[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-13685 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar MAY 10, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 0:09-cr-60260-WPD-8
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
NATIA SPATES,
a.k.a. Tia,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(May 10, 2011)
Before BARKETT, HULL and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Natia Spates appeals her 66-month sentence for distribution and possession
with intent to distribute crack cocaine within 1,000 feet of a playground, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860. On appeal, Spates argues that her 66-month
sentence is substantively unreasonable, and that the district court should have
imposed the 60-month mandatory minimum sentence that she requested.
Specifically, Spates argues that the district court failed to give appropriate weight
to certain factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), such as her lack of criminal history,
minimal participation in the conspiracy, and the fact that she has a child that she
will be unable to care for while incarcerated.
On this record, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion when it
sentenced Spates to 66 months imprisonment.1 The record indicates that the
district court carefully considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors in
determining an appropriate sentence for Spates, including her personal
characteristics and background, and found that they warranted a 21-month
downward variance from Spates’s advisory guidelines range of 87 to 108 months.
However, the district court concluded that a sentence above the mandatory
minimum of 60 months was appropriate because selling drugs near a playground is
a serious offense, and one in which Spates played a substantial role.
1
We review the reasonableness of sentences imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines by
an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 56, 128 S.Ct. 586, 600, 169
L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).
2
Although Spates disagrees with the weight given by the district court to her
personal characteristics and background, we cannot say the district court’s
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors was unreasonable. United States v. Shaw,
560 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 2847 (2009) (“[A]
district court has ‘considerable discretion’ in deciding whether the § 3553(a)
factors justify a variance and the extent of one that is appropriate.”) (citation
omitted). Accordingly, we affirm Spates’s 66-month sentence.
AFFIRMED.
3