UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-2361
KONJIT AMENU,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Argued: October 28, 2010 Decided: June 13, 2011
Before KING, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Petition for review granted; vacated and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: James Anthony Feroli, IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE APPELLATE
CENTER, LLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for Petitioner. Matthew
Allan Spurlock, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,
D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General, Francis Fraser, Senior Litigation Counsel, Kate D.
Balaban, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Konjit Amenu — an Ethiopian citizen now residing in the
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area — petitions for review of the
November 13, 2009 final removal order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals. See In re Amenu (B.I.A. Nov. 13, 2009)
(the “BIA Order”). The BIA Order affirmed the January 7, 2008
decision of an immigration judge. See In re Amenu (Immigr. Ct.
Arlington, Va. Jan. 7, 2008) (the “IJ Decision”). 1 By virtue
thereof, Amenu’s requests for asylum, withholding of removal,
and protection under the United Nations Convention Against
Torture (the “CAT”), were each denied. Because the IJ and the
BIA misapprehended the facts, engaged in speculation, and
otherwise failed to properly consider relevant evidence, we
grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA Order, and remand.
I.
Amenu legally entered the United States in April 1988, but
remained in this country longer than authorized. In December
1988, Amenu filed an application for asylum, which was denied in
September 1989. In January 1990, the Immigration and
1
The BIA Order is found at J.A. 3-5, and the IJ Decision is
found at J.A. 45-54. (Citations herein to “J.A. __” refer to
the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this
appeal.)
2
Naturalization Service (the “INS”) directed to Amenu an order to
show cause why she was not subject to deportation. Later, in
1990, Amenu’s case was “administratively closed” by an IJ
because her address was unavailable. In October 2006, the case
was recalendared at the joint request of Amenu and the
Department of Homeland Security (the “DHS”), which had absorbed
the INS in 2003. In February 2007, Amenu renewed her request
for relief by filing a new application, by which she sought
asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. On August
13, 2007, the IJ conducted an evidentiary hearing on Amenu’s
application for relief.
A.
The evidence presented at the IJ hearing and the materials
filed in support of Amenu’s application revealed the following.
Amenu’s father served in Ethiopia’s cabinet when Haile Selassie
was the Emperor of Ethiopia. 2 After the so-called Derg regime
overthrew Emperor Selassie’s government in 1974, the Derg
authorities arrested Amenu’s father and detained him for seven
years. The Derg authorities also arrested and detained Amenu on
2
Haile Selassie reigned as Ethiopia’s Emperor from 1930
until 1974. Selassie gained international recognition by
fending off an invasion of his country by Italy in 1935, and by
participating prominently in the funeral of President John F.
Kennedy in 1963, walking alongside French President Charles de
Gaulle behind the caisson carrying the assassinated President to
Arlington National Cemetery.
3
three separate occasions. She was first detained in 1978 in
Ethiopia for fifteen days while the Derg authorities determined
whether Amenu’s father had concealed property belonging to
Emperor Selassie. Amenu was next detained in 1984 for twenty-
four hours because she had not participated in a mandatory “May
Day” demonstration. Amenu’s third detention by the Derg was her
longest — in 1987, she was held for twenty-five days upon
refusing to accept her nomination to the Executive Committee of
the Women’s Association, a position she believed would be used
for propaganda purposes. During her 1987 confinement, Derg
soldiers beat and kicked Amenu. She was eventually released,
and thereafter travelled to and entered the United States as a
nonimmigrant visitor. The Derg regime was overthrown in 1991
and a different regime, called the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (the “EPRDF”), now controls
Ethiopia’s government.
Amenu’s application for relief expressed fear that she
would face persecution from the EPRDF government if she returns
to Ethiopia. To substantiate her application, Amenu appended
and filed several supporting exhibits and testified at the IJ
hearing. The exhibits included State Department reports
concerning political conditions in Ethiopia, a picture of Amenu
participating in a demonstration against the EPRDF government,
the affidavit of a woman named Ghennet Girma Woldegiorgis,
4
correspondence showing Amenu’s efforts to depose Woldegiorgis,
and a legal memorandum supporting Amenu’s application for
relief.
