In Re Hearst Newspapers, LLC

REVISED JUNE 9, 2011
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED
May 17, 2011

No. 10-40221 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk

HEARST NEWSPAPERS, L.L.C., doing business as
Houston Chronicle,

Intervenor Plaintiff - Appellant

_____________________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee
v.

OZIEL CARDENAS-GUILLEN,

Defendant - Appellee

v.

HEARST NEWSPAPERS, L.L.C., doing business as Houston Chronicle,

Intervenor - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas

Before BARKSDALE, DENNIS, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
DENNIS, Circuit Judge:
 No. 10-40221

This case involves a district court’s order to close the sentencing
proceeding of a drug cartel leader without first giving the press and public notice
and an opportunity to be heard regarding the decision to close the hearing. We
conclude that the press and public have a First Amendment right of access to
sentencing hearings, and that the district court should have given the press and
public notice and an opportunity to be heard before closing the sentencing
proceeding in this case.
BACKGROUND
Oziel Cardenas-Guillen, the former leader of the Gulf Cartel, a notorious
Mexican drug cartel, was arrested in Mexico in 2003. At the time, according to
the government, Cardenas-Guillen was considered “one of the most wanted,
feared, and violent drug traffickers in the world,” and was “widely believed to be
partly responsible for the ongoing drug trafficking wars and ‘bloodbaths’ along
the Mexican border, resulting in the deaths of approximately 2000 persons.”
Even while incarcerated in Mexico, he “reportedly continued to coordinate the
activities of his organization from jail.”
In 2007, the United States took custody of Cardenas-Guillen. He was
charged, inter alia, with involvement in conspiracies to distribute large
quantities of marijuana and cocaine, violating the continuing-criminal-enterprise
statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (also known as the “drug kingpin statute”), and
threatening federal officers. The case was assigned to a district court in the
Brownsville Division of the Southern District of Texas.
The government moved to transfer the venue for the criminal trial from
Brownsville, Texas, to another location. Among other reasons, the government
cited concerns about being able to ensure the security of personnel and civilians,
due to the proximity of Brownsville to the Mexican border. The government
enclosed a letter from the United States Marshals Service explaining that
Houston would be the best venue for holding the trial. Cardenas-Guillen did not

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oppose the motion, and the district court granted the transfer motion, directing
that the case be transferred to Houston. The case proceeded slowly, with almost
all of the filings being made under seal. Hearst Newspapers, L.L.C., doing
business as the Houston Chronicle (hereinafter “the Chronicle”), alleges that
many of the filings were sealed without following proper procedures.
On October 30, 2009, the Chronicle sent a letter to the district court,
making several requests. With regard to any future proceedings, the Chronicle
requested that the district court give notice and an opportunity to be heard
before closing such proceedings, and, if the court decided to close a proceeding,
to narrowly tailor such a closure and support its decision with on-the-record
findings. The Chronicle also requested that the court unseal any sealed
documents or make on-the-record findings regarding why those documents
remained under seal, and narrowly tailor any sealing. In response, the district
court ordered the parties to explain why previously sealed documents should
remain under seal. The parties conceded that some documents did not need to
remain sealed, but argued that others should remain under seal until the
conclusion of the case.
On February 9, 2010, the Chronicle moved to intervene and requested that
any uncontested documents be unsealed immediately, that the docket be
updated to provide some indication of documents that had been sealed, that the
government’s sealed memoranda be unsealed at least in redacted form so that
the Chronicle could respond, and that the court narrowly tailor any sealing
through redaction and enter specific findings as to documents that remained
under seal. The Chronicle attached to the motion its letter of October 30, 2009.
At some point, Cardenas-Guillen agreed to plead guilty to the charges against
him, but this fact was not made public. On February 18, 2010, the government
moved to close his sentencing hearing for reasons of public safety, and also
moved to deprive the public of notice that the hearing was taking place. The

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government attached to the motion the supporting affidavit of George Hephner,
the Supervisory Deputy United States Marshal for the Houston Division
Operations Section. The next day, without additional proceedings, the district
court granted the motion in a sealed order. The order expressly stated that it
would not be unsealed until after the sentencing hearing took place. The district
court also sealed the government’s motion.
The court scheduled the sentencing for February 25, 2010. A local
television station received word that the trial of Cardenas-Guillen would occur
on that date and inquired of the court as to whether that information was
correct. After consulting with the United States Marshals Service, the district
court covertly rescheduled the sentencing hearing for February 24, 2010.

During the sentencing hearing on that day, a Chronicle reporter
discovered a closed courtroom where the proceeding was being held and
attempted to gain access. An attorney for the Chronicle joined the reporter and
filed a handwritten motion requesting the district court to open the sentencing
hearing and to give the Chronicle an opportunity to be heard before the closed
hearing was completed. The district court was aware of the Chronicle’s efforts
to access the proceedings and stated during the hearing that “in spite of all the
efforts to ensure that this hearing not be noticed by the media, I am told that
there is a reporter from the Houston Chronicle who is, as I speak, drafting a
motion regarding his request to be heard — or to be present during the — the
hearing.” The district court declined to decide the motion at that time, and
instead continued with the closed sentencing proceeding. Although the
proceeding was sealed, the primary case agents and victims, as well as
Cardenas-Guillen’s wife and daughter, were permitted to be present. Later that
same day, after the sentencing proceeding had been completed, the district court
denied the Chronicle’s motion as moot.

