FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 8, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 11-2054
(D.C. No. 1:08-CR-02717-BB-1)
JOSHUA SANDOVAL, (D. N.M.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, MURPHY, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
In December 2009, defendant Joshua Sandoval entered a guilty plea
pursuant to a written plea agreement to two counts of a four-count indictment:
attempted carjacking, and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
violence. The district court determined the guideline sentencing range was 188 to
235 months in prison, but imposed a sentence of only 168 months (14 years) in
*
This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2);
10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral
argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
10th Cir. R. 32.1.
accordance with the parties’ agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. As part of his plea agreement, defendant waived his
right to appeal his “convictions and any sentence . . . within the statutory
maximum authorized by law and imposed in conformity with this plea
agreement.” Plea Agrmt. at 6, ¶ 12. When defendant filed this appeal, the
government moved to enforce the appeal waiver and dismiss the appeal. See
United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1328 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per
curiam).
In determining whether to dismiss an appeal based on a waiver of appellate
rights, we consider “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the
waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in
a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 1325. Defendant’s docketing statement identifies
the sole issue on appeal as whether the district court erred in denying his June
2010 motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In his response to the government’s
motion to enforce, defendant does not deny that this issue is an attack on his
conviction, see United States v. Leon, 476 F.3d 829, 832 (10th Cir. 2007), and
therefore is within the scope of the appeal waiver.
Defendant does argue, however, that his appeal waiver was not knowing
because the district court failed to conduct a proper inquiry under Rule 11. To
determine whether an appeal waiver is knowing and voluntary, we look to two
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sources in particular: (1) the language of the plea agreement, and (2) the Rule 11
colloquy. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. The government admits that the plea colloquy
did not comply with Rule 11(b)(1)(N), which requires the district court to “inform
the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands . . . the terms of
any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack
the sentence.” Although the district court discussed other aspects of the plea
agreement with defendant, it did not discuss the waiver of appellate rights. The
district court’s failure to discuss the waiver does not necessarily mean the waiver
was not knowing and voluntary and is not enforceable, however.
Defendant did not raise this Rule 11 error in the district court, 1 so we
review it only for plain error. See United States v. Edgar, 348 F.3d 867, 871
(10th Cir. 2003). Plain error occurs when: (1) there is an error; (2) that is plain;
(3) that affects the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding. Id. Defendant
bears the burden to establish all four elements. See United States v. Dominguez
Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004). Defendant can satisfy the first two elements
because the district court’s failure to comply with Rule 11(b)(1)(N) was error and
it was plain. See Edgar, 348 F.3d at 871-72. To satisfy the third element,
defendant must show that his substantial rights were affected by the error, which
1
Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, filed six months after he
entered his plea, did not mention the district court’s failure to advise him about
the appeal waiver or otherwise challenge the waiver.
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in this case means that “he would not have pleaded guilty if the district court had
complied with Rule 11(b)(1)(N),” id. at 872.
“We may consult the whole record when considering the effect of any error
on substantial rights.” Id. The record here contains substantial evidence that
defendant’s waiver was knowing. The waiver of appellate rights is contained in a
paragraph of the plea agreement separately entitled “WAIVER OF APPEAL
RIGHTS.” Plea Agrmt. at 6, ¶ 12 (additional font attributes omitted) . It recites
that “Defendant is aware that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742 afford a
Defendant the right to appeal a conviction and the sentence imposed” and
“[a]cknowledging that, the Defendant knowingly waives the right to appeal.” Id.
Another paragraph of the plea agreement, entitled “VOLUNTARY PLEA,”
recites:
The Defendant agrees and represents that this plea of guilty is
freely and voluntarily made and is not the result of force, threats, or
promises (other than the promises set forth in this agreement). There
have been no promises from anyone as to what sentence the Court
will impose. The Defendant also represents that the Defendant is
pleading guilty because the Defendant is in fact guilty.
Id. at 7, ¶ 15 (additional font attributes omitted). Immediately above defendant’s
signature, the agreement reads: “I have read this agreement and carefully
reviewed every part of it with my attorney. I understand the agreement and
voluntarily sign it.” Id. at 8.
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At the change of plea hearing, the district court engaged in a colloquy with
defendant about his understanding of the plea agreement and the rights he was
waiving if he pled guilty. The court ascertained that defendant was competent to
enter a guilty plea and advised defendant that he was under oath and could be
charged with perjury if he did not answer the court’s questions truthfully.