At the IJ hearing, Amenu testified that she has been a
member, since about 1995, of the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Party (the “EPRP”), a political organization that
opposes the EPRDF government. According to the 2007 Ethiopia
Asylum Country Profile (the “2007 Report”), the EPRP is among
the “[m]ajor [p]olitical organizations in the Diaspora” not
registered with Ethiopia’s mandatory National Election Board.
J.A. 203; see id. at 236. The EPRDF government does not
recognize the EPRP or allow it to operate in Ethiopia. See id.
at 87, 251. Amenu also testified that she has attended EPRP
meetings since 1995 “[a]t least once a month” and has
participated in EPRP demonstrations “two to three times a year,”
for a total of “about fifteen” demonstrations. Id. at 106-07,
129. Amenu appended to her application for relief two letters
from the EPRP’s Washington, D.C. office, dated in 2000 and 2006,
which confirmed that she is an “active member” of the EPRP and
expressed concern that she “will face an imminent danger to her
life and safety” should she return to Ethiopia. Id. at 212-13.
5
Elaborating on Amenu’s EPRP activities was the affidavit of
Ghennet Girma Woldegiorgis. 3 Woldegiorgis is a close childhood
friend of Amenu, and — despite being the daughter of the current
Ethiopian President — is “one of the prominent figures of” the
EPRP. J.A. 251. Woldegiorgis herself fled Ethiopia in the
1970s, joined the EPRP in 1975, and was granted asylum by France
in 1981. In 1993, Woldegiorgis travelled to Ethiopia to attend
a “Peace and Reconciliation Conference,” during which the EPRDF
detained her. Woldegiorgis now regularly travels to Washington,
D.C., where she coordinates and attends EPRP events. On her
visits to the United States, Woldegiorgis and Amenu are together
“frequently” for EPRP meetings, dinners, and other public social
3
Her affidavit revealed that Woldegiorgis “would have loved
to testify in person” at the IJ hearing, but her “authorized
stay [in the United States] would have expired” by the date on
which the hearing was scheduled. J.A. 250. Because
Woldegiorgis was unavailable for the hearing, Amenu sought the
IJ’s permission to depose Woldegiorgis before she left the
country. At a preliminary meeting conducted by the IJ on April
17, 2007, the IJ advised the parties that he would accept such a
deposition if both sides agreed to it. The IJ further advised
that, absent such an agreement, Amenu could “submit an affidavit
from [Woldegiorgis].” Id. at 64-65. By her letter of the same
day, Amenu sought permission from the DHS Chief Counsel to take
the deposition, with the costs to be paid by her. She also
advised that Woldegiorgis would depart the United States in less
than two weeks, on April 30, 2007. On April 24, 2007, the DHS
Chief Counsel declined to agree to the deposition. Accordingly,
pursuant to the IJ’s authorization, Amenu submitted the
Woldegiorgis affidavit for the IJ’s consideration.
6
gatherings. Id.; see id. at 87 (Amenu’s testimony corroborating
same).
The Woldegiorgis affidavit attested to Amenu’s EPRP
activities, including her attendance at meetings, her
distribution of leaflets, and her participation in
demonstrations. Woldegiorgis further declared, “I know that the
Ethiopian government through its embassy monitors my activity in
Washington, D.C.,” keeping an eye on the persons “with whom I
socialize, attend meetings and so on.” J.A. 251. According to
the affidavit, because of Amenu’s attendance at EPRP
demonstrations and her association with Woldegiorgis, “[t]he
EPRDF government is aware of [Amenu]’s EPRP activities,” and
Amenu “would face grave danger to her life” if she returns to
Ethiopia. Id. Amenu echoed Woldegiorgis’s concern that their
visible association would attract the attention of the EPRDF and
cause Amenu to be persecuted. See id. at 87, 348.
