UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHN ALBERT THOMPSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Martin K. Reidinger,
District Judge. (3:01-cr-00084-MR-1; 3:01-cr-00135-MR-2; 3:10-
cr-00187-MR-1)
Submitted: April 28, 2011 Decided: May 19, 2011
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jennifer Coulter, COULTER & THOMPSON, Charlotte, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States
Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
John Albert Thompson appeals the sentence he received
after the district court revoked his supervised release.
Thompson admitted four charged violations at the revocation
hearing. The district court imposed a sentence of nine months’
imprisonment to be followed by a new twenty-seven-month term of
supervised release. Thompson’s attorney has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising
two issues but stating that, in his view, there are no
meritorious issues for appeal. Thompson was informed of his
right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but has not filed a
brief. We affirm.
First, Thompson argues that the district court erred
in finding that revocation was mandatory. Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(g) (2006), revocation of supervised release is mandatory
when a defendant on supervised release possesses a firearm or a
controlled substance or refuses to comply with drug testing.
Thompson admitted that he failed to comply with drug testing.
Although the district court could have revoked Thompson’s
supervised release on this basis earlier, the fact that the
court instead continued Thompson on supervised release with
modifications, as requested by the probation officer, does not
establish that the court had discretion to ignore § 3583(g)’s
requirement for mandatory revocation when the probation officer
2
petitioned the court for revocation. The court did not err in
finding that revocation was mandatory.
Next, Thompson argues that his nine-month sentence was
an abuse of discretion and that the court erred in not
considering a sentence below the range. Generally, we will
affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release
if it is within the governing statutory range and is not plainly
unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40
(4th Cir. 2006). The nine-month sentence was within the Chapter
7 Guidelines range and is thus presumptively reasonable. United
States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007). Thompson
has not rebutted the presumption. The court had authority to
impose a new term of supervised release under § 3583(h) as long
as the new term did not exceed thirty-six months less the nine-
month term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation. The court
complied with this requirement.
Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed by the
district court. In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the
entire record for any meritorious issues and have found none.
This court requires that counsel inform Thompson, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Thompson requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
3
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Thompson. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4