In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-2256
A LMAS A BRAHAM ,
Petitioner,
v.
E RIC H. H OLDER, JR., Attorney General
of the United States,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
A099 333 747
S UBMITTED JANUARY 19, 2011 1—D ECIDED JUNE 1, 2011
Before P OSNER, K ANNE and R OVNER, Circuit Judges.
R OVNER, Circuit Judge. Almas Abraham petitions for
review of a decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) denying her application for
asylum and withholding of removal. Because we lack
1
We granted the petitioner’s unopposed motion to waive
oral argument. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs
and the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f).
2 No. 10-2256
jurisdiction to review the Board’s denial of her applica-
tion for asylum in the circumstances presented here,
we dismiss her petition with respect to asylum. We
deny her petition with respect to her application for
withholding of removal.
I.
Abraham is a native and citizen of Syria. She is also a
Christian in a country where the vast majority of citizens
are Muslims.2 Abraham entered the United States on
May 17, 2004, at Chicago, with a K-1 nonimmigrant visa,
which is also known as a “fiancé visa.” A fiancé visa
permits a foreign citizen fiancé of a U.S. citizen to travel
to the United States to marry his or her citizen sponsor
within ninety days of arrival. See 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(K)(i).
Abraham did not marry her citizen sponsor within
ninety days. She also failed to depart from the United
States at the end of the ninety-day period. After over-
staying her visa for more than a year, she filed an applica-
tion for asylum on November 5, 2005.3 Abraham was
2
Seventy-four percent of Syrians are Sunni Muslims. Christians
comprise approximately 10% of the Syrian population. See
United States Department of State, Background Note: Syria,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm (last visited
May 10, 2011) (hereafter “State Dept. Report”).
3
An application for asylum is automatically considered a
request for withholding of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (“An
asylum application shall be deemed to constitute at the
(continued...)
No. 10-2256 3
served with a Notice to Appear charging that she was
removable from the United States because she had re-
mained longer than was permitted. She conceded that
she was removable, and her application for asylum
and withholding of removal proceeded to a full hearing
before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”).
Abraham testified that she came from Tel-Sakra, a
small village of approximately fifty households, all of
whom are Assyrian Christians. While working on a
farm, she met a Muslim man named Mahmood Al-Deri.
She began a relationship with Al-Deri that started as a
dating relationship but quickly became abusive when
she refused Al-Deri’s demands that she convert to Islam.4
Al-Deri threatened to expose the relationship to her
family unless she converted. Eventually he made good
on his threat, and when her family learned she was dating
a Muslim man, her father and her eldest brother beat
3
(...continued)
same time an application for withholding of removal, unless
adjudicated in deportation or exclusion proceedings com-
menced prior to April 1, 1997.”).
4
Like much of Abraham’s testimony, her account of her
relationship with Al-Deri contains a number of seeming incon-
sistencies. She twice described the relationship as a “dating
relationship,” but also said it was “forced” and “not voluntary.”
R. at 125, 132-33. At one point, she testified, “It was like he
fall [sic] in love with me and he wanted me and I couldn’t
do anything about it.” R. at 124. She also said that Al-Deri
blamed her for starting the relationship and that for a time,
she also blamed herself. R. at 132-33.
4 No. 10-2256
her multiple times and threw her out of the house. After
a month of mistreatment, she moved to the capital city
of Damascus where she met Ben Dawood, a U.S. citizen
originally from Iraq. After knowing Dawood for a
week, she became engaged to him and traveled to the
United States on a fiancé visa. Once Abraham and
Dawood were in the United States, the relationship
quickly fell apart. According to Abraham, Dawood
refused to carry through with his promise to marry
her after his family and friends told him “bad things”
about her. Abraham testified that after she broke up
with Dawood, she intended to return to Syria because
she had no life in the United States. She then received a
letter from an uncle in Syria telling her not to return
and conveying what she considered to be a thinly veiled
threat. According to the uncle, Al-Deri was causing
trouble for her family. The uncle warned Abraham not
to return to “this tarnished land” because her actions
had shamed her entire tribe and because Al-Deri had
made demands on the family. R. at 221. After receiving
the letter, Abraham became afraid that her father or
brother would kill her if she returned to Syria because
she had disgraced the family’s honor. Such murders
of women, inaptly referred to as “honor killings,” are well-
documented in Syria. See United States Department of
State 2009 Human Rights Report: Syria, http://www.