Amenu is also a supporter of the All Amhara People’s
Organization (the “AAPO”), an opposition group that advocates on
behalf of those Ethiopians of Amhara heritage, a loose
description of the ethnic group that historically has ruled
Ethiopia. Some tensions exist between Amharas and the EPRDF,
although it is unlikely that a person “would be targeted simply
because of his or her Amhara ethnicity.” J.A. 186. Amenu has
donated money to and distributed pamphlets in support of the
7
AAPO. Amenu testified that the EPRDF twice arrested her older
brother for his involvement with the AAPO, after which he fled
to the United States, where he was granted asylum. According to
Amenu, the EPRDF sought to kill her younger brother, who then
fled to Kenya, where he died. Amenu testified that both of her
brothers were “prominent individuals” in the AAPO in Ethiopia.
J.A. 110. She also confirmed that the EPRDF authorities killed
her nephew.
Another of the exhibits to Amenu’s application for relief
was Ethiopia’s entry for the 2006 State Department Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices (the “2006 Report”). The
introductory portion to the 2006 Report observed that
“opposition parties [in Ethiopia] engaged in a steady process of
consolidation” in a series of elections in 2005, but that the
EPRDF remains in power and has suppressed opposition political
groups. J.A. 223. In addition, the 2006 Report recited
information concerning several human rights abuses in Ethiopia,
including the following:
limitation[s] on citizens’ right to change their
government during the most recent elections; unlawful
killings, and beating, abuse, and mistreatment of
detainees and opposition supporters; [and] arbitrary
arrest and detention, particularly [of] those
suspected of sympathizing with or being members of the
opposition.
Id. In the 2005 elections, “[o]pposition parties made an
unexpectedly strong showing, increasing their parliamentary
8
representation from 12 . . . to 172” of 547 seats, with the
EPRDF controlling 372 seats. Id. at 238. In those same
elections, however, “[o]bservers reported killings,
disappearances, voter intimidation and harassment, and unlawful
detentions of opposition party supporters, particularly in the
Amhara” and certain other regions of the country. Id. (emphasis
added). Protests later in 2005 resulted in the arrest of
“several dozen opposition leaders,” the detention of between
30,000 and 50,000 demonstrators without charge, and “arbitrary
detention and killings” by the military. Id. at 239.
B.
By the IJ Decision of January 7, 2008, Amenu’s three
requests for relief were denied. According to the IJ, “[i]t is
not reasonable to conclude that [Amenu] would be targeted by the
current government and face problems upon her return to Ethiopia
today.” IJ Decision 8. The IJ found that Amenu testified
credibly regarding her father’s involvement in the Selassie
government and her detentions at the hands of the Derg regime.
Notably, the IJ recited what was purported to be Amenu’s
testimony that, during an interrogation following her third Derg
detention in Ethiopia, a military leader told Amenu “that the
regime knew she was involved in the EPRDF.” Id. at 3, 6. The
IJ thus determined that Amenu had suffered past persecution
based on her third arrest and detention. Notwithstanding such
9
past persecution, however, the IJ found that Amenu did not have
a well-founded fear of future persecution, on the ground that
the overthrow of the Derg regime constituted a fundamental
change in circumstances. 4
The IJ also assessed whether Amenu had shown a well-founded
fear of persecution due to her AAPO associations and EPRP
activities. The IJ recited that Amenu’s “primary argument is
that the authorities will persecute her because of her Amhara
ethnicity,” which is unrelated to the Derg regime’s persecution
of her. IJ Decision 7. The IJ then found that Amenu had not
demonstrated “a reasonable likelihood that the government will
target her based on her ethnicity alone,” because “nothing in
the record . . . indicates that the government targets
individuals for persecution solely because of their Amhara
ethnicity.” Id. With respect to Amenu’s associations with and
support for the AAPO, the IJ “recognize[d] that the government
has continued to attack AAPO members in Ethiopia.” Id. at 8.
Nevertheless, the IJ determined that Amenu had not demonstrated
4
As explained more fully in Part III.A hereof, a finding of
past persecution entitles an asylum applicant to a presumption
that she has a well-founded fear of related future persecution.
This presumption may be rebutted by a finding that a
“fundamental change in circumstances” has occurred in the
relevant country. If an applicant’s fear of future persecution
is not related to her past persecution, the presumption does not
apply.
