United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
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No. 10-1734
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United States of America, *
*
Appellee, *
* Appeal from the United States
v. * District Court for the
* Western District of Missouri.
Michael Wigren, *
*
Appellant. *
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Submitted: January 12, 2011
Filed: June 9, 2011
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Before COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
Michael Wigren appeals from the district court’s1 order civilly committing him
to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 4246. The district court found that Wigren suffers from a mental disease or defect,
that his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or
serious damage to the property of another, and that a suitable state placement was not
available. Wigren asserts that the government violated his right to due process,
1
The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western
District of Missouri.
because it submitted to the district court an unsubstantiated certification that a suitable
state placement was unavailable. He also argues that the court erred in finding that
such a placement was not available. We affirm.
I.
On April 28, 2008, the District Court for the Eastern District of Washington
found Wigren incompetent to stand trial for the charge of threatening a federal
official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). The district court committed him
to the custody of the Attorney General for further mental health evaluations under 18
U.S.C. § 4246. The government transferred Wigren to the United States Medical
Center for Federal Prisoners (“MCFP”), located in Springfield, Missouri.
On June 5, 2009, the government filed a petition to determine whether Wigren
should be civilly committed under 18 U.S.C. § 4246. The petition included the
requisite certifications by the director of MCFP (the “warden”) that Wigren had a
mental health disease that rendered him substantially dangerous to the public, and that
suitable arrangements for state custody and care over Wigren were not available. On
or about the same day that the government filed its petition, a staff member at MCFP
sent a letter and referral packet to the State of Washington, inquiring whether the State
would be willing to accept Wigren for care, custody, and treatment in the state
hospital system. On July 18, 2009, the staff member received a letter from the State
stating that it was unable to accept Wigren.
A magistrate judge held a hearing on the government’s petition, and
subsequently recommended Wigren’s commitment. After considering objections to
the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court found by clear and
convincing evidence that Wigren suffers from a mental disease or defect, that his
unconditional release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person
or serious damage to the property of another, and that state placement was
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unavailable. Accordingly, the court ordered Wigren’s civil commitment pursuant to
§ 4246.
II.
The Insanity Defense Reform Act (“IDRA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247, sets
forth procedures for involuntary civil commitment of federal detainees. The warden
is responsible for commencing proceedings under § 4246. The statute provides for
commitment of detainees who are due for release, but who present a danger to society
as a result of mental illness. Pursuant to § 4246(a):
If the director of a facility in which a person is hospitalized certifies that
a person . . . is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a
result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury
to another person or serious damage to property of another, and that
suitable arrangements for State custody and care of the person are not
available, he shall transmit the certificate to the clerk of the court for the
district in which the person is confined.
The filing of the certificate stays the release of a person pending the completion of the
procedures set forth in §§ 4246 and 4247. 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a).
Upon receipt of the certificate, the district court must hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether clear and convincing evidence establishes “that the
person is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his
release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious
damage to property of another.” Id. § 4246(a), (d). If the court makes the requisite
findings, it must commit the person to the custody of the Attorney General for
treatment and care. Id. § 4246(d). The Attorney General is required to release the
person to the State in which he is domiciled or was tried, if the State is willing to
assume responsibility for the person’s custody, care, and treatment. Id. If the State
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will not accept the person despite all reasonable efforts of the Attorney General, then
the Attorney General must “continue periodically to exert all reasonable efforts to
cause . . . a State to assume . . . responsibility for the person’s custody, care, and
treatment.” Id.
Wigren does not contest the district court’s findings that he presently suffers
from a mental disease as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk
of injury or property damage. Rather, Wigren argues the warden’s “unsubstantiated”
certification that no suitable state placement was available violated the IDRA, and
thus violated his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment. He also asserts that
the district court erred in finding after a hearing that a suitable state placement was not
available.
As Wigren presents his constitutional claim, it depends entirely on his assertion
that the warden’s certification did not comply with the statute, and on his assumption
that a violation of the statute amounts to a violation of the Due Process Clause. We
reject this claim, because the government did comply with the statute. To stay a
person’s release and trigger a hearing on civil commitment, the IDRA requires only
that the warden certify that “suitable arrangements for State custody and care of the
person are not available.” The warden here certified as follows: “[W]e believe that
suitable arrangements for state custody and care over inmate Wigren are not currently
available.” The certificate was sufficient on its face, and facial sufficiency is all the
statute requires. Cf. United States v. Belknap, 26 F. App’x 600, 601 (8th Cir. 2002)
(per curiam). The IDRA does not provide for judicial review of the certification, or
establish standards by which a court could determine whether “suitable arrangements
for State custody” are available. Cf. United States v. Vancier, 515 F.2d 1378, 1380-81
(2d Cir. 1975) (holding that judicial review is not available of the government’s
certification under 18 U.S.C. § 5032 – as required to initiate a juvenile delinquency
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proceeding – that, inter alia, an “appropriate court of a State . . . does not have
available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles”).2
Wigren also contends that the district court erred in finding after a hearing that
the government established, by clear and convincing evidence, that suitable
arrangements for state custody and care were not available. Although some of our
cases have assumed in dicta that the court must make such a finding before ordering
commitment of a person, e.g., United States v. LeClair, 338 F.3d 882, 884 (8th Cir.
2003); United States v. Ecker, 30 F.3d 966, 970 (8th Cir. 1994), we conclude that the
statute does not require it. There is thus no need to review the district court’s
determination about the availability of arrangements for placing Wigren in state
custody.
The statute is clear about what is required of the court after a hearing under
§ 4246. The court must commit the person to the custody of the Attorney General if
“the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that [1] the person is presently
suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which [2] his release would
create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to
property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d). The statute requires an initial certification
by the warden about the availability of state custody, but does not call for the
government to present evidence on that matter, or for the court to make a
determination about it. See United States v. Thompson, 45 F. App’x 4, 4-5 (1st Cir.
2
Insofar as a substantial showing of unconstitutional motive might permit
judicial review of a certification, cf. United States v. Moeller, 383 F.3d 710, 712 (8th
Cir. 2004); United States v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474, 1478 (11th Cir. 1984), Wigren has
not made such a showing. The alleged failure by the warden to carry out formal
efforts to place Wigren in state custody before making the certification does not show
that his certified “belie[f]” in the unavailability of suitable arrangements was irrational
or otherwise based on an unconstitutional motive. And it is undisputed that the
warden undertook formal communications with the State of Washington well in
advance of the civil commitment hearing.
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2002) (per curiam). Rather, if the person is committed after a hearing based on
evidence of mental disease and dangerousness, the statute places responsibility on the
Attorney General to release the person to the State where the person is domiciled or
was tried, or periodically to “exert all reasonable efforts to cause such a State to
assume . . . responsibility.” 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d). Congress presumably thought the
States should bear responsibility for the care of mentally ill persons from their
jurisdictions, see S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 208 (1984), and the IDRA
thus imposes a duty on the Attorney General to pursue state placement. But the
statute does not endow the committed person with a judicially-enforceable “right” to
state custody that must be adjudicated at the hearing. See United States v. Ecker, 78
F.3d 726, 731 (1st Cir. 1996).
* * *
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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