IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-10434
(Summary Calendar)
SONYA LASHAWN CHAPMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WAYNE SCOTT, Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice -
Institutional Division, ET AL.,
Defendants,
WAYNE SCOTT, Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice -
Institutional Division; R. THOMAS,
Assistant Warden; A. COLLINS,
Correctional Officer III; MCDUFFY,
Captain,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
2:98-CV-333
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August 17, 2000
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Sonya Lashawn Chapman, Texas prisoner #
544798, argues that the district court erred in dismissing some of
her claims made in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint as frivolous or for
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Chapman
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
argues that she was demoted to a lower classification status and
was placed in close custody as the result of being charged with
three unwarranted major disciplinary violations. Chapman further
contends that Director Scott and Warden Thomas acted with
deliberate indifference to the excessive penalties imposed by
denying her grievances and ignoring her written complaints.
Chapman also asserts that the district court erred in denying her
claims of retaliation and conspiracy based on her allegations being
vague and conclusional.
We review dismissals based on frivolousness for an abuse of
discretion. We conduct a de novo review of a decision to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. See Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211,
213 (5th Cir. 1998); Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 274 (5th
Cir. 1998).
It is not clear whether Chapman lost any good-time credits as
a direct result of the disciplinary action taken against her.
Even assuming that she lost good time, however, she is not entitled
to seek damages under § 1983 until she has shown that her
conviction in the disciplinary proceeding has been expunged,
reversed, or otherwise set aside. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.
641, 648 (1997).
Chapman’s allegation that she was denied due process in
connection with the disciplinary proceedings fails to support an
arguable constitutional claim. Placement of a prisoner in close
custody is not an atypical or significant hardship when considered
in relation to the normal incidents of prison life and thus does
2
not implicate a liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 484 (1995). Consequently, such placement does not give rise
to protection by the Due Process Clause. Neither does Chapman have
a protected liberty or property interest in her custodial
classification. See Wilson v. Budney, 976 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir.
1992).
Chapman’s complaints about the outcome of the grievance
proceedings do not implicate the Constitution. See Martinez v.
Griffin, 840 F.2d 314, 315 (5th Cir. 1988). Insofar as she alleges
that the supervisory officials acted with deliberate indifference
to the imposition of an excessive penalty, Chapman has failed to
allege an arguable Eighth Amendment claim because she has not
asserted that the conditions in close custody deprived her of
life’s basic necessities. See Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716,
719-20 (1999).
Neither has Chapman proffered an arguable claim of
retaliation, because she failed to allege a chronology of events
giving rise to an inference that disciplinary charges were filed
against her in retaliation for her exercising a constitutional
right. See Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1995).
Chapman’s allegations of a conspiracy are conclusional and do not
give rise to an inference that the defendants had agreed to punish
Chapman unlawfully. See Russell v. Millsap, 781 F.2d 381, 383 (5th
Cir. 1985).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion or err in
dismissing Chapman’s complaints either as frivolous or for failure
to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
Chapman’s argument that the case must be remanded to the
district court for the entry of a judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 54(b) or 58 is frivolous. This case is in the proper procedural
status for review. See Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d
452, 467 (5th Cir. 1999).
Affirmed.
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Chapman v. Scott
Combined Opinion