In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 09-3654
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JEFFREY D EAN C HAMBERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 3:08-cr-30057-JES-BGC-1—Jeanne E. Scott, Judge.
A RGUED JANUARY 14, 2011—D ECIDED JUNE 16, 2011
Before B AUER, W OOD and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges.
B AUER, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted defendant-ap-
pellant Jeffrey Dean Chambers of attempting to entice
a minor under the age of eighteen to engage in sexual
activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and of
knowingly transporting child pornography in interstate
commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1). The
district court sentenced Chambers to 240 months’ im-
prisonment. Chambers challenges the sufficiency of the
2 No. 09-3654
evidence used to prove the attempted enticement charge
and the admission of certain evidence under Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b). For the following reasons, we
affirm Chambers’ convictions.
I. BACKGROUND
In March 2006, Chambers entered an American Online
(“AOL”) chat room entitled “I Love Much Older Men,” and
using the screen name “jefdean60,” initiated contact with
the screen name “Riverprincess.” The online profile for
“Riverprincess” revealed that the user was a 14-year-old
girl named Kendal; in actuality the girl was an under-
cover police detective named Carrie Smithberger. Over
a span of fourteen months, Chambers contacted Kendal
hundreds of times, engaging in sexually explicit online
chats, e-mails, text messages, and telephone conversations.
While partaking in the online relationship with Kendal,
Chambers continued to initiate contact with other
young users of the “I Love Much Older Men” chat room.
On May 21, 2006, Federal Bureau of Investigation Special
Agent Jonathon Cook, under the guise of a 13-year-old
girl named Jen with the screen name “Jensluv2cheer,”
entered into the same AOL chat room, and Chambers
initiated a conversation. During this single conversa-
tion, Chambers inquired about Jen’s appearance and
sexual development, spoke in sexually suggestive lan-
guage, sent Jen a sexually explicit image of what he
claimed was himself, and told Jen he was masturbating
and asked her to do the same “to make the experience
better for him.”
No. 09-3654 3
Approximately one year later in March 2007, Chambers,
again using the screen name jefdean60, initiated contact
with “Kaitlynm13” in the AOL chat room “I Love Much
Older Men.” The user of this screen name was actually
Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Wade
Luders, posing as a 13-year-old female named Kaitlyn.
During the chat with Kaitlyn, Chambers used sexually
explicit language and e-mailed Kaitlyn pornographic
pictures of both adults and children as well as videos of
minors being sexually abused and engaging in sexual
acts. Chambers then asked Kaitlyn if she would perform
sexual acts and send him pictures.
On June 13, 2007, federal agents obtained a search
warrant to search Chambers’ residence and seized Cham-
bers’ computer and other evidence linking Chambers to
Kendal. During the execution of the search warrant,
Chambers consented to an interview by an agent at
his home. Chambers admitted that he frequented AOL
chat rooms and was interested in chatting with young
females. He admitted that he had engaged in sexual
conversations with “Riverprincess” and other minors,
and that he sent her and other minors pornographic
images. He said that he discussed meeting the minors
to have sex but never actually intended to do so.
Chambers was charged with two counts of knowingly
transporting child pornography in interstate commerce
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) for sending child
pornography to Detective Smithberger, under the alias
Kendal, and to Special Agent Luders, under the alias
Kaitlyn.
4 No. 09-3654
When plea negotiations failed to resolve the issues,
the government filed a superceding indictment adding a
count charging enticement of a minor in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) for Chambers’ contact with Detective
Smithberger, under the alias Kendal.
Chambers was tried by a jury. The district court, over
Chambers’ objections, admitted several pieces of evidence
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), each of which
was offered primarily to prove “grooming,” motive, and
intent. First, the court allowed into evidence Chambers’
Internet chat and e-mails with Special Agent Luders,
under the alias Kaitlyn. Specifically, the government
introduced evidence that Chambers sent pornography
to Kaitlyn and that he chatted with Kaitlyn about
graphic sexual topics and a previous sexual encounter
with his ex-girlfriend’s 14-year-old daughter. Second, the
court admitted into evidence Chambers’ Internet chat
with Special Agent Cook, under the alias Jen. The gov-
ernment offered a one-and-a-half-hour-long chat log
between Chambers and Jen which was filled with sex-
ually graphic language. In that conversation, Chambers
described how he had sexual intercourse with the 14-year-
old daughter of an ex-girlfriend and inquired into
having sexual intercourse with Jen. Finally, the court
admitted twenty-two child pornography images found
on Chambers’ computer, most of which were not related
to the charges. The images were entered by the govern-
ment to establish Chambers’ ability to transfer porno-
graphic images to the undercover agents, as well as to
demonstrate Chambers’ sexual feelings toward children.