state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136080.htm (last visited
May 10, 2011) (hereafter “Human Rights Report”) (noting
that various human rights organizations report up to
several hundred honor killings each year in Syria,
although no official tracking takes place). Several
No. 10-2256 5
months after receiving this letter from her uncle,
Abraham filed her application for asylum.
Abraham’s testimony before the IJ was riddled with
inconsistencies. She testified, for example, that she lived
with her parents until she moved to Damascus, but she
also testified that she spent a month living with Al-
Deri’s family after her family forced her to move out and
before she moved to Damascus. She said that she began
her relationship with Al-Deri in 2002 and that it went
on for six or seven months before ending in June 2003.
She later testified that the relationship began in 2001
and ended in August 2002. She told the IJ that she moved
to Damascus in 2003 and became engaged to Dawood
in April 2003, a time line that overlaps with her testi-
mony that she broke off her relationship with Al-Deri
in June 2003. She testified that she knew Dawood for
only one week before becoming engaged to him and
traveling to the United States, but she came to the
United States in 2004, approximately one year after she
claimed the engagement occurred. She testified that
she lived with Dawood’s aunt and his first cousin’s family
in Damascus and that the aunt introduced her to
Dawood. But she also said that she lived in a church
building that served as a refuge for people from Iraq,
and that Dawood’s aunt was the only member of his
family living in the church. She testified that, except for
the letter from her uncle, she had no contact with any
members of her family after moving to Damascus, but
she also submitted to the IJ a photocopy of a permanent
resident card for one of her brothers who was living in
the United States. And after telling the IJ she had no
6 No. 10-2256
contact with her family after leaving for Damascus, she
also told the IJ that “of course” her parents knew she
was coming to the United States in 2004 because she had
to gather all of her documents and papers in order to
file the forms to come to the United States. She testified
alternately that her family first learned of her relation-
ship with Al-Deri in 2002 and in 2003.
She testified consistently that after moving to
Damascus, she suffered no more abuse from her family
or Al-Deri. She conceded that she never reported any
abuse from her family or from Al-Deri to the police
because she did not want anyone to know what had
happened and because the police do not help in these
cases. The Human Rights Report confirms that the
police are rarely contacted and are not helpful when a
report of domestic violence is lodged.5
5
According to the Human Rights Report, “The law does not
specifically prohibit domestic violence, and violence against
women occurred during the year. A 2006 study reported that
as many as one in four women surveyed had been victims
of domestic violence. The majority of domestic violence
and sexual assault cases went unreported; victims have tradi-
tionally been reluctant to seek assistance outside the family
for fear of social stigmatization. Observers reported that when
some abused women tried to file a police report, the police
did not respond to their claims aggressively, if at all. Women
reported incidents at police stations of sexual harassment,
verbal abuse, hair pulling, and slapping by police officers
when attempting to file police reports, particularly at the
(continued...)
No. 10-2256 7
When asked what would happen if she returned to
Syria, Abraham testified, “Either they would shun
me and because I wouldn’t have any life to live there,
I probably might kill myself.” R. at 129. She also
testified that she feared harm from her family if she
returned to Syria. Abraham also presented testimony
from a cousin residing in the United States to corroborate
her concern that her family might harm her if she
returned to Syria. Her cousin testified that he believed
Abraham would be the victim of an honor killing if she
returned to Syria. He noted that he had a friend who
served only three days in jail for killing his sister after
she dishonored the family. The Human Rights Report
also confirms that, until very recently, judges were
allowed to waive or reduce punishment for perpetrators
of honor killings. The law now stipulates a mandatory
two-year minimum sentence for anyone convicted in
an honor killing, but at the time Abraham left, a family
member who killed her was unlikely to face significant
legal sanctions. See Human Rights Report.
