United States v. Wright

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________

No. 10-2970
_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

JUSTINE WRIGHT,
Appellant
_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 09-cr-635-02)
District Judge: Hon. Timothy J. Savage
_______________

Argued
April 14, 2011

Before: FISHER, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: June 1, 2011)
_______________
Robert Epstein
Brett G. Sweitzer [ARGUED]
Mark T. Wilson
Defender Association of Philadelphia
Federal Court Division
501 Walnut Street - #540 West
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellant

Maria M. Carrillo
Robert A. Zauzmer [ARGUED]
Office of United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street - #1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee
_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

I. Background

Justine Wright1 appeals the judgment entered by the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania sentencing him to 20 months’ imprisonment.
Wright argues that the sentence was procedurally
unreasonable due to the erroneous application of an 8-level

1
In the record and briefs, Wright is referred to as both
“Justin Wright” and “Justine Wright.” We use “Justine” here,
as that name was used by Wright in his notice of appeal.

2
enhancement. Although the District Court’s rationale for
applying the 8-level enhancement was thoughtful and well-
explained, we agree with Wright that the enhancement should
not have been applied in this case and will therefore vacate
and remand for resentencing.

A. Factual History

On July 2, 2009, Wright approached Andrew Cella at
Cella’s pizza restaurant in Morgantown, Pennsylvania, to
inquire about purchasing the restaurant. Cella told Wright
that he would sell the restaurant for $400,000. Wright said he
did not have the money right then but that he would return
later with his brother, who did have the money. On July 6,
2009, Wright returned to the restaurant accompanied by Soko
Kanneh, who Wright falsely identified as his brother. Wright
and Kanneh renewed Wright’s earlier offer, and Cella again
told them he would sell the restaurant for $400,000. Wright
and Kanneh told Cella that they had the money, informing
him that their father had made “good money” as a political
figure and head of Sierra Leone’s National Bank. Their
father, they said, had recently been assassinated, and they had
fled to the United States as refugees. Cella was interested in
their offer, and they agreed to meet again for dinner to discuss
the details.

Several days later, Cella met Wright and Kanneh for
dinner at their hotel in Philadelphia. After dinner, Kanneh
told Cella that he wanted to show him something, and the
three men went to Cella’s car. Once in the car, Kanneh
removed a stack of black paper from a bag along with a
plastic plate and several small bottles of liquid. Kanneh told
Cella that the black paper was U.S. currency that had been

3
given to Sierra Leone by the United States as aid but had been
dyed black to keep it from being used by any rebels who
might intercept it. He explained that the black dye could only
be removed by a special solvent. Kanneh and Wright told
Cella that their father had been responsible for cleaning the
money for the Sierra Leone government and that, after he
died, they had brought the money with them to the United
States.

As Kanneh and Wright told Cella about the black
money, Kanneh demonstrated the cleaning process by placing
two black pieces of paper in the plastic plate, coating them
with liquid from one of the bottles, and then “slosh[ing]
[them] around on the plate like he was panning for gold.”
(App. at 93.) As Kanneh did this, the paper “started to clean
up” and “bec[ame] clearer and clearer.” (Id.) Once the
pieces of paper were clean, they were revealed as two genuine
$100 bills. Kanneh told Cella that he and Wright had
millions of dollars in black bills in their hotel room but that
they needed large amounts of money in order to buy the
solvent to clean the bills. Kanneh and Wright then offered to
sell Cella $120,000 worth of black bills and the necessary
solvent to clean them for $60,000.

Although Cella told Wright and Kanneh that he would
try to raise the $60,000, he instead contacted the police, who
put Cella in touch with the U.S. Secret Service. At the behest
of Secret Service Agent Matt Cimino, Cella contacted Wright
and Kanneh to arrange another meeting, telling them he had a
friend who also wanted to invest in the black money. Wright
and Kanneh agreed to another meeting but stated that if there
was a second investor, they wanted $100,000, for which they
would deliver $200,000 worth of black money. Cella

4
arranged for Agent Cimino and himself to meet Wright and
Kanneh on August 26, 2009, in a Philadelphia hotel room.
There, Wright and Kanneh repeated their earlier
demonstration for Agent Cimino, cleaning two genuine $100
bills that had been dyed black. They then showed Agent
Cimino a suitcase full of black paper, which they claimed was
$200,000 worth of “black money” but which was actually
plain black construction paper. They told Agent Cimino that
they had sufficient cleaning solution with them to clean all
$200,000 and that they would sell Agent Cimino the money
and the cleaning solution for $100,000. Following that
performance and offer, Wright and Kanneh were arrested.