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At the sentencing, the district court accepted Cardenas-Guillen’s guilty
pleas and the plea agreement between him and the government. The court then
sentenced Cardenas-Guillen, in accord with the plea agreement, to (1) 25 years
on one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute both cocaine and
marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A); (2) 5
years each on three counts of threatening to assault and murder federal agents,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 115 and 2; and (3) 20 years on a fifth count for
conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i),(a)(2)(A), and (h). The district court ordered that all the
sentences would run concurrently. The district court also ordered that
Cardenas-Guillen serve supervised release terms of 5 years on the count of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute both cocaine and marijuana, and
3 years as to each of the other four counts, all to run concurrently. Finally, the
district court ordered Cardenas-Guillen to pay a fine of $100,000 and special
assessments totaling $500, and entered a preliminary order of forfeiture of $50
million. The district court also indicated that it would docket the record of the
hearing, which would make public the fact that a sentencing hearing had
occurred, once it was advised by the United States Marshals Service that doing
so would be safe.
The government explains in its brief, and the district court docket
confirms, that “[w]ithin hours of the sentencing hearing, the hearing was
docketed.” Gov. Br. 11. In addition, “the recording of the hearing and the
transcript of the hearing were [made] available to the public . . . .” Id. The
docket also shows that the Chronicle ordered a copy of the transcript, which was
completed on February 25, 2010, the day after the sentencing proceeding.
On February 26, 2010, two days after the sentencing hearing, the
Chronicle filed a second motion to intervene. On that same date, the district
court, inter alia, granted the motion to intervene and denied the Chronicle’s

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request for public notice of all future hearings and for an opportunity to be heard
if closure were contemplated.
On March 2, 2010, the district court issued an order amending its
February 24, 2010 order, to further explain the reasoning of its February 24,
2010 order. It also added that in denying the Chronicle’s motion to open the
sentencing proceeding and to be heard before the closure of the sentencing
proceeding, it had considered the filings submitted by the government, as well
as the Chronicle’s February 9, 2010 motion to intervene.
The Chronicle timely appealed. On appeal, the Chronicle challenges (1)
the district court’s order of February 24, 2010 (as amended by the March 2, 2010
order), denying as moot the Chronicle’s request to open the sentencing
proceeding; (2) the district court’s order of February 24, 2010 (as amended by the
March 2, 2010 order), denying as moot the Chronicle’s request for an opportunity
to be heard prior to closure; and (3) the district court’s order of February 26,
2010, denying the Chronicle’s request for public notice of all future hearings and
an opportunity to be heard if the court intended to close any future proceedings.
The district court designated all three orders as final and immediately
appealable.
We have appellate jurisdiction over the orders under the collateral order
doctrine, which “establishe[s] that certain decisions of the district court are final
in effect although they do not dispose of the litigation.” Davis v. E. Baton Rouge
Parish Sch. Bd., 78 F.3d 920, 925 (5th Cir. 1996); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(establishing the jurisdiction of the courts of appeal over final decisions of
district courts). “Appealable collateral orders include ‘those district court
decisions that are conclusive, that resolve important questions completely
separate from the merits, and that would render such important questions
effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the underlying
action.’” Davis, 78 F.3d at 925 (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct,

6
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Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994)). The orders in this case certainly meet those
criteria. See id. at 926 (“We have previously held on several occasions that
members of the news media, although not parties to litigation, can appeal court
closure orders or confidentiality orders under the collateral order doctrine.”).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal, we are asked to determine whether the press and public have
a First Amendment right of access to sentencing proceedings, and, if so, whether
they are also entitled to receive notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to
closure of sentencing proceedings. “Because this case involves constitutional and
other legal questions, we review the district court’s orders de novo.” United
States v. Brown (In re Times Picayune Publ’g. Corp.), 250 F.3d 907, 913 (5th Cir.
2001). “Specific factual findings of the district court on the issue are, of course,
entitled to review under the clearly erroneous standard.” Id.
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, we conclude that this court has jurisdiction over the
case, because it falls within the exception to mootness for questions that are
capable of repetition, yet evading review. We also conclude that the press and
public, including the Chronicle, have a First Amendment right of access to
sentencing proceedings. Finally, we conclude that the district court deprived the
Chronicle of its First Amendment right of access, without due process, in
refusing to give the press and public notice and an opportunity to be heard
before sealing the sentencing proceeding.

A. Mootness
Despite the fact that Cardenas-Guillen’s sentencing proceeding has
already occurred, it is undisputed that this appeal is not moot. The issues in this
case are not moot because they are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 6 (1986);

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Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 600 (1982); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 563 (1980); United States v.
Edwards, 823 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1987). The issues that arise in this case
are capable of repetition because the Chronicle is a prominent newspaper that
seeks to cover major cases, and it is reasonable to expect that district courts will
close other criminal proceedings to the Chronicle in future cases. See United
States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 554 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[I]t is reasonable to expect
that [Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.], a major newspaper publisher in the
Philadelphia area, will be subjected to similar closure orders entered by the
district courts in this circuit.”). At the same time, these issues often evade
review due to the “short duration” of criminal trials. Richmond Newspapers,
Inc., 448 U.S. at 563.
B. The Chronicle’s First Amendment right of access to the
sentencing proceeding
The first question in this case is whether the press and public, including
the Chronicle, have a First Amendment right of access to a sentencing
proceeding. We conclude that they do. The Supreme Court has developed a
two-part test for determining whether there is a First Amendment right of
access to a particular criminal proceeding: (1) whether the proceeding has
historically been open to the public and press; and (2) “whether public access
plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in
question.” Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8-9; see also Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Super. Ct. (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 505-09 (1984). This test has been
referred to as the “experience” and “logic” test. See Globe Newspaper Co., 457
U.S. at 606 (explaining that “the institutional value of the open criminal trial
is recognized in both logic and experience”); see also Press-Enterprise II, 478
U.S. at 9 (summarizing the test as “considerations of experience and logic”).