10
a well-founded fear of persecution because she “was never
involved in the AAPO in Ethiopia” and “has not indicated that
the Ethiopian government continues to target her brother or
nephew for [their AAPO] activities.” Id.
The IJ accepted Amenu’s claim of membership in the EPRP,
but found that she was “exaggerating the scope of her current
EPRP activities.” IJ Decision 5. The IJ recognized that “human
rights violations continue to occur against political opponents
[under] the ruling government” and that “the ruling government
has previously persecuted EPRP activists.” Id. at 7 (citing the
2006 Report). Nonetheless, the IJ offered multiple grounds for
his determination that Amenu had failed to show a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of her EPRP activities:
• Amenu “admitted that she used to attend monthly
EPRP meetings, but now goes to EPRP events only
‘two to three times per year.’” Id. at 5.
Because she is not an EPRP “leader” and her
activities are “very minimal,” she is “not . . .
active enough in the EPRP to draw attention by
the Ethiopian authorities as a political
opponent,” id.;
• The “letter [from the EPRP] does not refer to any
specific current activities, but simply states in
a conclusory manner that she is an ‘active
member’ of the Washington, [D.C.] branch,” and no
evidence shows that active membership “means
anything more than paying annual membership
dues,” id.;
• Amenu “did not participate in the [EPRP] in
Ethiopia, where the government had targeted
opponents,” id. at 7;
11
• The EPRP “is becoming a decreasingly significant
political entity” that “no longer merits
inclusion in the State Department reports,” id.
(citing, inter alia, the 2007 Report);
• The Woldegiorgis affidavit “fails to show that
[Amenu] more than minimally participates in EPRP
activities.” Id. at 6. “Moreover, in the
absence of other credible testimony and
corroborating evidence, self-serving affidavits
from individuals who are biased in support of a
friend are not sufficient to establish a
respondent’s claims,” id.; and
• According to the 2006 Report, opposition parties
in Ethiopia “have engaged in a steady process of
consolidation” and “have made an unexpectedly
strong showing in recent elections,” while “major
changes” have occurred in the EPRDF government,
id. at 7.
Accordingly, the IJ Decision denied Amenu’s application for
relief. The BIA Order, filed on November 13, 2009, adopted the
IJ Decision. In supplementing the IJ Decision, the BIA
explained that, “[a]lthough the [EPRDF] is not above reproach,”
the State Department material appended to Amenu’s application
“actually indicates that individuals have more access to freedom
of expression, political participation, and rule of law.” BIA
Order 2.
Amenu thereafter filed her petition for review. By order
of January 4, 2010, a panel of this Court granted Amenu’s
unopposed motion for a stay of the BIA Order pending our
disposition of this matter. We possess jurisdiction pursuant to
the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
12
II.
When the BIA has adopted and supplemented an IJ decision,
we review both rulings for substantial evidence. Jian Tao Lin
v. Holder, 611 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2010). In applying this
standard of review, factual findings “are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), and an assessment of
witness credibility constitutes such a finding. See Kourouma v.
Holder, 588 F.3d 234, 240 (4th Cir. 2009).
III.
In order to properly assess Amenu’s petition for review, we
first trace the legal architecture of her requests for asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT relief. We then describe the IJ
and BIA’s obligation to consider the relevant evidence and offer
cogent reasons for their decisions. Applying those principles
to Amenu’s petition for review, we identify several errors.
Finally, we evaluate whether those errors were harmless.
A.
In order to gain eligibility for asylum, Amenu must satisfy
the relevant requirements for refugee status. As applicable
here, the term “refugee” means an alien “who is unable or
unwilling to return to” her native country “because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
13
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). An
applicant bears the burden of demonstrating that she is a
refugee. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a). The applicant “may qualify as
a refugee either because . . . she has suffered past persecution
or because . . . she has a well-founded fear of future
persecution.” Id. § 1208.13(b). If the applicant demonstrates
that she has suffered past persecution on account of a protected
ground, she is “presumed to have a well-founded fear of
persecution on the basis of the original claim”; if the fear of
future persecution is “unrelated to the past persecution,”
however, the presumption does not apply. Id. § 1208.13(b)(1).
