In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-1453
D EBRA L. L EWIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
S CHOOL D ISTRICT #70, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:05-cv-00776-WDS-CJP—William D. Stiehl, Judge.
A RGUED D ECEMBER 6, 2010—D ECIDED JUNE 1, 2011
Before B AUER and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
McC USKEY, District Judge.
B AUER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Debra Lewis
is a former employee of School District #70 in St. Clair
County, Illinois (the “District”), whose employment
The Honorable Michael P. McCuskey, Chief Judge of the
United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois,
sitting by designation.
2 No. 10-1453
was terminated after a period of absence under the
Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Following
her termination, Lewis sued the District, school superin-
tendent Robin Hawkins, and members of the District’s
school board, alleging violations of the FMLA, breach
of contract, defamation and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. The district court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendants and Lewis timely ap-
pealed. In an opinion written by Judge Ripple in April
2008, this court affirmed the district court’s dismissal
of Lewis’ claims for defamation and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, but remanded the claims for
violation of the FMLA and breach of contract. The parties
attended a settlement conference on April 25, 2009,
which culminated in a settlement agreement. Lewis
now challenges the validity of that agreement as well as
several rulings the district court made on remand. The
rulings in question include a dismissal of Lewis’ cause
of action for failure to comply with a court order. For
the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court’s
dismissal.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are detailed in Lewis v. School Dist.
#70, 523 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 2008). For our purposes, it
is sufficient to note that after this court remanded
Lewis’ claims for violation of the FMLA and breach of
contract, the parties attempted to settle these remaining
claims. Though the parties dispute whether an enforce-
able settlement was reached, an apparent settlement
No. 10-1453 3
was entered orally in the presence of a magistrate judge
sitting in the Southern District of Illinois on April 25,
2009. Shortly thereafter, on May 3, 2009, one of the de-
fendants took his own life. This defendant, Robin
Hawkins, had been superintendent of the District when
Lewis’ employment was terminated.
Following Hawkins’ death, details emerged about an
investigation into accusations of child molestation by
Hawkins. When Lewis became aware of these details,
she quickly halted efforts to memorialize the oral settle-
ment terms into a signed writing, as previously agreed
between the parties.
On June 3, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to
enforce the settlement. On June 12, 2009, the district court
judge granted the motion and ordered Lewis to sign the
relevant documents by June 15, 2009. Lewis moved to
postpone the deadline for medical reasons and the
court allowed her additional time. On August 16, 2009,
Lewis filed (1) a motion to reconsider and to supple-
ment her complaint and (2) a motion for interim
relief under the FMLA. These motions were denied in
a memorandum and order dated January 11, 2010,
and Lewis was again directed to execute the settlement
documents. After receiving a status report from the
defendants stating that they had received no signed
documents or other communication from plaintiff’s
counsel by the most recent court-ordered deadline, the
district court judge dismissed Lewis’ cause of action
with prejudice. At the direction of the court, the
defendants moved for sanctions, a motion which we are
advised is still pending below.
4 No. 10-1453
II. DISCUSSION
A. Enforceability of the Settlement Agreement
The first question presented for our review is whether
an enforceable settlement agreement exists between the
parties which the plaintiff cannot set aside. We review a
district court’s decision to enforce a settlement agree-
ment for abuse of discretion. Wilson v. Wilson, 46 F.3d
660, 664 (7th Cir. 1995).
Under Illinois law,1 an oral settlement agreement is
enforceable where there is offer, acceptance, and a
meeting of the minds as to the terms agreed upon. Id. at
666. In addition, the material terms must be sufficiently
“definite and certain” for a reviewing court to ascertain
the parties’ agreement. At the parties’ settlement confer-
ence, Magistrate Judge Proud recited the terms of the
settlement on the record and confirmed the parties’
agreement with those terms. When asked, “Is this
your understanding of the settlement?,” Lewis replied,
“Yes it is.” When Judge Proud followed up with, “[And]
this is acceptable to you?,” Lewis stated, “Yes it is.” A
memorialization of the settlement agreement was
prepared shortly after the conference and included the
material terms detailed on the record at the conference.