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In applying this test, the Supreme Court has recognized a First
Amendment right of access to various aspects of a criminal prosecution. See
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 10 (preliminary hearings as conducted in
California); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 505 (jury voir dire); Globe Newspaper
Co., 457 U.S. at 604 (trial); Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 576-77
(trial). The courts of appeals have also recognized a First Amendment right of
access to various proceedings within a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United
States v. Danovaro, 877 F.2d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 1989) (proceeding at which
guilty plea was taken); United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1988)
(plea hearings); In re Knight Publ’g Co., 743 F.2d 231, 233 (4th Cir. 1984)
(trials); United States v. Klepfer (In re Herald Co.), 734 F.2d 93, 99 (2d Cir.
1984) (pretrial hearing on motion to suppress); United States v. Chagra, 701
F.2d 354, 363-64 (5th Cir. 1983) (pretrial bond reduction hearing); United States
v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1167-71 (9th Cir. 1982) (jury voir dire, pretrial
hearing on motion to suppress, and hearing conducted during trial on motion
to suppress); Criden, 675 F.2d at 557 (pretrial suppression, due process, and
entrapment hearings). But see Edwards, 823 F.2d at 116-17 (First Amendment
right of access does not attach to mid-trial questioning of jurors about potential
misconduct).1
Although neither the Supreme Court nor this court has specifically
considered whether the First Amendment applies to a sentencing hearing, the
Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have done so, and each has

1
A sentencing hearing is distinguishable from mid-trial questioning of jurors regarding
potential juror misconduct, which was the proceeding at issue in Edwards. The Edwards court
noted that such proceedings were not traditionally open to the public, and were within the trial
court’s discretion to make private because of the possibility of alienating jurors from counsel
and dividing jurors against each other. 823 F.2d at 116-17. In contrast, as we explain below,
sentencing hearings have been historically open to the press and public. Moreover, the
functional concerns raised in Edwards are inapplicable in a sentencing hearing, especially
because there is no jury.

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 No. 10-40221

concluded that it does. United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 196-99 (2d Cir.
2005); United States v. Eppinger, 49 F.3d 1244, 1252-53 (7th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Soussoudis (In re Washington Post Co.), 807 F.2d 383, 389 (4th Cir.
1986) (plea hearings and sentencing proceedings); CBS, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct.,
765 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The primary justifications for access to
criminal proceedings . . . apply with as much force to post-conviction
proceedings as to the trial itself.”).2 Relatedly, courts of appeals have also
recognized a First Amendment right of access to documents filed for use in
sentencing proceedings. Washington Post v. Robinson (Robinson), 935 F.2d 282,
288 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (plea agreements); Oregonian Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct.,
920 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1990) (plea agreements and related documents);
Haller, 837 F.2d at 86 (plea agreements); CBS, Inc., 765 F.2d at 824-25
(defendant’s motion to reduce sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 35 and government’s response); United States v. Santarelli, 729 F.2d
1388, 1390 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he public has a First Amendment right to see
and hear that which is admitted in evidence in a public sentencing hearing.”).
We conclude, as have the other courts that have considered this question,
that the public and press have a First Amendment right of access to sentencing
proceedings. Indeed, we agree with the Second and Fourth Circuits that the
Supreme Court’s holdings in Globe Newspaper Co. and Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. that there is a First Amendment right of access to a trial should, logically,
already encompass sentencing hearings:
Sentencing may . . . be viewed as within the scope of the criminal
trial itself. Sentencing can occur before the termination of the trial
proceeding, and, even if it occurs in a separate hearing, it clearly

2
See also United States v. Santarelli, 729 F.2d 1388, 1390 (11th Cir. 1984) (explaining
that if an ambiguous district court order were “construed as being tantamount to closing the
sentencing hearing,” the order “could well run counter to the constitutional rule of open judicial
proceedings,” but declining to construe the order in that manner).

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 No. 10-40221

amounts to the culmination of the trial. Moreover, even if
. . . sentencing hearings are not considered a part of the trial itself,
they are surely as much an integral part of a criminal prosecution
as are preliminary probable-cause hearings, suppression hearings,
or bail hearings, all of which have been held to be subject to the
public’s First Amendment right of access.
Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 196-97 (quoting In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d at
389) (quotation marks omitted)). The First Amendment right of access to a
sentencing proceeding is especially salient in this case, where, as in the vast
majority of criminal cases, there was no trial, but only a guilty plea. Id. at 199
(“It makes little sense to recognize a right of public access to criminal courts and
then limit that right to the trial phase of a criminal proceeding, something that
occurs in only a small fraction of criminal cases.” (quoting In re Herald Co., 734
F.2d at 98 (quotation marks omitted)).).
Moreover, applying the experience and logic test set out by the Supreme
Court confirms that the public and press have a First Amendment right of
access to sentencing proceedings. First, sentencing proceedings have
historically been open to the press and public. Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 197 n.7
(listing numerous cases from the nineteenth century “describ[ing] sentencing
proceedings held in open court” and citing secondary sources to explain that
“[h]istorically, [s]entences were often imposed immediately after the jury
returned a guilty verdict in open court”); In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d
at 389 (“Sentencings have historically been open to the public . . . .”). As the
Chronicle points out, “the United States has a rich and proud tradition of
conducting public criminal trials and sentencing proceedings.” These include
numerous high profile cases of defendants who were considered dangerous3: the
open trial and sentencing proceeding held in the Southern District of Texas