If the presumption applies, it may be rebutted by an IJ finding
by a preponderance of the evidence that, inter alia, “[t]here
has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the
applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution.”
Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A).
If the presumption does not apply or is rebutted, an
applicant may still possess a well-founded fear of future
persecution. The applicant’s fear of persecution is well-
founded if (1) she subjectively fears persecution in her native
country on account of a protected ground, (2) “[t]here is a
reasonable possibility” of such persecution if she returns, and
(3) she is unable or unwilling to return to or avail herself of
14
the protection of her country because of fear, unless (4) she
could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the
country and it is reasonable to expect her to do so. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(A)-(C), (ii).
As relevant here, an applicant is entitled to withholding
of removal if she “establish[es] that it is more likely than not
that . . . she would be persecuted on account of [a protected
ground] upon removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2). If the
applicant “fail[s] to establish the less stringent . . .
standard of proof required for asylum relief,” she “is
necessarily also unable to establish” the “more demanding”
standard of proof required for withholding of removal. Abdel-
Rahman v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 444, 449 (4th Cir. 2007). Finally,
an applicant is entitled to protection under the CAT if she
establishes that she “is more likely than not to be tortured in
the country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2), (4).
B.
The Supreme Court has recognized that a proper judicial
review of an agency decision “requires that the grounds upon
which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and
adequately sustained.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94
(1943). We have applied Chenery to petitions seeking review of
BIA removal orders, explaining that, where “a BIA order does not
demonstrate that the agency has considered an issue, ‘the proper
15
course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency
for additional investigation or explanation.’” Nken v. Holder,
585 F.3d 818, 822 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting INS v. Orlando
Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam)). In conducting
such a review, it is “our responsibility to ensure that
unrebutted, legally significant evidence is not arbitrarily
ignored by the factfinder.” Baharon v. Holder, 588 F.3d 228,
233 (4th Cir. 2009). As we have explained, “[t]hose who flee
persecution and seek refuge under our laws have the right to
know that the evidence they present of mistreatment in their
home country will be fairly considered and weighed by those who
decide their fate.” Id.
Accordingly, an IJ cannot “base [a] decision on only
isolated snippets of [the] record while disregarding the rest.”
Baharon, 588 F.3d at 233. Similarly, an IJ may not “distort[]
or disregard[] important aspects of the alien’s claim,” or rule
based “on an inaccurate perception of the record.” Jian Tao Lin
v. Holder, 611 F.3d 228, 237 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Nor may an IJ “rely on speculation, conjecture,
or an otherwise unsupported personal opinion to discredit an
applicant’s testimony or [her] corroborating evidence.” Id.
(quoting Marynenka v. Holder, 592 F.3d 594, 601 (4th Cir.
2010)). Instead, “an IJ who rejects a witness’s positive
testimony . . . should offer a specific, cogent reason for . . .
16
disbelief.” Id. at 235-36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
At the same time, the obligation to provide a “specific and
cogent reason” does not “imply that an IJ must provide extensive
reasons for each and every item of testimony that is rejected,”
but rather “leaves ample room for the IJ to exercise common
sense in rejecting an applicant’s testimony even if the IJ
cannot point to contrary evidence in the record to refute it.”
Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted).
C.
Our review of the IJ Decision and the BIA Order reveals a
pattern of factual misapprehensions — not only of the evidence
before the IJ, but also concerning the nature of Amenu’s claims
— as well as several instances of speculation and conjecture.
1.
As to the first category of errors, we identify at least
six factual misapprehensions involving evidence going to the
heart of Amenu’s claims. Specifically, the IJ Decision
inaccurately characterizes Amenu’s claims; misapprehends her
testimony regarding her EPRP activities; crafts a factual
finding on the basis of testimony that she never gave; omits
specific corroborative factual statements in the Woldegiorgis
affidavit; relies on an inaccurate portrait of the status of
Amenu’s family members; and erroneously asserts that the EPRP is
17
not significant enough to be listed in the State Department’s
reports about Ethiopia.