No. 09-3654 5
A jury found Chambers guilty on all three counts.
Chambers now appeals his convictions.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Evidence of Attempted Enticement of a Minor
Chambers argues that the government produced insuf-
ficient evidence to prove the attempted enticement
charge. We give a jury verdict great deference and will
uphold the verdict if, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Hicks, 368
F.3d 801, 804-05 (7th Cir. 2004).
Chambers filed a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of
acquittal and a Rule 33 motion for a new trial pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which were
both denied by the court. We review a Rule 29 motion
de novo, accepting the factual findings in the light most
favorable to the government. United States v. Jones, 222
F.3d 349, 351 (7th Cir. 2000). When evaluating a Rule 33
motion for a new trial, our task is to determine whether
the verdict is so contrary to the weight of evidence
that a new trial is required in the interests of justice.
United States v. Washington, 184 F.3d 653, 657 (7th Cir.
1999).
The jury convicted Chambers under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b),
which makes it a crime to use interstate commerce to
attempt or to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or
coerce any individual under the age of eighteen to
engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which
6 No. 09-3654
any individual can be charged with a criminal offense.
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006). To prove the attempt of
this crime, the prosecution must show that Chambers
intended to complete the crime and had taken a “sub-
stantial step” toward its completion. United States v.
Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2008). The term “sub-
stantial step” can be an elusive concept, but has been
described as more than mere preparation, but less than
the last act necessary before actual commission of the
crime. United States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809, 821 (7th
Cir. 1985). A substantial step occurs when a person’s
actions make it reasonably clear that had he not been
interrupted or made a mistake, he would have com-
pleted the crime. Gladish, 536 F.3d at 648.
Chambers argues that he neither intended to meet
Kendal nor took a substantial step toward meeting
Kendal. Chambers’ argument that evidence of intent is
lacking is unconvincing. He argues that his failure to
meet Kendal after fourteen months of chatting online
indicates that there was no intent to actually meet her, and
that no reasonable jury could conclude beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that his actions were more than just “a
bunch of talk.” Chambers also emphasizes the testimony
of FBI Agent Christopher Lamb—one of the agents who
interviewed Chambers upon his arrest—who testified
that Chambers said he never intended to meet any
minors in person. Nevertheless, the jury was entitled to
conclude from the evidence that Chambers’ intent was to
meet Kendal for sex and not just talk about it. The jury
did not have to believe Chambers when he said he had
no intention to meet Kendal and the jury was instructed
No. 09-3654 7
as much. A reasonable jury could have found intent
based on the evidence presented by the government.
Chambers next argues that because he did not travel
to meet Kendal, there was no substantial step. While it
is true that Chambers never traveled to meet Kendal,
“travel is not a sine qua non of finding a substantial step.”
United States v. Zawada, 552 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir. 2008)
(conviction for enticement upheld when the defendant
and purported minor never met, but the two had a
concrete conversation about where and when they
would meet and the defendant ensured the purported
minor was taking birth control); Gladish, 536 F.3d at 649
(citing Doe v. Smith, 470 F.3d 331, 345 n. 23 (7th Cir.
2006)). The Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have
all found that “when a defendant initiates conversation
with a minor, describes the sexual acts that he would
like to perform on the minor, and proposes a rendezvous
to perform those acts, he has crossed the line toward
persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a minor to
engage in unlawful sexual activity.” United States v.
Goetzke, 494 F.3d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 2007).1
1
Goetzke cited the following cases in support of this proposi-
tion: United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 469 (3d Cir.
2006) (concluding that instant messages arranging a meeting
with a purported minor and appearing at the meeting
place provided sufficient evidence of a substantial step
toward persuading or inducing a minor); United States v.
Thomas, 410 F.3d 1235, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that
the defendant’s initiation of sexual online chats with the
(continued...)