3
We take judicial notice of these examples pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b),
as these are facts that are “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”

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(Houston) for Juan Garcia Abrego, who was a predecessor of Cardenas-Guillen4
as the leader of the Gulf Cartel;5 the open sentencing held in the Southern
District of New York for Jorge Mario Paredes-Cordova,6 who was “designated
by the United States Department of Justice as one of the world’s most
significant drug kingpins”;7 the open sentencing proceeding held in the Eastern
District of Virginia for Zacarias Moussaoui, for his participation in the attacks
of September 11, 2001;8 the open sentencing proceeding held in the Southern
District of New York for Mohamed al-‘Owhali, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed,

4
Narcotics Rewards Program: Antonio Ezequiel Cardenas-Guillen, Bureau of Int’l
Narcotics & Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/narc/
rewards/123682.htm (last visited April 27, 2011) (“Following [Garcia Abrego’s] 1996 arrest by
Mexican authorities and subsequent deportation to the United States, Oscar Malherbe-De
Leon took control of the cartel until his arrest a short time later. He was replaced by Osiel
Cardenas-Guillen, who was arrested in 2003, and extradited to the United States in 2007.”).
5
U.S. Jury Convicts Mexican on Drug Charges, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1996, available at
1996 WLNR 4331922 (“As the verdict was read, Mr. Garcia Abrego, 52, sat impassively, as he
had throughout the four-week trial.”); L.A. Times, Texas-born Drug Lord Gets 11 Life Terms
for Smuggling; Criminal also Must Pay $128 Million in Fines, Baltimore Sun, Feb. 1, 1997,
available at 1997 WLNR 1084726 (“U.S. District Judge Ewing Werlein sentenced Garcia
Abrego, who stood with hands clasped, wearing interpreter’s headphones . . . .”).
6
Bruce Golding, Guatemalan Drug Kingpin Cries after Getting 31 Years in the Slammer,
N.Y. Post, Apr. 16, 2010, available at http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/manhat
tan/guatemalan/drug_kingpin_cries_after_Mb7qndOT8kdColDpvObzHI (“Jorge ‘Gordo’
Paredes-Cordova — whose nickname means “Fatso’ in English — shuddered, shook his head
and grabbed a tissue to wipe tears from his eyes after hearing the hefty sentence imposed.”).
7
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Manhattan Federal Jury Finds Cocaine Kingpin
Guilty on Narcotics Importation and Distribution Charges (Nov. 6, 2009) available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/November09/paredescordovajorgemarioverdi
ctpr.pdf.
8
First U.S. Trial of 9/11 Case Was Full of Surprises, Associated Press, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34001021/ns/us_news-security/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2011)
(describing six-week sentencing trial, including Moussaoui’s demeanor and occasional
outbursts, and quoting the lead prosecutor: “A valuable part of the Moussaoui trial was that
we got an unvarnished, public view of this guy . . . of what we’re up against.” (alterations in
original)); Neil A. Lewis, One Last Appearance, and Outburst, From Moussaoui, N.Y. Times,
May 5, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 7711531 (“Judge Brinkema was clearly angered that
when the jury spared Mr. Moussaoui's life on Wednesday, he exulted, ‘America, you lost,’ and
said he had won.”).

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Mohamed Odeh and Wadih el-Hage, for their roles in the 1998 bomb attacks on
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania;9 the open trial and sentencing
proceeding held in the Southern District of New York for Ramzi Yousef, for his
role in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center;10 the open trial held in the
Northern District of Illinois for Al Capone;11 the open sentencing proceeding
held in the Eastern District of New York for John Gotti;12 and the open trial and
sentencing of Timothy McVeigh for his role in the 1995 bombing of the Alfred
P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.13

9
Elizabeth Neuffer, Four Get Life for Embassy Attacks, Boston Globe, Oct. 19, 2001,
available at 2001 WLNR 2230485 (“In a session fraught with emotion — and carried out
under heightened security — Judge Leonard Sands levied the same stiff sentences on all men
although two had been eligible for shorter terms. . . . [T]he shadow of the [September 11, 2001]
terrorist attack on New York and Washington . . . hung over the court session, both literally
and figuratively. The courthouse was wreathed in the acrid stench still emanating from ground
zero. Gun-toting US marshals with bomb-sniffing dogs, signs of New York’s increased security
awareness, stood watch on the courthouse steps.”).
10
See Benjamin Weiser, Mastermind Gets Life for Bombing of Trade Center, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 9, 1998, available at 1998 WLNR 2795240 (“Mr. Yousef wore a dark gray suit and a new
growth of beard. He strode to the lectern when offered a chance to speak by the judge, and
began to attack the United States and Israel, the peace process in the Middle East and the
‘Jewish lobby,’ which he said paid bribes to American officials to win their influence.”).
11
See Meyer Berger, Capone Convicted of Dodging Taxes; May Get 17 Years, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 17, 1931, available at http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/
1017.html (describing Capone’s demeanor after the jury went to deliberate: “Capone, looking
like a head barber off to meet his best girl, stood in the corridor after the jury went out. He was
smiling, but the smile seemed the equivalent of the quavery music of the whistler passing the
graveyard,” as well as Capone’s demeanor upon hearing the jury verdict: “He kept grinning at
all and sundry in the court room, his bulky figure in a screaming green suit (one of the $135
ones) drawing all eyes toward him.”).
12
See Arnold H. Lubasch, Gotti Sentenced to Life in Prison Without the Possibility of
Parole, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1992, available at 1992 WLNR 3331979 (“Judge I. Leo Glasser
sentenced the convicted boss of the Gambino crime family in a courtroom so packed that James
M. Fox, the head of the New York office of the F.B.I., was wedged next to Joseph DeCicco, a
reputed Gambino associate.”).
13
See Michael Fleeman, McVeigh Team Rips Witness, Rests Case, New Orleans Times
Picayune, May 29, 1997, available at 1997 WLNR 1109708 (“After the last piece of defense
evidence was introduced, McVeigh whispered to [one of his attorneys], then sat cross-legged
at the defense table, his hands tightly clasped in front of his chin.”); Peter G. Chronis and