B. Procedural History

On September 24, 2009, Wright and Kanneh were
charged with two counts of possessing and passing altered
currency, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472; two counts of
possessing false or fictitious items, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 514(a)(2); and one count of conspiring to do the same, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. After Kanneh pled guilty,
Wright proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the evidence,
the District Court entered an order of acquittal for the two
§ 514(a)(2) charges, after which the jury convicted Wright on
the remaining charges of possession of altered currency and
conspiracy.

In preparation for a sentencing hearing on June 29,
2010, a presentence investigation report recommended an
offense level of 17, calculated by taking a base offense level
of 9, pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines

5
(“U.S.S.G.” or the “Guidelines”) § 2B5.1(a),2 and adding to it
an 8-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B5.1(b)(1).
Section 2B5.1(b)(1) states:

If the face value of the counterfeit items (A)
exceeded $2,000 but did not exceed $5,000,
increase by 1 level; or (B) exceeded $5,000,
increase by the number of levels from the table
in §2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and
Fraud) corresponding to that amount.

The table in § 2B1.1, in turn, calls for an 8-level enhancement
for amounts between $70,000 and $120,000.

Wright objected to the application of the 8-level
enhancement, arguing that § 2B5.1(b)(1) called for any
enhancement to be based on “the face value of the counterfeit
items,” which all parties acknowledged was $400, that is, the
four $100 bills used in the demonstrations. The District Court
overruled Wright’s objection, concluding that, despite
§ 2B5.1(b)(1) referencing only the “face value of the
counterfeit items,” the enhancement could be applied based
on the loss Wright intended to cause. The Court explained:

I don’t think that there is any question that the
sentencing commission never anticipated the

2
U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, which covers conspiracy
convictions under § 371, directs the sentencing court to use
the base offense level from the Guideline provision applicable
to the substantive crime, which, in this case, is § 2B5.1. As a
result, Wright’s conviction for conspiracy under § 371 did not
alter the base offense level.

6
 situation that we have before us. This is
something new. Okay. And I am confident that
had it been presented with such a case as this,
that it would focus on what the intended loss
was as opposed to the actual altered
currency. … What they were using here is a
scam and I believe that if the commission were
to consider it, that they would calculate the
offense level based upon the total loss. And
therefore, I am going to deny your request to
change that.

(App. at 312-13.)

Based on that calculated offense level of 17 and a
criminal history category of III, the recommended Guidelines
sentence was 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment. After
analyzing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the Court varied
downward, and imposed a sentence of 20 months’
imprisonment and three-years’ supervised release.3 In doing
so, the Court stated that the sentence it imposed was the same
as it would have imposed even if the 8-level enhancement
pursuant to § 2B5.1(b)(1) did not apply.

Wright’s timely appeal followed.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18

3
Neither party has objected to the variance under
§ 3553(a), and, therefore, it is not discussed herein.

7
U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

In sentencing a defendant, district courts follow a
three-step process: At step one, the court calculates the
applicable Guidelines range, United States v. Tomko, 562
F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009), which includes the application
of any sentencing enhancements, United States v. Shedrick,
493 F.3d 292, 298 n.5 (3d Cir. 2007). At step two, the court
considers any motions for departure and, if granted, states
how the departure affects the Guidelines calculation. Tomko,
562 F.3d at 567. At step three, the court considers the
recommended Guidelines range together with the statutory
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and determines the
appropriate sentence, which may vary upward or downward
from the range suggested by the Guidelines. Tomko, 562 F.3d
at 567.

Our review of a criminal sentence is for abuse of
discretion and proceeds in two stages. Id. First, we review
for procedural error at any sentencing step, including, for
example, failing to make a “correct computation of the
Guidelines range” at step one, United States v. Langford, 516
F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008), failing to rely on “appropriate
bases for departure” at step two, United States v. Ali, 508 F.3d
136, 148 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), or
failing to give “meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a)
factors” at step three, United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203,
215 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).4 If we

4
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gall v. United
States lists a number of potential procedural errors, “such as

8
find procedural error at any step, we will generally “remand
the case for re-sentencing, without going any further.” Id. at
214.

