurers regard as beyond the scope
of coverage, fraudulent, or over-valued, they are still not
injured. This is so because they have the same full range of
contractual rights to protect their interests for which they
bargained at the inception of the insurance contracts pre-
petition. Indeed, the excess insurers themselves admitted that
the Silica Trust would still face the burden of first
establishing its right to coverage under the pre-petition
policies. For these reasons, the record does not support the
majority’s assertion that these claims represent a contingent
liability sufficient to ground standing. Given the multitude of

4
In footnotes 20 and 23, the majority does not clearly
articulate a position on whether the anti-assignment
provisions of this Reorganization Plan constitute a contractual
injury, given our holding in Combustion Engineering that
validated the Bankruptcy Code’s authorization to preempt
anti-assignment policy provisions. 319 F.3d at 218-20. I
interpret our holding in Combustion Engineering on anti-
assignment provisions as both fully applicable to this case and
regard it as binding precedent that eliminates any claim by the
insurers that this provision is the source of any injury.

7
variables at issue here, the only reliable points of reference
with respect to the excess insurers are the insurance contracts.
The fact that the policies are unchanged by the
Reorganization Plan is dispositive.

Moreover, contrary to the majority’s assertion,
jurisprudence on standing does not support their position in
this case. They point to the holding in Clinton v. New York,
524 U.S. 417, 429-436 (1998) to suggest that the Supreme
Court has already extended the bounds of Article III standing
to include entities that present nothing more than a possibility
of future impacts. Yet, as noted by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, Clinton is properly read precisely
for what it is: “a basic case of judicial review of legislation.”
Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
The entities involved here were in the highly unusual
circumstance of asserting standing to challenge the
President’s line item veto of specific legislative provisions
that had been crafted and duly authorized by Congress for
their benefit. Without the grant of standing, the parties in
Clinton v. New York would have been denied access to any
judicial fora to launch their case because the intended
legislated benefits vanished with the veto before they became
law. Within this highly unusual context, there was a clear
rationale for the Supreme Court to stretch the requirements of
constitutional standing to recognize specific, prospective
benefits of the legislation, and the impacts of the loss of those
benefits, to enable a constitutional challenge to the
President’s line item veto.

The majority’s reliance upon Clinton in this case,
where it is beyond question that the excess insurers will—if
needed—have standing to raise contractual issues in court at

8
the appropriate time and place, uproots long held and
traditional principles of standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564
n.2 (“It has been stretched beyond the breaking point when,
as here, the plaintiff alleges only an injury at some indefinite
future time, and the acts necessary to make the injury happen
are at least partly within the plaintiff's own control.”)
Moreover, in its haste to give the excess insurers standing to
challenge this Reorganization Plan the majority dilutes the
definition of injury in fact, with alarming consequences.

The closest that the majority comes to actually
describing the impact that the Reorganization Plan might
have upon the excess insurers is to say that their “quantum of
liability” might be impacted in the future, or that there might
be a “tangible disadvantage.” Yet, to say that an insurance
company is worried that its risk for future indemnity
obligations might be larger than it projected when it
established the insurance policy is another way of describing
the leitmotif of the insurance industry within its normal
course of business. That, at some point in the future, the
scope of coverage determined by an insurer at a policy’s
inception may include liabilities that the insurer failed to
consider when it priced the policy is of no moment to the
bankruptcy proceedings. Moreover, even if an insurer may
incur costs in conducting claim evaluations and other
expenses in litigating those they deny, none of this puts the
insurer outside of the milieu in which it operates day to day.
Considering all of this, I cannot find any rationale to extend
the definition of injury in fact to include the risks that occur
to insurers within the normal course of their business.
Particularly given the highly speculative nature of the impacts
claimed here, the Bankruptcy Court correctly kept its eye on
the ball, ascertaining whether the Reorganization Plan altered

9
the contractual relationship between insurers and insured. It
did not err in concluding that this relationship remains
unaltered post-reorganization.

Moreover, by misapplying Clinton, the majority
generally lowers, at a minimum, the threshold for injury in
fact to include anyone who can conjure up the mere risk of a
future business impact. The majority’s detour from the
standard analytic pathway for determining contingent injury
ensures that bankruptcy courts will, henceforth, be burdened
with determining whether sufficient injury exists among a
broad new class of persons who, to obtain party in interest
standing, may now allege only a fear that future business
dealings with the reorganized entity may result in less profit
than projected.5 In my view, the effects of this type of
approach to Article III standing beyond the realm of
bankruptcy are staggering.

I agree with the majority’s statement that party in
interest standing is to be broadly construed. However, I
disagree that a generous interpretation of Article III standing
in the bankruptcy context should extend to entities that have,
in spite of ample opportunity, utterly failed to provide any
evidence that the Reorganization Plan inflicts any injury upon
them. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

5
One can also reasonably posit collateral
complications to the general analysis of the justiciability of
claims if the majority’s position is applied to the doctrine of
ripeness, given the obvious intent of the insurers to launch
premature coverage disputes.

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