UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4822
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ENRIQUE CORONADO,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (1:09-cr-00073-JAB-1)
Submitted: April 12, 2011 Decided: May 6, 2011
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Arza Feldman, FELDMAN AND FELDMAN, Uniondale, New York, for
Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Randall S.
Galyon, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Enrique Coronado appeals his conviction and sixty-
five-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to
conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846 (2006). On appeal, Coronado contends that the district
court plainly erred in accepting his guilty plea because the
factual basis was insufficient and that the district court
failed to adequately explain his sentence. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
Prior to accepting a defendant’s guilty plea, “the
[district] court must determine that there is a factual basis
for the plea.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). The district court
“need only be subjectively satisfied that there is a sufficient
factual basis for a conclusion that the defendant committed all
of the elements of the offense.” United States v. Mitchell, 104
F.3d 649, 652 (4th Cir. 1997). Upon review, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in accepting the
offense conduct as set forth in the factual basis accompanying
the plea agreement as sufficient to support Coronado’s guilty
plea. See id. (reviewing acceptance of guilty plea for abuse of
discretion); see also United States v. Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 139
(4th Cir.) (stating elements of offense), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 657 (2009).
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Coronado also contends that his sentence was
unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately
explain that sentence. In reviewing a sentence, we must first
ensure that the district court did not commit any “significant
procedural error,” such as failing to properly calculate the
applicable Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006) factors, or failing to adequately explain the
sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The
district court is not required to “robotically tick through
§ 3553(a)’s every subsection.” United States v. Johnson, 445
F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). However, the district court
“must place on the record an ‘individualized assessment’ based
on the particular facts of the case before it. This
individualized assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy, but
it must provide a rationale tailored to the particular case at
hand and adequate to permit ‘meaningful appellate review.’”
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50) (internal footnote omitted).
With regard to a sentence within the Guidelines range,
[g]enerally, an adequate explanation . . . is provided
when the district court indicates that it is
“rest[ing] [its] decision upon the Commission’s own
reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is a proper
sentence (in terms of § 3553(a) and other
congressional mandates) in the typical case, and that
the judge has found that the case before him is
typical.”
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United States v. Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267, 271 (4th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007).
Because counsel raises the claimed error for the first
time on appeal, we review for plain error. United States v.
Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577-78 (4th Cir. 2010); see United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (detailing plain error
standard). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
the district court’s explanation, although brief, was adequate
under Carter. Thus, the district court did not commit
reversible procedural error in imposing Coronado’s sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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