The IJ found that Abraham’s asylum application was
not timely filed and that she did not meet any of the
exceptions for extending the time to file. The IJ concluded
that Abraham did not meet the standards to qualify
for withholding of removal or for relief under the Con-
5
(...continued)
criminal security branch at Bab Musallah in Damascus. Victims
of domestic violence have the legal right to seek redress in
court, but few did so because of the social stigma attached
to such action.”
8 No. 10-2256
vention Against Torture, and therefore denied her ap-
plication in its entirety. The IJ first noted that Abraham
had failed to file her application for asylum within one
year of arriving in the United States. Under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a)(2)(B), a claim for asylum not filed within a year
of arrival in the United States will be denied unless it
meets one of the exceptions contained in the statute.
The IJ rejected Abraham’s argument that the letter from
her uncle satisfied the only applicable exception for
changed circumstances. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (per-
mitting consideration of a late-filed application for
asylum “if the alien demonstrates to the satisfaction of
the Attorney General either the existence of changed cir-
cumstances which materially affect the applicant’s eligi-
bility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating
to the delay in filing an application within the [one-year]
period”). The IJ found that the letter did not meet the
materiality requirement of the statute because the letter
only repeated a threat to Abraham’s safety that existed
when she left Syria. Because those same circumstances
existed when Abraham first arrived in the United States,
the IJ found that she should be held to the one-year
limit for filing claims for asylum. The IJ also noted
that Abraham provided no information regarding the
timing of her breakup with Dawood and thus it was
impossible to determine whether she filed within a rea-
sonable time after her nonimmigrant status expired. The
IJ therefore denied the application for asylum as untimely.
The IJ then considered whether Abraham was eligible
to be considered for withholding of removal. In order to
qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must
No. 10-2256 9
demonstrate a clear probability that she will suffer perse-
cution on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion if
she returns to her country of origin. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A). The IJ found that Abraham failed to
demonstrate a “clear probability” that she would be
persecuted on her return to Syria because her testi-
mony was not credible, not persuasive, and not detailed
enough to meet the standard of proof required. The
IJ noted the multiple inconsistencies in Abraham’s testi-
mony and found that, absent corroboration, Abraham
had not shown that it was more likely than not that
she would be persecuted. The IJ also found that
Abraham had failed to establish that she had been perse-
cuted in the past on account of one of the protected
grounds in the statute. Again finding that Abraham’s
testimony was not credible, the IJ also noted that the
incidents of abuse she described were not severe, caused
no injuries and required no medical treatment. Moreover,
the IJ found that Abraham’s stated intent to return to
Syria even though these incidents occurred undermined
her claim that she had been persecuted in Syria. The IJ
also noted that Abraham was able to live in Damascus
for some period of time without any further abuse from
either her family or Al-Deri. The IJ therefore concluded
that Abraham would not be seriously harmed if she
returned to Syria. Finally, the IJ concluded that Abraham
had also failed to establish that any abuse she suffered
was due to one of the protected grounds in the statute.
Abraham appealed to the BIA. The BIA first agreed
with the IJ that Abraham’s claim for asylum was
10 No. 10-2256
statutorily barred because it was untimely. The BIA then
considered Abraham’s claim for withholding of removal
and concluded that she failed to present sufficient cor-
roborating evidence of critical elements of her claim. After
noting that Abraham could have obtained corroboration
from her brother living in the United States, the people
with whom she lived in Damascus, her uncle, or anyone
else who knew her in Syria, the BIA adopted and affirmed
the IJ’s denial of relief. Abraham’s appeal was therefore
dismissed.
II.