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Second, public access plays a “significant positive role,” Press-Enterprise
II, 478 U.S. at 8-9, in a sentencing hearing. In particular, the Supreme Court
has recognized several interrelated ways in which openness is beneficial in a
criminal trial. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 593-97. The
recognized benefits of having open trials also apply in the context of sentencing
proceedings.
To begin with,“[t]he knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to
contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint
on possible abuse of judicial power . . . .” Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S.
at 596 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948)) (quotation marks
omitted); see also Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606 (“[I]n the broadest
terms, public access to criminal trials permits the public to participate in and
serve as a check upon the judicial process — an essential component in our
structure of self-government.”). The need for such a restraint is also present in
the sentencing context. “The presence of the public operates to check any
temptation that might be felt by either the prosecutor or the court . . . to seek
or impose an arbitrary or disproportionate sentence.” In re Washington Post
Co., 807 F.2d at 389. Indeed, the fact that there is no jury at the sentencing
proceeding, in contrast to jury trials, heightens the need for public access. Cf.
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 12-13 (“[T]he absence of a jury, long recognized
as ‘an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge,’ . . . makes the importance of

Howard Pankratz, Tearful Parents Beg for Son’s Life as Timothy McVeigh’s Fate Goes to Jury
Today, The Denver Post, June 12, 1997, available at 1997 WLNR 542338 (describing “tearful
pleas from [McVeigh’s] parents to spare him” from the death penalty, and adding that “[a]s [his
mother] choked back tears, McVeigh looked flushed, clasping his hands tightly together against
the lower part of his face.”).

.

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 No. 10-40221

public access to a preliminary hearing even more significant.” (quoting Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).).
Relatedly, openness in a trial builds public confidence in the criminal
justice system because members of the public can observe whether justice is
being carried out in adjudicating guilt or innocence. Richmond Newspapers,
Inc., 448 U.S. at 595 (“Open trials assure the public that procedural rights are
respected, and that justice is afforded equally. Closed trials breed suspicion of
prejudice and arbitrariness, which in turn spawns disrespect for law.”).
Likewise, openness in the sentencing context allows the public to observe
whether the defendant is being justly sentenced, especially where the court,
rather than a jury, is determining the sentence. Eppinger, 49 F.3d at 1253
(“The public must have the opportunity to observe and criticize the judiciary in
the operation of its duties. In sentencing, unlike other aspects of criminal
proceedings, it is the distinct province of the court to determine what
constitutes [a] proper sentence.” (quoting United States v. Carpentier, 526 F.
Supp. 292, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 1981))); In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d at 389.
Similarly, openness of a proceeding also promotes more accurate fact-
finding, either because witnesses are more hesitant to commit perjury in a
proceeding open to the public, or because “key witnesses unknown to the
parties” may learn about a trial if it is public. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448
U.S. at 596-97. As there may well be witnesses and contested issues of fact in
a sentencing proceeding, see Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 198 (explaining that in both
trials and sentencing proceedings, “[t]he defendant . . . can present evidence,
call witnesses, and cross-examine government witnesses”), this rationale
applies in a sentencing proceeding as much as it applies in a trial.
Relatedly, the Supreme Court has explained that “[u]nderlying the First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the common understanding that
‘a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of

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governmental affairs,’” Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604 (quoting Mills v.
Alabama, 84 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)), and “to ensure that this constitutionally
protected ‘discussion of governmental affairs’ is an informed one,” id. at 605.
This rationale also applies in the sentencing context. For example, allowing the
public “to see the application of sentencing laws in person is important to an
informed public debate over these laws.” Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 199 (citing
Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the
Federal Courts 85 (1998)).
Finally, there is a “community therapeutic value” to having an open
proceeding, because of the concerns and emotions of members of the public who
have been affected by a crime or crimes. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S.
at 570. “When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and
public protest often follows. Thereafter the open processes of justice serve an
important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern,
hostility, and emotion.” Id. at 571 (citation omitted); see, e.g., Mark Eddy et al.,
Guilty on Every Count, Denver Post, June 3, 1997, available at
http://extras.denverpost.com/ bomb/bombv1.htm (describing the reaction of
survivors of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing upon hearing that the jury had
found Timothy McVeigh guilty on all counts: “survivors rushed into the hall
outside the courtroom where they cried, hugged and tried to console each other
as this chapter in the bombing tragedy drew to a close”). This rationale applies
as strongly in a sentencing proceeding as it does in a trial. Alcantara, 396 F.3d
at 198; see, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Mastermind Gets Life for Bombing of Trade
Center, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1998, available at 1998 WLNR 2795240 (“Several
victims of the [1993 World Trade Center] blast attended the [sentencing
proceeding of Ramzi Yousef]. One, Charles Maikish, a former [World] Trade
Center official, nearly broke down as he addressed the court on behalf of the
families, reading a list of the names of each victim who had died in the bombing.

