UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4016
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RENE ALEJO RUIZ-CASTILLO,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:08-cr-00020-WO-2)
Submitted: November 8, 2010 Decided: May 26, 2011
Before KING, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
K.E. Krispen Culbertson, CULBERTSON & ASSOCIATES, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United
States Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rene Alejo Ruiz-Castillo appeals his jury conviction
for conspiracy to distribute and possession with the intent to
distribute more than fifty kilograms of marijuana, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 (2006). Ruiz-Castillo asserts that the
district court erred when it admitted into evidence a statement
made by his co-conspirator and instructed the jury on willful
blindness. We affirm.
Although “[r]ulings related to admission and exclusion
of evidence are addressed to the sound discretion of the
[district court] and will not be reversed absent an abuse of
that discretion,” United States v. Stitt, 250 F.3d 878, 896
(4th Cir. 2001), we review for plain error where, as here, no
objection to the evidentiary ruling is made at trial, United
States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2006).
A statement is not hearsay if it is offered against
the defendant and is a statement of a co-conspirator of the
defendant “during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). For a statement to be
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), there “must be evidence that
there was a conspiracy involving the declarant and the
nonoffering party, and that the statement was made during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987) (internal quotation
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marks omitted). Accordingly, when the Government shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that (i) a conspiracy existed of
which the defendant was a member, and (ii) the co-conspirator’s
statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of
the conspiracy, the statement is admissible. United States v.
Neal, 78 F.3d 901, 905 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1255 (4th Cir. 1992).
We conclude that the Government’s evidence amply
demonstrated that a conspiracy to distribute more than fifty
kilograms of marijuana existed between June and December 2007
and that Ruiz-Castillo was a member of the conspiracy.
We further conclude that the admitted statement was made in
furtherance of the conspiracy, as it pertained to the
declarant’s plan for obtaining some of the conspiracy’s supply
of marijuana for further distribution. Accordingly, we conclude
that the district court committed no error in admitting the
statement.
Ruiz-Castillo also contends that the district court
erred in instructing the jury on willful blindness. We review
this issue for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jeffers,
570 F.3d 557, 566 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 645
(2009). “A willful blindness . . . instruction allows the jury
to impute the element of knowledge to the defendant if the
evidence indicates that he purposely closed his eyes to avoid
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knowing what was taking place around him.” United States v.
Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 384 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also United States v. Whittington, 26 F.3d
456, 463 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The record need not contain direct
evidence . . . that the defendant deliberately avoided knowledge
of wrongdoing; all that is necessary is evidence from which the
jury could infer deliberate avoidance of knowledge.”). “A
willful blindness instruction is proper when the defendant
asserts a lack of guilty knowledge but the evidence supports an
inference of deliberate ignorance” on the defendant’s part.
Ruhe, 191 F.3d at 384 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ruiz-Castillo’s defense was that he did not know that
bales of marijuana were hidden inside the pallets of ceramic
tile a co-conspirator instructed him to break. After review of
the record, we conclude that the jury could properly infer that
Ruiz-Castillo closed his eyes to his involvement in a drug
operation. Moreover, the district court properly instructed the
jury not to infer guilty knowledge from a mere showing of
careless disregard or mistake. See United States v. Guay,
108 F.3d 545, 551 (4th Cir. 1997). We therefore conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing
on willful blindness.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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