If there is no procedural error, the second stage of our
review is for substantive reasonableness, and “we will affirm
[the sentence] unless no reasonable sentencing court would
have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant
for the reasons the district court provided.” Tomko, 562 F.3d
at 568.

III. Discussion

On appeal, Wright argues that the District Court
committed procedural error at step one by imposing an 8-
level enhancement for intended loss under U.S.S.G.
§ 2B5.1(b)(1). He says that, because § 2B5.1(b)(1) sets forth
an enhancement based only on “the face value of the
counterfeit items,” applying the enhancement based on
intended loss was an abuse of discretion. We agree that
intended loss is not an aspect of § 2B5.1(b)(1), though we do
not accept all of Wright’s reasoning.

Both in his briefs and at oral argument, Wright argued
that the District Court had the option of applying § 2B5.1
with its base offense level of 9 but no enhancement, or

failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to
consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on
clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence – including an explanation for any deviation
from the Guidelines range.” 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

9
applying § 2B1.1 “in toto” with a base offense level of 6 and
an enhancement based on intended loss. However, the
assertion that either § 2B5.1 or § 2B1.1 could be applied
under these circumstances is incorrect. Wright was convicted
of altering four $100 bills in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472.
While the statutory index to the Guidelines states that either
§ 2B5.1 or § 2B1.1 may be applied for convictions under
§ 472, the index further instructs that “[i]f more than one
guideline section is referenced for the particular statute, use
the guideline most appropriate for the offense conduct
charged in the count of which defendant was convicted.” See
U.S.S.G. app. A. Here, § 2B5.1 states that it applies to
offenses involving “Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of the
United States,” whereas § 2B1.1 applies to offenses involving
“Counterfeit Instruments Other than Counterfeit Bearer
Obligations of the United States.” The Guidelines define
“bearer obligations of the United States” as obligations “not
made out to a specific payee,” including, among other things
“currency and coins,” and define counterfeiting to include
altering. U.S.S.G. § 2B5.1 cmt. n.1, 2. Accordingly, because
the “offense conduct” Wright was charged with was altering
“bearer obligations of the United States,” namely $400 in
United States currency, § 2B5.1 is the appropriate base
Guideline to apply in this case.

The District Court thus properly applied § 2B5.1 and
its base offense level of 9. Then, relying on the instruction in
§ 2B5.1(b)(1) to increase the offense level according to the
table in § 2B1.1“if the face value of the counterfeit
items … exceeded $5,000,” the Court concluded that, because
the intended loss for Wright’s scheme was $100,000, it
should increase the offense level by 8, the number indicated

10
in the § 2B1.1 table for values greater than $70,000 and less
than or equal to $120,000.

While we have never addressed whether § 2B5.1(b)(1)
supports an enhancement for intended loss, the language of
that section directs any enhancement to be based on face
value only. The government concedes that point,
acknowledging that § 2B5.1(b)(1) does not support a step-one
enhancement based on intended loss. The government’s only
argument on appeal is that the District Court did not apply a
step-one enhancement but, instead, made a step-two upward
departure. The government points to U.S.S.G.
§ 5K2.0(a)(2)(B), which allows upward departures where
“there is present a circumstance that the Commission has not
identified.” Although the Court never used the word
“departure,” the government argues that the Court’s statement
that “the sentencing commission never anticipated the
situation that we have before us” invoked § 5K2.0(a)(2)(B)
and should be viewed as a departure.

We do not dispute the District Court’s conclusion that
“the sentencing commission never anticipated the situation”
presented by this case. (App. at 312.) Indeed, the primary
harm in a scheme of the sort at issue here is the amount
sought by the fraud, not the nominal value of the currency
defaced to perpetrate the fraud. Thus, by focusing on the
value of the defaced currency, § 2B5.1 does not address the
gravamen of the harm, as the District Court quite rightly
pointed out.5 A step-two upward departure for unidentified

5
We note that, because of its focus on the face value
of the counterfeit items, rather than intended loss, § 2B5.1
would not distinguish between a black money scheme that

11
circumstances under § 5K2.0(a)(2)(B) would therefore be
justified, as would a step-three upward variance under
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) “to reflect the seriousness of the offense,”
and the District Court might have legitimately reached the
imposed sentence or a similar one through either or both of
those procedural mechanisms.