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Patricia Smith, whose pregnant daughter-in-law, Monica Smith, was killed in
the explosion, did not speak in court but glared at Mr. Yousef’s back as he stood
just a few feet in front of her, addressing the judge. Later, Ms. Smith said she
wanted to hit him with her cane.”).
In sum, we conclude, as have the other courts of appeals that have
addressed this issue, that the press and public have a First Amendment right
of access to sentencing proceedings.14

C. Notice and an opportunity to be heard
Because there is a First Amendment right of access to sentencing
proceedings, there is a presumption that they should remain open, absent
specific, substantive findings made by the district court that closure is
necessary to protect higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve such goals:

[T]he presumption [of openness] may be overcome only by an
overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings
specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the
closure order was properly entered.
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9-10 (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at
510) (quotation marks omitted). In making its findings, the court must consider
any “reasonable alternatives to closure.” Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14
(citing Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510; Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S.
at 581); see also Edwards, 823 F.2d at 119 (“Press [Enterprise] II requires, if

14
We do not, however, call into question “the practice of keeping presentence reports
confidential,” CBS, Inc., 765 F.2d at 826, which is a distinct issue for multiple reasons. First,
in contrast to sentencing proceedings, “[presentence] reports themselves have historically been
treated as confidential . . . .” United States v. Huckaby, 43 F.3d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1995).
Moreover, unlike with sentencing proceedings, “[t]he Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
expressly provide for limited [public] access to information contained in presentence reports.”
CBS, Inc., 765 F.2d at 826.

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closure of a presumptively open proceeding is to withstand a [F]irst
[A]mendment challenge, that the court make specific, on-the-record,
factfindings demonstrating that a substantial probability exists that an interest
of a higher value will be prejudiced and that no reasonable alternatives to
closure will adequately protect that interest.”). “When . . . closure is ordered,
the constitutional values sought to be protected by holding open proceedings
may be satisfied later by making a transcript of the closed proceedings available
within a reasonable time, if the judge determines that disclosure can be
accomplished while safeguarding” the interest that gave rise to the need for
closure. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 512.
In this case, we do not reach the question of whether the district court’s
decision to close Cardenas-Guillen’s sentencing proceeding was substantively
correct. The Chronicle does not challenge this. Rather, the Chronicle is
challenging the district court’s refusal to follow two procedural requirements
before closing the sentencing of Cardenas-Guillen: (1) to give public notice of
contemplated closure of the proceeding, and (2) to give interested parties, such
as the Chronicle, an opportunity to be heard before the sentencing proceeding
was closed.
Those procedural requirements stem from the Supreme Court’s dictate
that trial courts should make determinations about closure “on a case-by-case
basis.” Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 609. The Court explained that “[o]f
course, for a case-by-case approach to be meaningful, representatives of the
press and general public ‘must be given an opportunity to be heard on the
question of their exclusion.’” Id. at 609 n.25 (quoting Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 401 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring)); see also
Edwards, 823 F.2d at 119 (“In requiring a case-by-case resolution of the issues
concerning closure of presumptively open proceedings, the Globe Court noted
that, for this approach to be effective, ‘the press and general public must be

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given an opportunity to be heard on the question of their exclusion.’” (quoting
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 609 n.25)).
The courts of appeals that have addressed the question of whether notice
and an opportunity to be heard must be given before closure of a proceeding or
sealing of documents to which there is a First Amendment right of access, have
uniformly required adherence to such procedural safeguards. See, e.g.,
Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 200 (“[A] motion for courtroom closure should be
docketed in the public docket files . . . . Entries on the docket should be made
promptly, normally on the day the pertinent event occurs . . . . We think this
type of general public notice suffices to afford an adequate opportunity for
challenge to courtroom closure.” (quoting In re Herald Co., 734 F.2d at 102-03));
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 156 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“[I]f a court contemplates sealing a document or transcript, it must provide
sufficient notice to the public and press to afford them the opportunity to object
or offer alternatives. If objections are made, a hearing on the objections must
be held as soon as possible.”); Oregonian Publ’g Co., 920 F.2d at 1466 (9th Cir.
1998) (affirming previous holding that “those excluded from the proceeding
must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to state their objections” (citing
Brooklier, 685 F.2d at 1167-68; In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d at 390-91));
United States v. Valenti, 987 F.2d 708, 713 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that
giving “notice and an opportunity to be heard on a proposed closure” is required
prior to closing a “historically open process where public access plays a
significant role”); Robinson, 935 F.2d at 289 (explaining that before a plea
agreement is sealed, “(1) [t]he government must file a written motion to seal the
plea agreement and notice of that motion must be entered in the public docket;
[and] (2) [t]he trial court must promptly allow interested persons an opportunity
to be heard before ruling on the motion and entering the sealing order”); In re
Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d at 390 (holding that before making specific

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findings in conjunction with an order to close a proceeding or seal documents,
the district court must docket closure motions “‘reasonably in advance of their
disposition’” in order to give the press and public notice and then “provide
interested persons ‘an opportunity to object to the request before the court
ma[kes] its decision’” (quoting In re Knight Publ’g Co., 743 F.2d at 234-35));
Criden, 675 F.2d at 559-60 (holding that in order to provide notice, “[t]he
district courts should take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that the
docket entries are made a reasonable time before the closure motion is acted
upon” and explaining that doing so would allow “the public and press . . . to take
timely action if they wished”). Furthermore, the Department of Justice has
issued “guidelines [that] generally prohibit a government attorney from
consenting to[, inter alia,] a closed plea or sentencing proceeding when the
public has not been given notice of the proposed closure.” Alcantara, 396 F.3d
at 200 n.9 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 50.9).
These procedural requirements are essential to safeguarding the First
Amendment right of access to sentencing proceedings. Given the weight of the
right of access, we agree that courts must provide the press and public with
notice and an opportunity to be heard before closing a sentencing proceeding,15
because “it seems entirely inadequate to leave the vindication of a First
Amendment right to the fortuitous presence in the courtroom of a public
spirited citizen willing to complain about closure . . . .” Alcantara, 396 F.3d at
199-200 (quoting In re Herald Co., 734 F.2d at 102); see also Criden, 675 F.2d
at 559 (“The press should not be expected to ‘camp out’ in the hallway in order

15
We do not speculate on the possibility of whether, in a future case, some circumstance
might arise that could justify a trial court's deciding to give no notice or opportunity to be
heard, of any kind, before closing a sentencing proceeding. As we explain below, the
circumstances of this case were not sufficient to justify such a decision. Any decision to deny
all notice and opportunity to be heard would have to be justified under the balancing test of
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), which we refer to later in this opinion.