First, the IJ misportrays Amenu’s “primary argument” as
being that she would face persecution because of her “Amhara
ethnicity,” and then knocks down this straw by reasoning that
the EPRDF does not target individuals “solely” on account of
their Amhara ethnicity. See IJ Decision 7. In fact, Amenu’s
avowed fear of persecution stems not from her ethnicity as such,
but from her EPRP activities and her activities on behalf of
(and family ties to prominent members of) the AAPO. Indeed,
Amenu’s application for relief describes her fear, reiterated in
her testimony and in the Woldegiorgis affidavit, that she will
face persecution “because of her actual or imputed opposition to
the EPRDF and on suspicion of membership in opposition political
organizations.” J.A. 348.
Second, the IJ misapprehends Amenu’s testimony regarding
her EPRP activities. Specifically, the IJ describes Amenu’s
“admi[ssion]” that “she used to attend monthly EPRP meetings,
but now goes to EPRP events only ‘two to three times per year.’”
IJ Decision 5. Amenu made no such admission. Rather, she
testified that, since 1995, she has consistently attended
monthly EPRP meetings and attended an average of two to three
EPRP demonstrations per year. The IJ thus conflated
demonstrations with meetings, and his finding that Amenu was not
18
sufficiently active in the EPRP to justify the EPRDF’s attention
is therefore faulty, as it proceeds from an inaccurate
perception of Amenu’s avowed level of EPRP participation.
Third, the IJ fashions a finding — apparently from whole
cloth — that, during an interrogation following her third
arrest, a Derg military leader told Amenu that they knew of her
EPRDF activities. See IJ Decision 3, 6. From this, the IJ
Decision intimates that, because the Derg regime has been
overthrown and the EPRDF is now in power, Amenu has nothing to
fear from the current government. Amenu, however, gave no such
testimony, and there is no evidence suggesting that she has ever
been involved with the EPRDF government.
Fourth, the IJ omits important aspects of the Woldegiorgis
affidavit from his analysis. Those omitted portions explain
Woldegiorgis’s prominence in the EPRP, her close friendship and
frequent public outings with Amenu, and Woldegiorgis’s belief
that the EPRDF is aware of Amenu’s participation in the EPRP
because the EPRDF monitors the EPRP events that Amenu attends.
It appears that the IJ summarily rejected those aspects of the
Woldegiorgis affidavit on the sole ground that he deemed the
affidavit to be a “self-serving” statement from someone “biased
in support of a friend” for which there was no “other credible
testimony and corroborative evidence.” IJ Decision 6. The IJ
was not entitled, however, to invoke such a ground for
19
disbelieving Woldegiorgis’s factual assertions, and in doing so
“disregard[ed] important aspects of [Amenu’s] claim[s].” Jian
Tao Lin, 611 F.3d at 237. As to corroboration, we have
explained that “[t]here is no general rule that evidence offered
in corroboration requires independent corroboration,” and
therefore such evidence cannot “be discredited on the ground
that it automatically require[s] corroboration.” Marynenka, 592
F.3d at 602.
Nor does the IJ’s blanket allegation of bias justify his
discrediting of Woldegiorgis’s factual assertions. We begin by
observing that the IJ’s description of the affidavit as “self-
serving” is misplaced, as the affidavit was on behalf of Amenu
only, and there was never an assertion that Woldegiorgis
received any benefit from executing it. The IJ also erred in
describing Woldegiorgis merely as Amenu’s “friend” — she is also
a prominent figure in the EPRP who has attracted additional
attention from the EPRDF government because she is the daughter
of Ethiopia’s President. As we have explained, a letter from a
party leader on behalf of a member seeking asylum can both
corroborate and provide independent support for an applicant’s
claims, and the IJ is not free to “completely ignore[]” such
evidence. Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 369-70 (4th Cir.
2004). Moreover, the IJ failed to offer a “specific and cogent”
reason to reject Woldegiorgis’s factual specifications.
