FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 06 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BLANCA D. COLLINS, No. 09-56652
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:07-cv-01572-SGL-SS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JOHN E. POTTER, Postmaster General
and DOUG BINGHAM, Postal Inspector,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen G. Larson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 3, 2011**
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON, FISHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Blanca Collins brought this action in federal district court alleging that her
termination from the United States Postal Service was discriminatory and
retaliatory. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
on all claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Collins, EEOC v. Luce,
Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2003), Collins has not
established a prima facie case of race, gender, or national origin discrimination.
Collins failed to show that she was treated less favorably than other similarly
situated employees who were outside of Collins’s protected class. See Leong v.
Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003). The employee with whom Collins
compares herself is not “similarly situated [to Collins] in all material respects,”
Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 2006), because the employee was not
subject to a Last Chance Employment Agreement, nor does the record suggest that
she was ever dishonest or insubordinate to a supervisor. Additionally, Collins has
not argued and has offered no evidence to support her claim of age discrimination.
See Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008).
The district court correctly held that Collins has not established a prima facie
case of disability discrimination. Collins has failed to show that she was
terminated because of her disability.1 See Lucero v. Hart, 915 F.2d 1367, 1371
(9th Cir. 1990). Collins does not allege that her supervisors became hostile to her
1
We assume without deciding that Collins had a qualifying disability as
defined by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.,
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
2
upon learning of her disability, nor does she provide evidence that the tasks given
to her were unrealistically difficult. See Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571, 574 (9th
Cir. 1987).
Moreover, Collins has not established a prima facie case of retaliation.
Collins has failed to show a causal link between her 2003 informal Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission complaint and Defendant’s decision to
terminate her eighteen months later. See Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d
634, 651 (9th Cir. 2004).
Because Collins has not established a prima facie case of discrimination or
retaliation, her claims fail as a matter of law. However, even if Collins had been
able to establish a prima facie case for any of her claims, they still must fail
because Collins has not proved that Defendant’s legitimate and non-discriminatory
reasons for terminating her are pretextual. See Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413
F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005). Therefore, the district court correctly granted
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all claims.
AFFIRMED.
3