Nonetheless, despite the government’s argument to the
contrary, that is not what the Court did. The record plainly
shows that the District Court imposed a step-one
enhancement. The Court overruled Wright’s objection to the
application of the 8-level enhancement and stated that “the
offense level will remain at 17.” (App. at 313.) As Wright
correctly notes, “[i]f the district court had imposed a step-two
departure, the court would have sustained Mr. Wright’s
objection to the enhancement, identified the applicable
Guidelines range as 8-14 months, and then proceeded to
upwardly depart from that range. Instead, the court squarely
overruled Mr. Wright’s objection.” (Reply Brief for
Appellant at 3 (emphasis in original).) Furthermore, the
government never made a motion for an upward departure,
nor did the District Court so much as mention the word
“departure.” There is simply no basis in the record to
conclude that the District Court did anything other than apply
a step-one enhancement for intended loss based on
§ 2B5.1(b)(1). Because § 2B5.1(b)(1) requires any
enhancement to be based on the face value of the counterfeit

attempted to defraud a victim of $1,000 and one that
attempted to defraud a victim of $1,000,000. Plainly, the
sentencing commission did not have this kind of scheme in
mind when they penned § 2B5.1.

12
items, the District Court erred in imposing an enhancement
based on intended loss.

We acknowledge that a “form over substance”
criticism can be leveled at that conclusion, but we are bound
to follow what we perceive to be the plain meaning of the
Guidelines. Furthermore, in the sentencing context it is
firmly established that form – i.e. procedure – and substance
are both of high importance. We have a responsibility “to
ensure that a substantively reasonable sentence has been
imposed in a procedurally fair way.” United States v.
Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Merced,
603 F.3d at 214-15 (“[T]he broad substantive discretion
afforded district courts … makes adherence to procedural
sentencing requirements all the more important.”). And, of
course, our recognition that the District Court could reach this
same result by use of a departure or variance does not mean
that that result is compelled. On remand, Wright will have
the opportunity to argue that neither a departure nor a
variance is warranted, something he was unable to do in the
first instance. We cannot say whether the District Court will
be persuaded by those arguments and, thus, cannot say
whether the resulting sentence on remand will be identical to
that already imposed.6

6
The District Court’s statement that it would have
imposed the same sentence whether or not it had applied the
8-level enhancement does not affect our disposition. We
have previously held that a statement by a sentencing court
that it would have imposed the same sentence even absent
some procedural error does not render the error harmless
unless that “alternative sentence” was, itself, the product of
the three step sentencing process. United States v. Smalley,

13
 Although the identified error requires that we vacate
and remand, we emphasize again our agreement with the
District Court’s conclusion that § 2B5.1 does not address the
circumstances of this case. As we have already noted, the
focus of § 2B5.1 on face value fails to capture the seriousness
of Mr. Wright’s crime, and we endorse the District Court’s
efforts to ensure that the sentence imposed is adequate in light
of all relevant circumstances. We remand solely because
those circumstance needed to be addressed at steps two or
three of the sentencing process, rather than through the
imposition of a step-one enhancement that, by its terms, does
not apply.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate Wright’s
sentence and remand for resentencing.7

517 F.3d 208, 214-16 (3d Cir. 2008). Here, the District Court
said only that it would have imposed the same sentence even
absent the 8-level enhancement, without explaining what the
Guidelines range would have been without the enhancement,
and without explaining why an upward departure or variance
would be merited from that range. As the government
concedes, that alternative sentence is procedurally insufficient
and does not render the error here harmless.
7
Wright completed serving the 20-month sentence on
February 8, 2011. The case is not moot, however, because
Wright is still serving his period of supervised release and if,
on remand, the District Court imposes a sentence of
imprisonment less than the 20 months served, Wright may
receive credit against his supervised release period for the
excess months of imprisonment. See United States v.

14
Cottman, 142 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a
sentencing appeal was not mooted by the prisoner’s release
because if “the appropriate sentencing range [was]
reduced … . [it] would likely merit a credit against [the
prisoner’s] period of supervised release for the excess period
of imprisonment”).

15