20
Marynenka, 592 F.3d at 601. The IJ is not free to summarily
reject an affiant’s uncontroverted and plausible factual
allegations. As we explained in Tewabe, an immigration case
where the IJ “attached the bare label ‘implausible’ to [the
applicant]’s testimony without providing specific and cogent
reasons for doing so,” such an “unexplained characterization is
unsustainable because [the applicant]’s testimony is not
inherently implausible.” 446 F.3d at 539. Indeed, in Tewabe,
the witness was more likely to be “biased” than Woldegiorgis, as
the witness there was the applicant herself.
Fifth, the IJ relies on an “inaccurate perception” of the
status of Amenu’s family members. Jian Tao Lin, 611 F.3d at
237. The IJ Decision was premised in part on Amenu’s perceived
failure to show “that the Ethiopian government continues to
target her brother or nephew” for their AAPO activities. IJ
Decision 8. This aspect of the IJ’s reasoning is erroneous. It
is also somewhat perplexing because the IJ Decision elsewhere
recites Amenu’s testimony that her nephew died at the hands of
the EPRDF and that her brother fled from the EPRDF to the United
States, where he was granted asylum. The IJ Decision also
overlooks Amenu’s testimony that another brother died in Kenya
after fleeing the EPRDF. Clearly, the EPRDF is incapable of
“continu[ing] to target” Amenu’s family members, and thus the IJ
erred in expecting Amenu to produce evidence thereof. Moreover,
21
the IJ Decision was issued without the benefit of our recent
decision in Baharon, where we explained that “[v]iolence or
threats to one’s close relatives is an important factor” in
determining whether an applicant has a well-founded fear of
persecution. 588 F.3d at 232.
Sixth, the IJ erroneously asserts that the EPRP is
“decreasingly significant” because it “no longer merits
inclusion in the State Department reports.” IJ Decision 7
(citing, inter alia, the 2007 Report). Strikingly, the EPRP is
listed as a “[m]ajor [p]olitical organization[]” in one of the
very reports that the IJ Decision perceives as not mentioning
the EPRP at all. J.A. 203 (the 2007 Report).
2.
The second category of errors in the IJ Decision is the
speculation and conjecture that it utilizes to support the
proposition that Amenu failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear
of persecution. As explained above, an IJ is not entitled to
engage in speculation or conjecture, or rely on unsupported
personal opinion, to discredit an applicant’s evidence. See
Marynenka, 592 F.3d at 601. Three specific aspects of the IJ
Decision contravene this settled principle.
First, the IJ’s conclusion that Amenu is unlikely to stand
out as an EPRDF opponent because she has never held a leadership
position in the EPRP — and engaged in only limited activities
22
for the EPRP — is entirely speculative, and overlooks the
likelihood that Amenu would stand out as an EPRDF opponent for
multiple reasons. We need not look far to identify how Amenu’s
opposition activities could otherwise come to the EPRDF’s
attention — namely, her close friendship and frequent public
outings with Woldegiorgis, an EPRP leader and daughter of the
Ethiopian President whose uncontroverted affidavit specifies
that (1) her own activities are monitored by the EPRDF and (2)
the EPRDF is aware of Amenu’s involvement with the EPRP.
Indeed, Amenu expressed her personal fear of the EPRDF
government on account of those associations, both in her
application for relief and in her testimony. See J.A. 87, 348.
Moreover, the State Department reports make clear that the
EPRDF’s suppression of contrary views is hardly limited to those
at the upper echelons of opposition groups. Those reports
reveal multiple human rights violations against individuals
other than opposition leaders — including “unlawful killings,
and beating, abuse, and mistreatment of detainees and opposition
supporters by security forces,” as well as “arbitrary arrest and
detention, particularly [of] those suspected of sympathizing
with or being members of the opposition.” Id. at 223 (emphasis
added); see also id. at 225-26, 235, 239.