Tr. Plea Hr’g at 3-4. In response to the court’s questions, defendant said he had
adequate time to discuss the case with his lawyer, he understood the charges
against him, and he had no questions about them. Id. at 4. He further stated he
read the plea agreement before he signed it, he talked it over with his lawyer, and
he understood it. Id. at 5-6. Defendant said no one had threatened him or tried to
force him to plead guilty and no promises had been made to him other than those
set forth in the plea agreement. Id. at 8. And defendant verified that the
signature on the plea agreement was his own. Id. at 5.
Despite this evidence that he read and understood the plea agreement and
executed it knowingly and voluntarily, defendant contends the waiver of appellate
rights within the plea agreement is unenforceable because the district court did
not discuss the waiver with him and ascertain that he understood it. Notably,
defendant does not contend that the waiver was not in fact knowing and
voluntary, just that the district court failed to address it in the plea colloquy.
Defendant “has the burden to present evidence from the record establishing that
he did not understand the waiver,” however, and “[a] mere silent record does not
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satisfy this burden.” Edgar, 348 F.3d at 872-73. Looking at the record as a
whole, we conclude defendant has not met his burden of showing his appeal
waiver was not knowing and voluntary.
Having determined that defendant’s appeal falls within the scope of his
waiver of appellate rights and that the waiver was knowing and voluntary, we
must consider one final matter: whether our enforcement of the waiver would
result in a miscarriage of justice. See Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. Enforcing a
waiver of appellate rights will result in a miscarriage of justice only when (1) “the
district court relied on an impermissible factor such as race”; (2) “ineffective
assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the
waiver invalid”; (3) “the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum”; or (4) “the
waiver is otherwise unlawful.” Id. at 1327 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“To be ‘otherwise unlawful,’ [d]efendant’s waiver must embody an error that
‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
proceedings,’ as per United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 . . . (1993).”
United States v. Ibarra-Coronel, 517 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2008). It matters
not whether some other aspect of the proceeding involved legal error, only
whether the waiver itself is otherwise unlawful. United States v. Shockey,
538 F.3d 1355, 1357 (10th Cir. 2008).
Defendant bears the burden of establishing that enforcement of the waiver
would result in a miscarriage of justice. United States v. Anderson, 374 F.3d 955,
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959 (10th Cir. 2004). He contends it would be a miscarriage of justice to enforce
the waiver because he is factually innocent “and revocation of his plea agreement
is the only way that will ever be shown.” Def. Resp. to Mot. to Enforce at 4.
While under oath during the plea colloquy, defendant told the district court
he did not make any claim that he was innocent of either the carjacking or the
firearms charge and he agreed the government could prove a factual basis to
support each charge. Tr. of Plea Hr’g at 11. When asked, defendant’s counsel
stated that, based on his investigation, he believed “the Government would have
competent, admissible evidence on every element of the counts; that the
Government’s case would survive a motion for judgment of acquittal, and would
be affirmed on appeal for sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 9-10.
Defendant was appointed new counsel after he moved to withdraw his
guilty plea, and at the hearing on that motion, his new counsel informed the court
that defendant knew the terms of the plea agreement and had discussed it with his
former attorney before entering his guilty plea. Tr. of Hr’g on Jan. 20, 2011, at 5,
6. Nonetheless, counsel explained, defendant contended he was actually innocent
of attempted carjacking, he did not want to serve time for a crime he did not
commit, and he signed the plea agreement and entered a guilty plea because the
government said its offer of a 14-year sentence was the best he would get and if
he did not accept it, the government would withdraw the offer and go to trial,
which would expose defendant to a possible sentence of 30 years to life. Id. at 3,
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4-5, 7-8; see also id. at 14-18 (testimony from former defense counsel discussing
extended plea negotiations, defendant’s unhappiness with length of proposed
sentence, and government’s indication that it would not offer less than 14-year
sentence and would withdraw that offer if defendant did not accept it in a timely
fashion).
None of the foregoing suggests that defendant’s waiver of his appellate
rights is undercut by an error that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings. Defendant has not met his burden of
showing that it would be a miscarriage of justice to enforce the appeal waiver.
This appeal is within the scope of defendant’s waiver of his appellate
rights, defendant waived those rights knowingly and voluntarily, and enforcing
the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. We therefore grant the
government’s motion to enforce defendant’s waiver of his appellate rights and
dismiss the appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
PER CURIAM
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