UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5240
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOSHUA B. HENDRIX,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (8:08-cr-00429-GRA-1)
Submitted: May 31, 2011 Decided: June 15, 2011
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lora E. Collins, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William Corley Lucius, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Joshua B. Hendrix appeals the revocation of his
supervised release and the imposition of a sentence of twelve
months and one day in prison. Hendrix’s counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning
whether the district court abused its discretion in revoking
Hendrix’s supervised release and in imposing sentence. Hendrix
was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief,
but has not filed a brief. The Government declined to file a
brief.
We review a district court’s judgment revoking
supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th
Cir. 1999). To revoke supervised release, a district court need
only find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a
preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006).
Our review of the record, which includes Hendrix’s admission
that he committed the alleged violations, leads us to conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking
Hendrix’s supervised release.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is not plainly unreasonable. United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). In
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making this determination, we first consider whether the
sentence imposed is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). A
sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court has
considered the policy statements contained in Chapter 7 of the
Guidelines and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)
factors, Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439, and has adequately explained
the sentence chosen, though it need not explain the sentence in
as much detail as when imposing the original sentence.
Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547. A sentence is substantively
reasonable if the district court states a proper basis for its
imposition of a sentence up to the statutory maximum. Crudup,
461 F.3d at 439. In this initial inquiry, we take a more
deferential posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise
of discretion than in applying reasonableness review to
Guidelines sentences. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652,
656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if we find the sentence unreasonable
must we decide whether it is plainly so. Id. at 657. We have
carefully reviewed the record and conclude that the sentence
imposed after Hendrix’s supervised release revocation was not
plainly unreasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly,
we affirm the district court’s judgment. The court requires
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that counsel inform Hendrix, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Hendrix requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Hendrix.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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