Second, it was speculative for the IJ to assert that Amenu
is not likely to face persecution because she did not
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participate in the EPRP or the AAPO in Ethiopia. See IJ
Decision 7-8. Such reasoning appears to rest on the
questionable premise that the EPRDF will persecute only those
who have engaged in opposition activities within the
geographical bounds of Ethiopia. The IJ offers no evidentiary
support for this premise, and we are unwilling to accept it,
especially when the IJ “recognizes that the [EPRDF] has
continued to attack AAPO members in Ethiopia.” Id. at 8. Put
simply, “there is nothing implausible about the idea that” the
EPRDF will persecute, on their return to Ethiopia, individuals
who have engaged in opposition activities while abroad. Camara,
378 F.3d at 369 (rejecting IJ’s adverse credibility finding
because IJ’s reasoning was “based only on speculation”).
Indeed, the IJ’s premise in this regard is contradicted because,
when Woldegiorgis returned to Ethiopia for the 1993 conference,
the EPRDF government detained her.
Finally, the IJ’s conclusion that Amenu is not likely to
face persecution because the EPRP is “a decreasingly significant
political entity” is also based on speculation and conjecture.
That is, the IJ’s conclusion is premised on the dubious
assumption that the EPRDF will persecute individuals involved in
an opposition group only so long as it perceives the group as
significant. Yet the IJ offers no basis for the proposition
that the EPRDF — which, he concedes, continues to contravene the
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human rights of political opponents, see IJ Decision 7 — would
cease to persecute members of an opposition group (like the
EPRP) that it had previously persecuted, simply on account of
the group’s diminishing prominence.
D.
Having identified errors in the IJ Decision (and, by
extension, the BIA Order), we must, in deciding whether to
vacate and remand, also assess whether those errors are
harmless. See Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 190 n.8 (4th
Cir. 2004) (explaining that harmless error analysis applies to
immigration cases). Even where the agency has failed to
consider all the evidence or where some of the reasons offered
for its decision are invalid, we may yet affirm if “the alleged
error clearly had no bearing on the . . . substance of the
decision reached.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). By
contrast, we have remanded where, “[w]ithout [its] erroneous
perception of the record, it is far from clear that the
[adjudicator] would have” made the inferences and conclusions
that it made, Jian Tao Lin, 611 F.3d at 238; if “it is not
apparent from the [agency] order that it considered the crux of
[the applicant’s] argument,” Nken, 585 F.3d at 823; or if “it is
likely that the [adjudicator] would have reached a different
outcome if he had given due consideration to the independent
25
evidence that he [improperly] discounted,” Anim v. Mukasey, 535
F.3d 243, 261 (4th Cir. 2008).
In these circumstances, we are unable to say that the IJ
and the BIA would reach the same decision again, if they
properly assess the evidence and refrain from speculation and
conjecture. To begin with, the IJ’s speculative assumptions
taint his reasoning, and removing even one of these pillars
could well result in a different outcome. We are just as
skeptical that the IJ’s misapprehensions of fact were harmless.
To begin with, the prejudice to Amenu is self-evident, in that
the IJ expressly relies on his erroneous perceptions of three
crucial facts: Amenu’s avowed level of EPRP activities; the
“decreasing[] significan[ce]” of the EPRP; and the absence of
ongoing persecution against Amenu’s family members. See IJ
Decision 7.
We are also convinced that the IJ’s treatment of the
Woldegiorgis affidavit was prejudicial. Cf. Gonahasa v. INS,
181 F.3d 538, 542 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding agency’s failure
to consider affidavit from applicant’s spouse to be harmless,
where most of affidavit related to issue upon which applicant
prevailed in agency proceedings and balance of affidavit did not
undermine BIA’s reasoning). The IJ’s failure to fully assess
Woldegiorgis’s uncontroverted factual statements prejudiced
Amenu in at least two respects. First, such failure caused the
26
IJ to overlook how those corroborative facts lend credence to
Amenu’s claim that the EPRDF is aware of her EPRP activities
because of her association with Woldegiorgis and participation
in monitored demonstrations. Second, such failure resulted in
the IJ overlooking the possibility that the EPRDF might become
aware of and persecute Amenu, not only because of her level of
EPRP activities, but also because of her visible association
with a prominent opposition figure whose social and political
activities the EPRDF monitors.
IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we grant Amenu’s petition for
review, vacate the BIA Order, and remand for such other and
further proceedings as may be appropriate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED;
VACATED AND REMANDED
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