8 No. 09-3654
We recognize that child sexual abuse can be accom-
plished by several means and is often carried out
through a period of grooming. United States v. Berg,
No. 09-2498, 2011 WL 1238309, at *13 (7th Cir. Apr. 5, 2011)
(“[Section 2422(b)] targets the sexual grooming of minors
as well as the actual sexual exploitation of them. The
statute’s focus is on the intended effect on the minor
rather than the defendant’s intent to engage in sexual
activity.”); United States v. Hensley, 574 F.3d 384, 391 (7th
Cir. 2009); Gladish, 536 F.3d at 649. Grooming refers to
deliberate actions taken by a defendant to expose a child
to sexual material; the ultimate goal of grooming is the
formation of an emotional connection with the child and
a reduction of the child’s inhibitions in order to
prepare the child for sexual activity. Doe v. Liberatore, 478
F.Supp.2d 742, 749-50 (M.D. Pa. 2007); Sana Loue, “Legal
and Epidemiological Aspects of Child Maltreatment,” 19
J. Legal Med. 471, 479 (1998).
Here, there is significant evidence that Chambers was
grooming Kendal. He used many common grooming
methods during his communications with Kendal; he
spoke to her in sexually explicit terms, e-mailed her
adult and child pornography, discussed sexual activities
with her and instructed her on how to arouse herself,
1
(...continued)
purported minor and attempting to make arrangements to
meet were a substantial step); United States v. Bailey, 228
F.3d 637, 639-40 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the defendant’s
attempts to schedule meetings with minors constituted a
substantial step).
No. 09-3654 9
told her that he had sexual intercourse for years with
his ex-girlfriend’s 14-year-old daughter, and otherwise
attempted to prepare her for a sexual encounter with
him by discussing in graphic detail how the act would
occur. In addition to grooming Kendal, Chambers took
other preparatory actions to establish his intent and a
substantial step toward the completion of the crime.
Chambers and Kendal repeatedly discussed specific
plans to meet, including several exact meeting points,
and discussed in detail how Kendal would sneak out of
her house. Chambers obtained her home address, exam-
ined maps of her neighborhood, and inquired about
motels within walking distance of her home. He also
invited Kendal to travel at his expense to meet him
where he lived in Illinois because he was concerned
about driving after a recent DUI conviction. He formu-
lated a plan to meet Kendal on an Amtrak train in or
near Kendal’s hometown in Ohio so that he could have
sex with her on the train. Chambers further prepared
for his encounter with Kendal by confirming that Kendal
was taking birth control and by purchasing Viagra
for his own use during the encounter. Furthermore,
Chambers evidenced concern that Kendal was a police
officer and repeatedly inquired about nude pictures of
her. When Kendal responded that she had no means to
send him pictures, Chambers obtained a web camera to
mail to her. While the plans to meet never culminated in
a meeting, it was more a substantial step than “a bunch
of talk.”
While speech alone is not enough to establish a “sub-
stantial step,” Gladish, 536 F.3d at 650, here, a reasonable
jury could conclude that Chambers’ actions amounted
10 No. 09-3654
to more than mere “hot air” or “a bunch of talk.” The jury’s
verdict was not so contrary to the weight of evidence
that a new trial is warranted, and we affirm the denial
of Chambers’ Rule 33 and Rule 29 motions.
B. Rule 404(b) Evidence
Chambers’ second challenge is to the admission of
certain evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).
The district court, over Chambers’ objections, admitted
evidence under Rule 404(b) of Chambers’ Internet chats
with Special Agent Luders, Internet chats with Special
Agent Cook, and images of child pornography found
on Chambers’ computer.2 A trial court’s evidentiary
rulings will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing
of abuse of discretion. United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d
394, 398 (7th Cir. 1985).
As a general matter, all relevant evidence is admissible.
Fed. R. Evid. 402. However, Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is inadmissible to prove a defendant’s
propensity to commit the charged crime. Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b). This type of evidence may be admissible
for other purposes though, such as “motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or ab-
2
In a pre-trial hearing regarding the admissibility of this
proposed Rule 404(b) evidence, the district court judge believed
that the pornographic images and the chats were actually
part of the res gestae of the case, but nonetheless completed
a Rule 404(b) analysis.
No. 09-3654 11
sence of mistake or accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). But,
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides for the exclusion
of relevant evidence that is unfairly prejudicial to
the defendant. Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Evidence is unfairly
prejudicial only if it will induce the jury to decide the
case on an improper basis, commonly an emotional one,
rather than on the evidence presented.” United States
v. Zahursky, 580 F.3d 515, 525 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing
United States v. Harris, 536 F.3d 798, 809 (7th Cir. 2008)).
Courts employ a four-part test to determine whether
evidence of prior acts is admissible under Rule 404(b)
and will find that evidence was properly admitted if:
(1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter
in issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit
the crime charged; (2) the evidence shows that the other
act is similar enough and close enough in time to be
relevant to the matter in issue; (3) the evidence is suf-
ficient to support a jury finding that the defendant com-
mitted the similar act; and (4) the probative value of the
evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice. United States v. Asher, 178 F.3d 486,
492 (7th Cir. 1999).
