UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4579
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ARTEMIO AGUILAR, a/k/a Multa, a/k/a Antonio Mota, a/k/a
Andres Olivares Amaro,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:08-cr-00151-WO-1)
Submitted: June 1, 2011 Decided: June 8, 2011
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Rafael Rodriguez, Miami, Florida, for Appellant. Randall
Stuart Galyon, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Artemio Aguilar pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846
(2006). The district court sentenced Aguilar to 360 months of
imprisonment and he now appeals. Appellate counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
questioning whether the district court fully complied with Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11 and whether the sentence is reasonable. Aguilar
was informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief
but has not done so. Finding no error, we affirm.
Counsel first questions whether the district court
conducted a complete Rule 11 colloquy. Prior to accepting a
guilty plea, a trial court, through colloquy with the defendant,
must inform the defendant of, and determine that he understands,
the nature of the charges to which the plea is offered, any
mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty he
faces, and the various rights he is relinquishing by pleading
guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The court also must determine
whether there is a factual basis for the plea. Id.; United
States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991). The
purpose of the Rule 11 colloquy is to ensure that the plea of
guilt is entered into knowingly and voluntarily. See United
States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58 (2002). Our review of the
record reveals that the district court fully complied with the
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requirements of Rule 11. We therefore conclude that Aguilar’s
guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.
Counsel next questions whether the sentence is
reasonable. We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying
an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d
330, 335 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 290 (2009). In
doing so, we examine the sentence for “significant procedural
error,” including “failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)
[(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. “If the district court
decides to impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range, it
must ensure that its justification supports ‘the degree of the
variance’. . . .” United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161
(4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). Finally, we
then “‘consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence
imposed.’” Id. (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the
sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The
district court properly calculated the advisory Guidelines
range, considered the statutory factors, responded to the
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parties’ arguments at sentencing, and thoroughly explained the
chosen sentence. See United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330
(4th Cir. 2009) (district court must conduct individualized
assessment based on the particular facts of each case, whether
sentence is above, below, or within the Guidelines range).
Moreover, the variant sentence below the advisory Guidelines
range is also substantively reasonable.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with
the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues
for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. This court requires that counsel inform Aguilar, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Aguilar requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Aguilar. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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