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to ascertain whether evidentiary proceedings are being conducted in
chambers.”). These requirements are “not mere punctilios, to be observed when
convenient.” Phoenix Newspapers, 156 F.3d at 951. The trial court cannot
properly weigh the First Amendment right of access against the interests
served by closure, nor can it fully consider alternatives to closure, without
providing notice and an opportunity to be heard to the press and public:
All too often, parties to the litigation are either indifferent or
antipathetic to disclosure requests. This is to be expected: it is not
their charge to represent the rights of others. However, balancing
interests cannot be performed in a vacuum. Thus, providing the
public notice and an opportunity to be heard ensures that the trial
court will have a true opportunity to weigh the legitimate concerns
of all those affected by a closure decision.
Id.
The importance of these requirements, however, does not preclude a trial
court from choosing among various options, given the circumstances and
interests involved in a particular case, to determine how it will provide notice
and an opportunity to be heard. For example, in giving the press and public
notice that a proceeding may be closed, the trial court may choose to docket the
motion. See, e.g., Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 200; Robinson, 935 F.2d at 288. The
trial court may do that, or it may decide that security or other concerns warrant
declining to reveal what kind of proceeding is going to be closed and simply
place a notice on the docket that there is a motion to close a proceeding, leaving
the parties to submit arguments regarding the various proceedings that could
hypothetically be closed. Relatedly, the trial court may decide to disclose all,
some, or none of what is contained in the motion to close. Cf. Robinson, 935
F.2d at 290 (“We fail to see anything in this case that would have precluded the
government from filing a written motion to seal (notice of which would be
entered on the public docket), with the plea agreement attached, and then
asking the court to seal both the motion and the plea agreement pending final

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disposition. This would have protected the secrecy of the plea agreement until
the court ruled on the motion after hearing from interested parties.”); In re
Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d at 391 (“A district court considering a motion for
closure of hearings for national security reasons need not divulge the facts of
the situation to persons seeking access to the hearings.”).
Similarly, in giving interested members of the press and public an
opportunity to be heard, the trial court can choose among various options to
determine how to do so in a particular case. At the very least, the trial court
can permit interested parties to submit briefs on whether a proceeding should
be closed. In addition, the trial court may decide to hold a hearing at which
parties can orally argue before the court. Finally, the trial court “may file its
statement of the reasons for its decision under seal” if it deems that doing so is
necessary. In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d at 391. This court can, of
course, still review a sealed statement of reasons.
Of course, the fact that a trial court may choose among various options
does not mean that it should automatically choose the most minimal options
available. “[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Trial courts should weigh these factors in relation to the unique facts of the case
where closure is at issue. Cf. United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 318-28
(2d Cir. 2004) (applying the Mathews v. Eldridge test by weighing the
defendant’s interest in having notice and an opportunity to be heard, as well as

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the public and the defendant’s shared interest in open criminal proceedings,
against the government’s interest in protecting the identity and safety of
confidential witnesses, and concluding that “ex parte submissions in opposition
to bail release . . . should generally not be received or considered by district
courts”). In this appeal, we need not examine the factors in detail, because the
district court gave the press and public no notice, and no opportunity to be
heard, whatsoever. Regardless of exactly what arrangements would have been
sufficient, the district court’s actions did not provide even a minimal level of due
process before closing the sentencing proceeding.
The government does not dispute that notice and an opportunity to be
heard should generally be afforded to the press and public before the closure of
a proceeding to which a First Amendment right of access attaches. Instead, the
government advances two alternative arguments: (1) that the security concerns
of this case were such that the district court was excused from giving notice and
an opportunity to be heard; and (2) in the alternative, that the district court
essentially gave the Chronicle an opportunity to be heard because it took into
account the Chronicle’s February 9, 2010 motion to intervene and the
Chronicle’s October 30, 2009 letter, which was attached to the motion to
intervene, when it closed the sentencing proceeding. We address each
argument in turn.
First, we conclude that the security concerns raised by the government
in this case did not justify the district court’s decision not to give the press and
public any notice or opportunity to be heard prior to closure. At the sentencing
proceeding, the district court gave two rationales for its decision to seal the
government’s motion to close the sentencing proceeding: “failure to seal the
United States’ motion to seal will result in a substantial probability that the
lives and safety of persons will be placed in danger and that ongoing
investigations will be jeopardized.” The government contends that holding a

