UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-8310
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CORWIN TYRELL WOODSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief
District Judge. (3:94-cr-00079-JRS-10)
Submitted: March 22, 2011 Decided: June 2, 2011
Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Dismissed in part, vacated and remanded in part by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Corwin Tyrell Woodson, Appellant Pro Se. James Brien Comey, Jr.,
Norman Scott Sacks, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Richard Daniel Cooke, Stephen Wiley Miller, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Richmond, Virginia; William Neil Hammerstrom,
Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Corwin Tyrell Woodson appeals from the district
court’s orders denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) motion
and his motion for reconsideration. Woodson sought application
of Amendment 706 to the Guidelines, which lowered the offense
levels for drug offenses involving crack cocaine. We vacate the
denial of Woodson’s § 3582 motion and remand for further
consideration. We dismiss the appeal of the motion for
reconsideration.
The district court denied Woodson’s § 3582 motion,
finding that Woodson had previously received a departure
resulting in a sentence 84-months below the low end of the
applicable Guidelines range. The court noted that this
departure was a result of the consideration of the disparity
between crack and powder cocaine and concluded that the “84[-]
month reduction given then exceeds the reduction available to
the Defendant under the retroactive amendments.”
On appeal, Woodson asserts that the district court
improperly found that he was not eligible for a sentence
reduction. Pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 1B1.10 (2010), when a defendant’s applicable Guidelines range
has been lowered by an amendment to the Guidelines, the district
court may reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment pursuant
to § 3582. In determining the extent of that reduction, that
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section provides that a court may not reduce a defendant’s term
of imprisonment under § 3582 below the minimum of the amended
Guidelines range unless the original term of imprisonment was
also below the original Guidelines range. USSG § 1B1.10(b)(2).
The commentary to that section provides “[i]f the original term
of imprisonment imposed was less than the term of imprisonment
provided by the guideline range applicable to the defendant at
the time of sentencing, a reduction comparably less than the
amended guideline range determined under subsection (b)(1) may
be appropriate.” See USSG § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(B)(3).
Here, the district court stated that the 84-month
reduction given at Woodson’s resentencing exceeded the reduction
available to Woodson under the retroactive amendments. However,
under USSG § 1B1.10, Woodson was eligible for a reduction down
to a sentence “comparably less” than 262 months, the bottom of
the amended Guidelines range. The determination of a
“comparably lower” sentence may be determined by using a lower
offense category, a percentage, a flat number of months to
calculate the reduction, or any other reasonable method. See
United States v. Fennell, 592 F.3d 506, 509 (4th Cir. 2010).
Under each of these methods, Woodson would have been eligible
for a reduction below 240 months. Accordingly, the district
court erred by ruling that Woodson’s 240-month sentence
“exceed[ed] the reduction available.” Thus, while the district
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court was not required to grant Woodson’s motion for a sentence
reduction, it was error to conclude that Woodson was ineligible
for a potential reduction. For this reason, we vacate the
district court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
Turning to Woodson’s appeal from the denial of his
motion for reconsideration, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
35(a) authorizes a district court, “[w]ithin [fourteen] days
after sentencing,” to reconsider a sentence, but only if
reconsideration is necessary to correct an “arithmetical,
technical, or other clear error.” See United States v. Goodwyn,
596 F.3d 233, 235 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3530 (2010). If a
criminal defendant seeks modification of his sentence under
3582(c)(2), however, we have recognized that, because the
defendant had an opportunity to persuade the district court to
modify his sentence pursuant to § 3582, the defendant is
obligated to appeal an unsatisfactory result rather than ask the
district court to reconsider its denial. See id. at 236. Thus,
the district court was without jurisdiction to determine whether
Woodson provided adequate grounds for reconsideration.
Based on the foregoing, we dismiss Woodson’s appeal
from the denial of his motion for reconsideration. We vacate
the district’s order denying Woodson’s § 3582 motion and remand
for further proceedings. We express no opinion on Woodson’s
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remaining claims on appeal. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
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