FILED
FOR PUBLICATION MAY 26 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
JUDICIAL COUNCIL U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IN RE COMPLAINT OF Nos. 10-90078 and 11-90083
JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT ORDER
KOZINSKI, Chief Judge:
A pro se litigant alleges that a magistrate judge “unlawfully granted
[defendants’] request for dismissal of all defendants and all causes of action” in
several of his civil cases and that a district judge “rubber-stamped” those decisions.
These charges relate directly to the merits of the judges’ rulings and must therefore
be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii); Judicial-Conduct Rule
11(c)(1)(B); In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 685 F.2d 1226, 1227 (9th Cir.
Jud. Council 1982).
Complainant further alleges that the judges were corrupt because they never
“adjudg[ed] anything against [defendants],” but routinely “dismiss[ed] any pro se
complaint for violation of civil rights §1983 against officers.” But adverse rulings
do not prove bias or conspiracy. See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 583
F.3d 598, 598 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 2009). Because complainant presented no
evidence to support these allegations, they must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C.
page 2
§ 352(b)(1)(A)(iii); Judicial-Conduct Rule 11(c)(1)(D); In re Complaint of Judicial
Misconduct, 569 F.3d 1093, 1093 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 2009).
Complainant also alleges that the judges “have been forced on all [of his]
cases, even when he requested assignment to different judges.” But, under Ninth
Circuit precedent, a litigant has “no right to any particular procedure for the
selection of the judge,” so long as the judge is chosen “in a manner free from bias
or the desire to influence the outcome of the proceedings.” Cruz v. Abbate, 812
F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, complainant offered no evidence that the
judges were even involved in assigning his cases, much less that they acted with an
improper motive. The mere fact that the same judge presided over multiple cases
filed by complainant is not proof of misconduct. Because complainant offers no
other evidence to support this claim, this charge must be dismissed. See In re
Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 632 F.3d at 1287, 1288 (9th Cir. Jud. Council
2011).
Complainant makes various other allegations against the judges, including
that the district judge “doctored” a motion “by crossing over ‘Addendum’ and
superimposing ‘Reply in Opposition’ in handwriting,” and that the magistrate
judge “issued an incredibly open legal advice to [defendants]” and “intimidat[ed
complainant] to not persisting with his motions.” A review of complainant’s
exhibits reveals no evidence that the judges did anything improper. See In re
page 3
Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 630 F.3d 968, 969–70 (9th Cir. Jud. Council
2010). Because there is no evidence that misconduct occurred, these claims must
be dismissed. See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 632 F.3d at 1288.
Finally, complainant asserts that “[t]here are too many allegations and proofs
against [the magistrate judge], that it would be very superflous [sic] and
perfunctory if this complaint were decided on this form and allegations alone.” He
therefore directs us to order transcripts from one of his underlying cases, because
“when substantiated [the charges] would represent a scandalous misconduct by a
judicial officer and a stain to the . . . Court.” But nowhere in complainant’s six-
page complaint or ten-page supplement does he explain what specific misconduct
those transcripts would reveal, or where within the transcripts the alleged
misconduct can be found. Cf. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 630 F.3d at
969–70. Without pointing to anything specific, complainant’s suggestion that we
order transcripts isn’t proof of misconduct, but rather an invitation for the Judicial
Council to conduct a fishing expedition. As we’ve previously explained, “vague
accusations and convoluted demands don’t satisfy complainant’s obligation to
provide objective evidence of misconduct,” so this claim must be dismissed. In re
Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 584 F.3d 1230, 1231 (9th Cir. Jud. Council
2009).
DISMISSED.