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preclosure hearing would have endangered Cardenas-Guillen, courthouse and
United States Marshals Service personnel, and members of the public in the
courthouse, because of the possibility of an attack on the courthouse due to
Cardenas-Guillen’s presence during such a hearing, as well as the possibility
of attack while transporting Cardenas-Guillen to and from the courthouse.
While this concern is understandable, it did not preclude giving notice and an
opportunity to be heard. For instance, the district court could have simply
given notice that the government had filed a sealed motion to close the
upcoming sentencing proceeding, and given the press and public an opportunity
to be heard by inviting any interested parties to write and express their
opposition. Anyone who wanted to see the government’s sealed motion before
filing an opposing motion could also have filed a motion to do so, which the
district court could have granted or denied in the exercise of its sound
discretion.
Neither did the district court’s concern about jeopardizing ongoing
investigations preclude it from giving notice and an opportunity to be heard in
this case. The district court noted at sentencing that pursuant to the
government’s request, it would not docket the proceeding or make the transcript
available until the United States Marshals Service informed the district court
“that the . . . possibility of substantial danger or substantial possibility of
danger imminent — the public being placed in imminent danger has passed
. . . .” And, as the government noted in its brief, the docket shows (1) that the
proceeding was docketed within hours of the end of the hearing; (2) that the
hearing and transcript were made available to the public; and (3) that the
Chronicle ordered a copy of the transcript, which was completed by the next
day. The fact that the government requested for the sentencing to occur, and
that it did not object to the docketing of the proceeding within hours of the
hearing and the release of the transcript the next day, shows that at some point

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before the sentencing proceeding, the government had resolved any concerns it
had regarding ongoing investigations. After the government resolved those
concerns, instead of immediately holding the sentencing proceeding, the district
court could instead have given notice and an opportunity to be heard on
whether the sentencing should be closed. It would have been no more harmful
with regard to ongoing investigations for the district court to take these steps
— thereby providing notice and an opportunity to be heard — than to do what
it actually did.
In sum, the government’s contention that security concerns justified the
lack of notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to closure of the sentencing
proceedings is unpersuasive. The district court had multiple options available
to it for providing notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to closure, while
also accommodating the security concerns raised by the government.16
The government argues in the alternative that even if the district court
was required to give notice and an opportunity to be heard before closing the
sentencing proceeding, the district court essentially gave the Chronicle such an
opportunity to be heard. Specifically, the government contends that the district
court was aware of, and stated that it had considered, the Chronicle’s February
9, 2010 motion to intervene and the letter from the Chronicle dated October 30,
2009, which was attached to the motion to intervene. Thus, the government
concludes, the district court was not required to “hold a hearing and write
redundant findings of fact that merely reiterate truisms.” Gov. Br. 25, 37
(quoting Edwards, 823 F.2d at 119 (quotation marks omitted)).

16
We note that in its brief, the government cited to but did not explicitly discuss
another security concern, which was outlined in the government’s sealed filings to the district
court. We conclude that there are options among those we have discussed here that would
have adequately addressed that concern while also providing the public and press with notice
and an opportunity to be heard. Thus, that security concern does not justify the failure to
provide notice and an opportunity to be heard.

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We are not persuaded by this argument. The February 9, 2010 motion
filed by the Chronicle did not deal with closure of any proceedings. Instead, it
contained a motion to intervene and arguments against continued sealing of
documents. The Chronicle did not have notice of what was happening: it did not
know that there would be an upcoming sentencing hearing or any other
proceeding. The arguments in its February 9, 2010 motion dealt with what the
Chronicle knew was happening — the continued sealing of documents, not the
closure of a sentencing hearing. Even the October 30, 2009 letter only makes
a general argument that notice should be given if closure of a proceeding was
contemplated at some point in the future. The Chronicle had no notice and was
not given the opportunity to make arguments addressing precedents regarding
access to and closure of sentencing proceedings; to argue that openness is
important in proceedings in this particular case, a case of great public
importance; or to suggest more narrowly tailored alternatives to closure.
Moreover, it would be perverse to hold that the district court fulfilled its
obligation to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard in this case because
the Chronicle’s reporter “‘camp[ed] out’ in the hallway,” Criden, 675 F.2d at 559,
and its attorneys sent the court anticipatory requests asking for notice and an
opportunity to be heard if a proceeding were to be closed. The court is not
relieved from its duty to adhere to due process requirements, in order to
safeguard the First Amendment right of access, by the fact that a newspaper,
out of an abundance of caution, took some steps to attempt to secure that right.

We conclude that the district court did not give the Chronicle notice and
an opportunity to be heard before closing the sentencing proceeding. Thus, the
district court deprived the Chronicle of its First Amendment right without
following the proper procedures — i.e., without due process.
CONCLUSION

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We conclude (1) that this court has jurisdiction over the case, because it
falls within the exception to mootness for issues that are capable of repetition,
yet evading review; (2) that the press and the public have a First Amendment
right of access to a sentencing proceeding; and (3) that the district court
deprived the Chronicle of its First Amendment right of access without due
process in refusing to give the press and public, including the Chronicle, notice
and an opportunity to be heard before closing the sentencing proceeding.
Because the sentencing of Cardenas-Guillen has already occurred, we simply
REVERSE the district court’s orders of February 24, 2010 (as amended by the
March 2, 2010 order) and of February 26, 2010, denying the Chronicle’s
requests for notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to closure, as well as
the district court’s February 24, 2010 order (as amended by the March 2, 2010
order) denying the Chronicle’s motion to open the sentencing proceeding. See
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 15 (reversing because the lower court “failed to
consider the First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings”);
Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 580-81 (reversing where “trial judge
made no findings to support closure; no inquiry was made as to whether
alternative solutions would have met the need to ensure fairness; there was no
recognition of any right under the Constitution for the public or press to attend
the trial”). We do not decide whether the district court’s decision to close the
sentencing proceeding was substantively wrong, but we reverse the order
denying the motion to open the sentencing proceeding because the district court
did not follow the required procedures before rendering its decision to close. See
In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d at 393.
It is so ordered.

27