IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 99-31181
Summary Calendar
_____________________
ERIC L. MOORE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CHARLES W. HOPPER; DANIEL P. MERIAM;
STEPHEN W. PRATOR; CITY OF SHREVEPORT,
Defendants-Appellees.
_______________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Western District of Louisiana
(USDC No. 97-CV-2104)
_______________________________________________________
August 11, 2000
Before REAVLEY, BARKSDALE and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Eric Moore appeals the grant of summary judgment on his discrimination claim against
Charles Hopper, Daniel Meriam, Stephen Prator and the City of Shreveport, Louisiana. We
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
affirm.
Moore has not submitted any competent evidence to establish a prima facie case of
discriminatory treatment. Moore’s summary judgment affidavits rely solely on conclusory
statements that white officers received preferential treatment. None of the affidavits contain any
testimony that would be admissible to establish differential treatment. Several of these affidavits
contain stories that are not based upon personal knowledge and therefore are not competent
evidence of the events described. The stories also do not relate differential treatment under nearly
identical circumstances as required to establish differential treatment. Mayberry v. Vought
Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir. 1995).
The only evidence submitted to establish discrimination are that: 1) Moore is black; 2) the
events took place; 3) Moore thinks that Prator, Hopper and Meriam were motivated by racial
animus; and 4) other black officers believe that white officers receive preferential treatment. This
is simply not sufficient to create an inference of discrimination.
Only adverse employment actions can form the basis for a claim under Title VII and 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Under § 1983, an investigation, a change in hours, and a rescinded reprimand do
not constitute adverse employment actions. Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 376-7
(5th Cir. 1998). Because Moore’s demotion was rescinded and his promotion to sergeant was
granted with retroactive pay and seniority, there is no injury requiring judicial relief. Id. Title VII
only addresses ultimate employment decisions, such as hiring, firing, granting leave, promotion
and compensation. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707-8 (5th Cir. 1997). Title
VII does not provide a remedy for disciplinary filings or reprimands by supervisors. Id. The lack
of adverse employment actions is fatal to most, if not all, of Moore’s complaints.
2
The district court’s ruling that these events do not constitute a continuing violation is not
erroneous; therefore most of the events are subject to the defense of prescription, either under the
Louisiana one year prescription for § 1983 claims or for the failure to file an EEOC complaint
within 300 days for the Title VII claims. The continuing violation doctrine is an equitable
exception to the statute of limitations that arises “where the unlawful employment practice
manifests itself over time, rather than as a series of discrete acts.” Waltman v. International Paper
Co., 875 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1989). To show a continuing violation, the plaintiff must “show
an organized scheme leading to and including a present violation.” Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d
233, 239 (5th Cir. 1988). With the exception of the change in days off and the paddy
wagon/curfew duty assignment, each of the events is a discrete act relating to a specific infraction
by Moore. The only way to find an organized scheme is to assume a discriminatory motive,
which is not supported by any competent evidence.
The only events which occurred within the prescription period were the rescinded
demotion, the alleged use of expunged information and the order of a 90 day evaluation which
never took place. As indicated above, none of these constitute an adverse employment action.
AFFIRMED
3