On appeal here, Abraham argues that the IJ and the
BIA applied an incorrect legal standard to her applica-
tion for asylum. She also asserts that the BIA’s decision
is not supported by substantial evidence. Finally, she
contends that we should reverse the decision denying her
withholding of removal because the IJ and BIA ignored
corroborating evidence that she provided and failed to
forewarn her that they required additional corroborating
evidence.
A.
Section 1158(a)(2) provides that an alien must apply
for asylum within one year of the date of the alien’s
arrival in the United States unless “the alien demonstrates
to the satisfaction of the Attorney General either the
existence of changed circumstances which materially
No. 10-2256 11
affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extra-
ordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing
an application within the period specified[.]” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a)(2)(B) and (D). Section 1158 also provides
that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any
determination of the Attorney General under paragraph
(2).” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3). Therefore, in general, we lack
jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s rejection of
an untimely request for asylum. Restrepo v. Holder, 610
F.3d 962, 964 (7th Cir. 2010). Notwithstanding that limita-
tion on our jurisdiction, we retain authority to review
constitutional claims and questions of law. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).
In order to get around the limit on our jurisdiction,
Abraham attempts to characterize her claim as one in-
volving a question of law. A review of her brief, how-
ever, reveals that she simply disagrees with the IJ’s con-
clusions regarding the facts of the case. In particular, she
contests the IJ’s conclusion that she did not present evi-
dence of a “material” change in circumstances. The IJ’s
conclusion that Abraham lacked sufficient credible evi-
dence to meet the materiality standard is not a question
of law. Restrepo, 610 F.3d at 964-65 (noting that our
circuit limits § 1252(a)(2)(D) to strictly legal controversies,
and so we are not authorized to review applications of
law to facts); Khan v. Filip, 554 F.3d 681, 687-89 (7th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1049 (2010) (concluding
that our review under § 1252(a)(2)(D) is limited to “pure”
questions of law); Vasile v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 766, 768-69
(7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the agency’s determination
that an alien failed to file his asylum claim within one
12 No. 10-2256
year and failed to qualify for an extension of time
was an unreviewable question of fact and exercise of dis-
cretion). We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider Abra-
ham’s petition as it relates to her claim for asylum
and dismiss that part of her petition.
B.
We turn next to Abraham’s petition for review of the
decision of the IJ and the BIA to deny her application
for withholding of removal. Where the BIA’s order
adopts and supplements the IJ’s decision, we review
both. Surganova v. Holder, 612 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir.
2010); Milanouic v. Holder, 591 F.3d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 2010);
Krishnapillai v. Holder, 563 F.3d 606, 615 (7th Cir.
2009); Khan, 554 F.3d at 690. We examine the IJ’s factual
findings deferentially and uphold them so long as they
are supported by substantial evidence. Krishnapillai, 563
F.3d at 615; Khan, 554 F.3d at 690; Balogun v. Ashcroft,
374 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2004). Under the substantial
evidence test, we must uphold the IJ’s findings if they
are supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record considered as a whole. Balogun,
374 F.3d at 498. We may reverse the IJ’s determinations
only if the evidence compels a different result. Balogun,
374 F.3d at 498.
Credibility determinations are questions of fact subject
to this standard of review. Balogun, 374 F.3d at 498. See
also Krishnapillai, 563 F.3d at 617 (holding that only in extra-
ordinary circumstances will this court overturn an IJ’s
No. 10-2256 13
credibility assessment). The Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”), as amended by the REAL ID Act of 2005,
sets forth the parameters for the Immigration Judge’s
credibility determinations:
Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
determination on the demeanor, candor, or respon-
siveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent
plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the
consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s
written and oral statements (whenever made and
whether or not under oath, and considering the cir-
cumstances under which the statements were made),
the internal consistency of each such statement,
the consistency of such statements with other
evidence of record (including the reports of the De-
partment of State on country conditions), and any
inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, with-
out regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy,
or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s
claim, or any other relevant factor. . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The REAL ID Act also
modified the INA to allow immigration judges substan-
tial discretion “to demand corroboration of an asylum
applicant’s allegations whether or not the judge finds
the applicant credible.” Krishnapillai, 563 F.3d at 618.