1
Whether a settlement agreement is binding is an issue
governed by the law of the state in which the parties executed
the agreement. Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 489
(7th Cir. 2002). Since the conference which arguably gave rise
to the parties’ agreement took place in Illinois, Illinois law
must govern.
No. 10-1453 5
Such terms included: (1) a substantial annuity for the
plaintiff; (2) a lump sum to be paid by the defendant
within thirty days of signing the settlement documents;
(3) an agreement by the plaintiff to release any and all
claims against the District and its employees; (4) a non-
disparagement agreement; (5) an agreement that the
plaintiff not re-apply for employment with the District;
and (6) an agreement regarding the allocation of costs
and attorney fees.
We harbor no doubt that the parties intended to
enter into a settlement agreement and did so at the con-
clusion of their April 25, 2009 conference. Through
his careful line of questioning, Judge Proud established
that a meeting of the minds had been reached before
indicating to the parties that he would report the case
as settled. Lewis affirmed her understanding of the settle-
ment terms and indicated her acceptance of those terms
on the record. Though Lewis now argues she never ac-
cepted the settlement, there is simply no support in
the record or in her brief for such a claim.
Having found that Lewis did enter into a valid oral
settlement agreement, we turn to her argument that the
settlement was tainted by fraud and should therefore
not be enforced. Lewis claims that “material facts were
intentionally concealed from her”during the conference.
Though Lewis does not state the legal principle under-
lying her argument with any precision, it is true that
an otherwise enforceable contract may be set aside
where there is evidence of fraud in the inducement of
the contract. Jordan v. Knafel, 880 N.E.2d 1061, 1069
6 No. 10-1453
(Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2007). In order to establish fraud in the
inducement, a party seeking relief must show that the
representation made by the offending party was “(1) one
of material fact; (2) made for the purpose of inducing
the other party to act; (3) known to be false by the maker,
or not actually believed by him on reasonable grounds
to be true, but reasonably believed to be true by the
other party; and (4) relied upon by the other party to
his detriment.” Id.
As a preliminary matter, we note that Lewis has not
alleged any active misrepresentation on the part of the
defendants. Rather, it was their failure to reveal that
defendant Hawkins was the subject of a criminal inves-
tigation which she argues tainted the settlement.
Though fraud may arise from the omission or conceal-
ment of a material fact,2 it would strain credulity to
find that the facts Lewis puts at issue on appeal are
material to her claim.
As both parties now acknowledge, defendant Hawkins
was the suspect of a criminal investigation into allega-
tions of child molestation during the parties’ settlement
negotiations. Regrettably, he took his own life on May 3,
2009. In our view, the investigation had little to no
bearing on the settlement struck between the parties.
Lewis argues that Hawkins’ character and conduct
relating to child molestation were at issue in this case,
but that is plainly not true. The primary conduct in ques-
2
See Check v. Clifford Chrysler-Plymouth of Buffalo Grove, Inc.,
794 N.E. 2d 829, 835 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2003).
No. 10-1453 7
tion has always been the firing of Lewis following her
leave. Lewis may be correct that if the investigation
had been revealed, she would have garnered a larger
settlement from the District; outside factors often play
a role in determining the concessions a party is willing
to make in order to dispose of a claim. But the fact
that knowledge of the investigation may have given
Lewis better bargaining power is not enough to invali-
date a settlement that was entered freely and voluntarily.
The argument “I could have gotten more from them if
I knew” does not convert an immaterial fact into
a material one.
Lewis asks us to draw several tenuous conclusions
in what the district court aptly characterized a “round-
about attempt to link Hawkins’ alleged misconduct to
the facts of [plaintiff’s] FMLA claim.” Her argument that
Hawkins’ suicide was an admission of guilt on the
charges of child molestation against him is both highly
speculative and far removed from the facts at issue
in her own case. Even if we were to assume that the al-
legations against Hawkins were true, Lewis has not
pleaded sufficient factual evidence to connect Hawkins’
alleged misconduct toward others to her own termina-
tion.3 Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not
3
If Lewis had alleged that she was a whistleblower termi-
nated in retaliation for bringing Hawkins’ alleged misconduct
to light, perhaps her case would be stronger. However, Lewis
has never proffered such an argument in her pleadings. In
fact, the record seems to show that she was not aware of
(continued...)
