NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-1414
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 03-cr-245)
District Judge: Honorable Nora Barry Fischer
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 3, 2011
Before: SCIRICA, SMITH and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 6, 2011 )
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Frederick H. Banks appeals from an order of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania, which denied his “Motion to Modify Special
Assessment and Restitution for Changed Circumstances” for lack of jurisdiction. For the
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reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
In October 2004, a federal jury found Banks guilty of mail fraud, criminal
copyright infringement, uttering and possessing counterfeit or forged securities, and
witness tampering. These charges stemmed from Banks‟ sales of illegally copied
(“pirated”) versions of copyrighted Microsoft software products through an Internet
marketplace website, Amazon.com. The District Court subsequently sentenced Banks to
sixty months of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. The
Court also imposed restitution in the sum of $70,708.59, and a special assessment of
$700.00, see 18 U.S.C. § 3013. This Court affirmed the judgment and sentence, United
States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2006), and the United States Supreme
Court denied Banks‟ petition for certiorari, Banks v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 424 (2006).
On December 15, 2009, Banks filed a motion asking the District Court to modify
his financial obligations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d). Banks claimed that he was no
longer able to pay the special assessment or restitution because he does not earn sufficient
income in prison, and asked the Court to “set a payment schedule of $0.00 per month.”
(Supplemental Appendix “SA” at 1.) The government opposed the motion on the
grounds that: (1) the District Court lacked authority under section 3572(d) to modify the
special assessment or restitution; and (2) even if it did have authority to do so,
modification was not warranted under the “economic hardship” provision of § 3572(d).
The District Court denied the motion, agreeing with the government that it lacked
authority to modify the special assessment or restitution order imposed as a part of the
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judgment in his case. The Court further noted that even if it had jurisdiction to modify
the assessment, it would deny the motion because Banks‟ alleged change in economic
circumstances was self-induced. Banks filed a timely appeal.
II.
We have jurisdiction to review the District Court‟s order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291.1 We may affirm the District Court on grounds other than those relied on by the
District Court. Kabakjian v. United States, 267 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2001).
Banks argues that the District Court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction
to modify the order of restitution or special assessment imposed in his case. Indeed, a
court has jurisdiction to modify a payment schedule if there has been “any material
change in the defendant‟s economic circumstances that might affect the defendant‟s
ability to pay restitution.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k); United States v. Jaffe, 417 F.3d 259, 267
(2d Cir. 2005) (district court retains jurisdiction to amend or adjust restitution order if
there is any material change in defendant‟s economic circumstances).2
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We do not have jurisdiction, however, to review the District Court‟s Order denying
Banks‟ motion for reconsideration, which he filed in the District Court
contemporaneously with his notice of appeal, because Banks did not file a notice of
appeal from that Order.
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Banks cited 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(3) as authority for allowing the court to adjust the
payment schedule. While, as Appellee points out, that provision refers to a “fine,” and
Banks was seeking modification of an order of restitution, “the [Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act] provides that „all provisions of [§ 3664(m)(1)(A)] are available to the
United States for the enforcement of an order of restitution,‟ 18 U.S.C. § 3613(f), and §
3664(m)(1)(A) provides that an order of restitution may be enforced in the same manner
as a fine.” United States v. Hyde, 497 F.3d 103, 108 n.9 (1st Cir. 2007). However, as
section 3664(k) refers specifically to modification of a restitution order, the District Court
could have construed Banks‟ motion as seeking relief pursuant to that section.
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Here, although the District Court may have erred by failing to recognize that it
potentially had jurisdiction to entertain Banks‟ motion, any error is without consequence,
as Banks failed to show that there had been a “material change” in his “economic
circumstances.” As the District Court noted, at the time that Banks filed his motion in
December 2009, he held a prison job. (SA at 41.) At that time, Banks had not received
income since September 2009, however, because he had not been reporting to work. (Id.)
Because Banks has not provided any records contradicting the information provided by
the Bureau of Prisons, we agree with the District Court that any change in Banks‟
economic circumstances was self-induced and hardly constitutes a material change in
economic circumstances.
To the extent that Banks also attempted to challenge in the District Court the
overall validity of the District Court‟s restitution order, the limited jurisdiction conferred
by section 3664(k) does not encompass an attack on the overall validity of a restitution
order. Cf. Matheny v. Morrison, 307 F.3d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 2002) (a motion to suspend
the payment of a fine is not the “proper vehicle” for bringing such a claim).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment.
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