“Only if such evidence is beyond the reasonable ability
of the immigrant to obtain is the judge precluded from
demanding corroboration.” Krishnapillai, 563 F.3d at 618;
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Eke v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 372, 381
(7th Cir. 2008).
14 No. 10-2256
In this case, the IJ expressly found that Abraham’s
testimony was not credible. That finding was well-sup-
ported by the numerous internal inconsistencies in
her testimony. As we noted above, she testified inconsis-
tently on a number of issues including: (1) her living
situation after Al-Deri told her family about the relation-
ship; (2) the time line for her relationship with Al-Deri,
her move to Damascus, and her engagement to Dawood;
(3) whether she had any contact with her family after
moving to Damascus; and (4) whether her relationship
with Al-Deri was consensual or forced upon her. We
will not disturb the IJ’s credibility finding because it is
supported by substantial evidence.
Nor is there any reason to overturn the decision of the
IJ or the BIA requiring that Abraham produce corrobora-
tion of her claims. We cannot say that it would have
been unreasonable in these circumstances to require
corroboration because Abraham had contacts in
Damascus who could verify her story, and also appears
to have been in contact with her uncle and with a
brother in the United States. Abraham complains that if
the IJ wished for her to produce corroborative evidence,
she should have been given notice of this requirement.
But the REAL ID Act:
clearly states that corroborative evidence may be
required, placing immigrants on notice of the conse-
quences for failing to provide corroborative evi-
dence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (“Where the
trier of fact determines that the applicant should
provide evidence that corroborates otherwise cred-
No. 10-2256 15
ible testimony, such evidence must be provided
unless the applicant does not have the evidence and
cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”). To hold
that a petitioner must receive additional notice
from the IJ and then an additional opportunity to
provide corroborative evidence before an adverse
ruling, would necessitate two hearings—the first to
decide whether such corroborating evidence is re-
quired and then another hearing after a recess to
allow the alien more time to collect such evidence.
This would add to the already overburdened
resources of the DHS, and such an approach
would seem imprudent where the law clearly
notifies aliens of the importance of corroborative
evidence.
Raphael v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 530 (7th Cir. 2008). There
is therefore no need for additional notice. Abraham
notes that the IJ and BIA did not address the testimony
given by her cousin that she would be the victim of
an honor killing on her return to Syria. That testimony
did corroborate that honor killings occur in Syria and that
punishment for the killers is virtually nonexistent. The
cousin also stated his opinion that Abraham would be
the victim of an honor killing if she returned to Syria.
Although the IJ and BIA did not expressly mention
this testimony, the IJ did not dispute that honor killings
occurred in Syria and agreed that they are a “terrible
problem” there. Oral Decision of the IJ (August 7, 2008), at
13. But the IJ found that, in light of all of the evidence,
and because Abraham’s family and former boyfriend
did not disturb her after she moved to Damascus, it was
16 No. 10-2256
unlikely that they would harm her if she returned to
Syria. Having reviewed the short and conclusory testi-
mony of Abraham’s cousin, we conclude that no further
analysis by the IJ or the BIA was necessary. It is clear
from the record and from the IJ’s decision that the IJ
understood all of the evidence presented and still
found Abraham’s proof lacking. See Kiorkis v. Holder, 634
F.3d 924, 928-29 (7th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that it is
impossible for immigration courts to write an exegesis
on every contention an applicant raises).
In short, the IJ found that Abraham did not produce
sufficient credible evidence that she had suffered past
persecution or would suffer persecution on her return
to Syria. The IJ and BIA concluded that Abraham also
failed to provide corroborating evidence of her claim
in circumstances where it was not unreasonable to
require her to produce corroboration. Because the deci-
sions of the IJ and BIA are supported by substantial
evidence, Abraham’s petition regarding withholding
of removal is denied.
D ISMISSED IN P ART AND
D ENIED IN P ART.
6-1-11