8 No. 10-1453
abuse its discretion in finding that the criminal investiga-
tion of Hawkins was immaterial to Lewis’ claims and
therefore no barrier to enforcement of the parties’ settle-
ment.
B. Dismissal of Lewis’ Cause of Action for Failure
to Comply with the Court’s Order
Pursuant to an order of the district court dated
January 27, 2010, Lewis’ cause of action was dismissed
with prejudice on January 28, 2010. The reason for the
dismissal was her refusal to execute settlement docu-
ments as the court had repeatedly directed her to do.
District Judge Stiehl first ordered Lewis to sign settle-
ment documents no later than June 15, 2009. In a subse-
quent order dated January 11, 2010, she was again
directed to sign the documents, this time no later than
January 25, 2010. At that point, she was warned that
noncompliance could result in dismissal and the imposi-
tion of sanctions, including attorneys’ fees. It should
therefore have come as no surprise to Lewis that her
case was ultimately dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 41(b) when the documents remained
unsigned.
We review a district court’s decision to sanction a
plaintiff by dismissing her lawsuit under the abuse of
3
(...continued)
Hawkins’ alleged misconduct until after the settlement was
reached, making the existence of a whistleblower-type
scenario impossible.
No. 10-1453 9
discretion standard. Williams v. Chicago Board of Education,
155 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir. 1998). A court should only
dismiss a cause of action pursuant to Rule 41(b) “when
there exists a clear record of delay or contumacious
conduct or when less drastic sanctions have proven
ineffective.” Roland v. Salem Contract Carriers, Inc., 811
F.2d 1175, 1177 (7th Cir. 1987).
Lewis explains that she refused to comply with the
court’s orders because she believed the settlement agree-
ment was “dishonest” and because she wanted to “per-
suade the court her position was the better one.” Repeated
orders directing Lewis to proceed on the basis of a
valid settlement should have been sufficient to convince
her that her position had not gained any traction with
the court. Instead, the court’s orders were consistently
met with disregard by the plaintiff, leaving Judge Stiehl
with little recourse but to dismiss the lawsuit.
We do not render this decision lightly. The settlement
agreement that was vacated provided for what on all
accounts appeared to be a significant recovery for
Lewis; the defendants had even admitted liability on
the FMLA claim. However, Lewis’ dogged pursuit of
more than she agreed to take under the settlement has
left her with nothing in the wake of the district court’s
dismissal. Though we think it unfortunate that Lewis’
actions have caused her to lose a substantial settlement,
we can find no abuse of discretion on Judge Stiehl’s
part. While the power to sanction via dismissal is one
which should be exercised with great care, it is “essential”
to a court’s ability to efficiently manage its caseload.
10 No. 10-1453
Roland v. Salem Contract Carriers, Inc., 811 F.2d 1175, 1177-
78 (7th Cir. 1987). At the time Lewis’ case was dis-
missed, eight months had passed since the court first
directed her to sign settlement documents. She had also
been warned that dismissal could result from her con-
tinued refusal to comply. When a district court judge
is unable to dispose of a matter because a recalcitrant
plaintiff systematically refuses to obey the court’s orders,
dismissal is justified. Such was the case here and for
that reason, we affirm.4
C. Plaintiff’s Remaining Arguments
Having found that the settlement agreement was
valid, but that the district court properly vacated the
settlement and dismissed Lewis’ cause of action for
failure to comply with a court order, we need not address
Lewis’ remaining arguments on appeal. We note that
because the defendants’ motion for sanctions was still
pending in the district court at the time we were briefed
on this appeal, any ruling on sanctions beyond the dis-
missal would be premature.
4
Even if we were inclined to restore the parties to their relative
positions under the settlement, Lewis has not provided any
argument why we should. At page 19 of her reply brief, Lewis
rhetorically asks whether an alternative to dismissal was
available to the district court judge. If such an alternative
existed, it was Lewis’ responsibility to (1) bring it to this
court’s attention and (2) persuade us that the district court
abused its discretion by not resorting to such measure(s)
prior to dismissing her claim.
No. 10-1453 11
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we A FFIRM the
district court’s dismissal of Lewis’ cause of action with
prejudice.
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