Chambers challenges the first and fourth factors of this
analysis, arguing that the evidence was probative only
on his propensity to entice minors and that the evidence
should not have been admissible because any probative
value of the evidence was substantially outweighed
by unfair prejudice. He then maintains that the district
court did not give a cautionary limiting instruction to
cure any prejudice.
12 No. 09-3654
First, Chambers objects to the admission of his chat
with Special Agent Luders, posing as Kaitlyn, arguing
that the evidence was not probative because he was not
charged with attempted enticement of Kaitlyn. This is
true, but the statements in this chat are highly proba-
tive on the child pornography transportation charge.
Chambers sent Kaitlyn images and video of adult and child
pornography, and this conversation was properly admitted
to prove intent and absence of mistake.
Next, Chambers objects to the admission of his chat
with Special Agent Cook, under the name Jen, arguing
that the chat demonstrates nothing more than Chambers’
propensity to entice minors. In this chat, along with
the chats with Special Agent Luders and Detective
Smithberger, Chambers spoke in sexually explicit
language and boasted about having sex with his ex-girl-
friend’s 14-year-old daughter multiple times over the
course of two years. The government argues that the
first prong is satisfied because the information regarding
a possible prior sexual act with a minor, as well as the
sexually explicit nature of the chat, is admissible to show
motive and intent. We agree. “Prior instances of
sexual misconduct with a child victim may establish a
defendant’s sexual interest in children and thereby serve
as evidence of the defendant’s motive to commit a
charged offense involving the sexual exploitation of
children.” United States v. Sebolt, 460 F.3d 910, 917 (7th
Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Cunningham, 103 F.3d
553, 556 (7th Cir. 1996)); see Zahursky, 580 F.3d at 524.
Finally, Chambers argues that the district court abused
its discretion in admitting twenty-two images of child
No. 09-3654 13
pornography on Chambers’ computer. Only one of those
images pertained to his charges, specifically Count III
involving transporting child pornography to Special
Agent Luders. The extensive supply of pornographic
images of children on Chambers’ computer makes that
evidence probative as to Chambers’ motive and intent.
It demonstrates Chambers’ ability to transport child
pornography to Detective Smithberger and Special Agent
Luders, as well as his sexual inclination towards children.
“That evidence may be highly prejudicial does not
compel its exclusion; the evidence must be unfairly prej-
udicial.” Zahursky, 580 F.3d at 525. While Chambers is
correct that evidence of child pornography and sexual
chats with young girls may be prejudicial, we agree
with the district court that it was not unfairly prejudicial
toward him.
Chambers relies on United States v. Ciesiolka in arguing
unfair prejudice, a case in which we reversed the district
court’s admission of Rule 404(b) evidence. United States
v. Ciesiolka, 614 F.3d 347, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). However, the
Ciesiolka court never reached the issue of whether the
evidence was unfairly prejudicial because the court felt
compelled to reverse and remand the case based on the
district court’s failure to explain its reasoning for ad-
mitting the evidence and give a proper limiting instruc-
tion. Here, the district court did explain its reasoning in
more than a “bare-bones conclusion,” and the evidence
was much less voluminous and took up a much smaller
portion of the trial than in Ciesiolka. The Ciesiolka opinion
does not provide support for Chambers’ case. Further-
more, the record makes clear that the district court
14 No. 09-3654
judge provided a limiting instruction to the jury re-
garding the evidence entered under Rule 404(b). “Absent
any showing that the jury could not follow the court’s
limiting instruction, we presume that the jury limited its
consideration of the testimony in accordance with the
court’s instruction.” Zahursky, 580 F.3d at 525-26 (quoting
United States v. Lee, 558 F.3d 638, 649 (7th Cir. 2009)).
Chambers has not attempted to show that the jury could
not follow the court’s limiting instruction. Therefore,
we assume that the instruction removed any unfair preju-
dice. See id. (citing United States v. Vargas, 552 F.3d 550,
557 (7th Cir. 2008)).
Chambers asserts that this evidence was “sure to
disgust the jury toward Chambers.” Sexual abuse of a
child or the attempt thereof is a disgusting crime and
any evidence of it is no doubt unfavorable to the defen-
dant, but here it was not unfairly prejudicial. We find
no abuse of discretion by the district court in admitting
the challenged evidence.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we A FFIRM Chambers’ con-
victions.
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