IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-10241
Summary Calendar
ALLEN TAYLOR; Et Al.,
Plaintiffs,
ALLEN TAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DAVID G. UNDERWOOD; GEORGE J. COSENZA; COSENZA and UNDERWOOD,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:99-CV-2632-X
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September 11, 2000
Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Sometime prior to 1985, Allen Taylor and a business
associate invested in a company planning to develop and drill oil
and gas wells in West Virginia. It was the demise of this ill-
fated business venture that gives rise to the appeal before us
today. Specifically, as the investment began to fail, and
creditor lawsuits were filed, Taylor sought representation from
Cosenza and Underwood (defendants), in his defense against these
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
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suits. In 1997, however, after protracted litigation and court
delays that lasted close to ten years, that defense failed and
Taylor was found jointly and severally liable for two contracts
totaling close to $100,000 plus interest. Taylor now contends
that defendants’ malpractice resulted in the West Virginia
court’s adverse judgment.
Specifically, Taylor filed suit against the defendants in
Texas state court, complaining of the defendants’ alleged
malpractice in the West Virginia litigation. Defendants filed a
timely motion to remove the proceedings to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas on the basis of
diversity. Taylor did not seek remand to state court.
Defendants then filed a Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, which Taylor opposed. On February
1, 2000, the district court granted the motion, dismissing
Taylor’s lawsuit without prejudice. In a Memorandum Opinion and
Order filed January 31, 2000, the district court concluded that
Taylor had failed to meet his burden of establishing either
general or specific personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
Taylor filed a timely notice of appeal.
In his brief, Taylor focuses his argument on the district
court’s failure to find specific jurisdiction. As such, we only
consider this aspect of the district court’s ruling and we
further consider any other arguments to be abandoned. See Yohey
v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222 (5th Cir.1993) (arguments must be
briefed to be preserved).
The district court correctly noted that federal courts
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sitting in diversity apply a two-part test to determine personal
jurisdiction. The first part requires the court to look to the
law of the state in which it sits. If the state court would
confer jurisdiction, then so should the federal court. In this
case, however, Texas has a long-arm statute that confers
jurisdiction over out-of-state plaintiffs to the limit of the
Federal Constitution. Thus, federal courts sitting in diversity
in Texas must only apply the second part of this test, to
determine whether a finding of personal jurisdiction would offend
the Due Process Clause.
The due process test comprises two parts: first, courts
determine whether the defendants established the requisite
‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state; second, courts determine
whether exercising jurisdiction would result in “fair play and
substantial justice.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987). Specific jurisdiction “refers to a
suit ‘arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with
the forum.’” Interfirst Bank Clifton v. Fernandez, 844 F.2d 279,
283 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales De
Colombia S.A., 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984). These contacts,
however, must evidence the defendants’ intent to purposefully
avail themselves of the benefits and protections of the forum
state such that they would “reasonably anticipate being haled
into court” in the forum - here, Texas. Worldwide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980).
The district court did not err in concluding that Taylor
failed to demonstrate that the defendants made the requisite
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contact with Texas. As specific jurisdiction is supported only
where the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of the contacts
in question and where the defendants’ contacts were purposefully
directed towards the forum, it is worth recounting the sequence
of events asserted by Taylor that purportedly support
jurisdiction: Taylor, due to his own business misfortune, sought
the assistance of local counsel in West Virginia to defend
against suits brought in West Virginia. Defendants represented
Taylor in an action which ultimately resulted in an adverse
judgment against Taylor in West Virginia. Taylor asserts that
this representation was tortious.
This representation, however, occurred strictly in West
Virginia. In an attempt to divert our attention from this fact,
Taylor emphasizes that some correspondence took place between
himself in Texas and his attorneys in West Virginia. However, as
the test for specific jurisdiction requires, these isolated
instances of communication concerning the West Virginia action do
not evidence activities that were purposefully directed at Texas.
Further, it is worth noting, the defendants never visited Texas,
they are not licensed to practice law in Texas, and they remained
in West Virginia throughout the performance of the contract to
provide legal services.
Simply stated, incidental contacts in the form of
communication between an out-of-state lawyer and his in-state
client, concerning legal services required solely for a matter
that occurred out-of-state and involved litigation in out-of-
state courts does not give rise to specific jurisdiction, without
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more. Accordingly, as Taylor fell woefully short of his burden
of demonstrating more substantial contact, we AFFIRM the judgment
of the district court for these reasons and essentially the
reasons stated by the district court in its Memorandum Opinion
and Order dated January 31, 2000.
A F F I R M E D.