UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4946
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RAYMOND JOHNSON, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(4:10-cr-00091-TLW-1)
Submitted: May 26, 2011 Decided: May 31, 2011
Before KING, SHEDD and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael A. Meetze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William E. Day, II, Assistant
United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Raymond Johnson, Jr., pled guilty to embezzling,
stealing, purloining, or converting Social Security benefits, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2006). His attorney has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but
questioning whether the district court complied with Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 in accepting Johnson’s plea and whether the court
adequately explained the chosen sentence. Johnson was advised
of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but did not.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Prior to accepting a plea, a trial court must conduct
a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and
determines that the defendant comprehends, the nature of the
charge to which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum
penalty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the rights
he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b);
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991).
The district court conducted a thorough hearing and
substantially complied with Rule 11. Although the court
neglected to inform Johnson of his right to remain silent,
Johnson read and discussed with counsel the plea agreement,
which informed him of this right. Under the circumstances, this
omission did not impair any substantial right of Johnson’s. We
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therefore conclude that the record demonstrates Johnson
knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty.
An appellate court reviews a sentence for
reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This review requires
consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of a sentence. Id. First, the court must assess
whether the district court properly calculated the Guidelines
range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors,
analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and
sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49-50; see
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). The
court also must consider the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence, “examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances to see
whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding
that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in
§ 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216
(4th Cir. 2010). After reviewing the record, we conclude that
Johnson’s sentence is both procedurally and substantively
reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Johnson, in writing, of the right
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to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Johnson requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Johnson. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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